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ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH
AND STATE.

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ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE
CHURCH AND STATE,

ACCORDING TO THE IDEA OF EACH.

BY

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE. *W*

EDITED FROM THE AUTHOR'S CORRECTED COPY, WITH NOTES,

By HENRY NELSON COLERIDGE, M.A.

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"O THAT our Clergy did but know and see that their tithes and glebes belong to them as officers and functionaries of the Nationalty,—as clerks, and not exclusively as theologians, and not at all as ministers of the Gospel;—but that they are likewise ministers of the Church of Christ, and that their claims and the powers of that Church are no more alienated or affected by their being at the same time the Established Clergy, than by the common coincidence of their being justices of the peace, or heirs to an estate, or stockholders! The Romish divines placed the Church above the Scriptures: our present divines give it no place at all.

"But Donne and his great contemporaries had not yet learnt to be afraid of announcing and enforcing the claims of the Church, distinct from, and coordinate with, the Scriptures. This is one evil consequence, though most unnecessarily so, of the union of the Church of Christ with the National Church, and of the claims of the Christian pastor and preacher with the legal and constitutional rights and revenues of the officers of the National Clerisy. Our Clergymen, in thinking of their legal rights, forget those rights of theirs which depend on no human law at all."—*Literary Remains*, vol. iii. p. 119.

PREFACE TO THE CHURCH AND STATE.

A RECOLLECTION of the value set upon the following little work by its Author,* combined with a deep sense of the wisdom and importance of the positions laid down in it, will, it is hoped, be thought to justify the publication of a few preliminary remarks, designed principally to remove formal difficulties out of the path of a reader not previously acquainted with Mr. Coleridge's writings, nor conversant with the principles of his philosophy. The truth is that, although the Author's plan is well defined and the treatment strictly progressive, there is in some parts a want of detailed illustration and express connexion, which weakens the impression of the entire work on the generality of readers. "If," says Mr. Maurice, "I were addressing a student

* See *Table Talk*, 2nd edit. p. 5, note.

who was seeking to make up his mind on the question, without being previously biassed by the views of any particular party, I could save myself this trouble by merely referring him to the work of Mr. Coleridge, on the Idea of Church and State, published shortly after the passing of the Roman Catholic Bill. The hints respecting the nature of the Christian Church which are thrown out in that work are only sufficient to make us wish that the Author had developed his views more fully; but the portion of it which refers to the State seems to me in the highest degree satisfactory. When I use the word satisfactory, I do not mean that it will satisfy the wishes of any person who thinks that the epithets *teres atque rotundus* are the highest that can be applied to a scientific work; who expects an author to furnish him with a complete system which he can carry away in his memory, and, after it has received a few improvements from himself, can hawk it about to the public or to a set of admiring disciples. Men of this description would regard Mr. Coleridge's book as disorderly and fragmentary; but those who have some notion of what Butler meant when he said, that the best writer would be he who merely stated his premisses, and left his readers to work out

the conclusions for themselves;—those who feel that they want just the assistance which Socrates offered to his scholars—assistance, not in providing them with thoughts, but in bringing forth into the light thoughts which they had within them before;—these will acknowledge that Mr. Coleridge has only deserted the common high way of exposition,—that he might follow more closely the turnings and windings which the mind of an earnest thinker makes when it is groping after the truth to which he wishes to conduct it. To them, therefore, the book is satisfactory by reason of those very qualities which make it alike unpleasant to the formal school-man and to the man of the world. And, accordingly, scarcely any book, published so recently, and producing so little apparent effect, has really exercised a more decided influence over the thoughts and feelings of men who ultimately rule the mass of their countrymen.” *

Under these circumstances, the following argument or summary of the fundamental and more complicated portion of the work may be serviceable to the ingenuous but less experienced reader.

I.—The constitution of the State and the Church

* *Kingdom of Christ*, vol. iii. p. 2 (first edition). A work of singular originality and power. (See Dedication to the Second Edition.)

is treated according to the Idea of each. By the Idea of the State or Church is here meant that conception, which is not abstracted from any particular form or mode in which either may happen to exist at any given time, nor yet generalised from any number or succession of such forms or modes, but which is produced by a knowledge or sense of the ultimate aim of each. This idea, or sense of the ultimate aim, may exist, and powerfully influence a man's thoughts and actions, without his being able to express it in definite words, and even without his being distinctly conscious of its indwelling. A few may possess ideas in this meaning;—the generality of mankind are possessed by them. In either case, an idea, so understood, is in order of thought always and of necessity contemplated as antecedent,—a mere conception, strictly defined as an abstraction or generalisation from one or more particular forms or modes, is necessarily posterior, in order of thought, to the thing thus conceived. And though the idea is in its nature a prophecy, yet it must be carefully remembered that the particular form, construction, or model, best fitted to render the idea intelligible to a third person, is not necessarily—perhaps, not most commonly—the mode or form in which it actually arrives at realisation.

For in consequence of the imperfection of means and materials in all the works of man, a law of compensation and a principle of compromise are perpetually active : and it is the first condition of a sound philosophy of State to recognise the wide extent of the one, the necessity of the other, and the frequent occurrence of both.

II.—The word State is used in two senses,—a larger, in which it comprises, and a narrower, in which it is opposed to, the National Church. A Constitution is the ideal attribute of a State in the larger sense, as a body politic having the principle of its unity within itself; and it is the law or principle which prescribes the means and conditions by and under which that unity is established and preserved. The Constitution, therefore, of this Nation comprises the idea of a Church and a State in the narrower sense, placed in simple antithesis one to another. The unity of the State, in this latter sense, results from the equipoise and interdependence of the two great opposite interests of every such State, its Permanence and its Progression. The permanence of a State is connected with the land; its progression with the mercantile, manufacturing, distributive, and professional classes. The first class is subdivided into what our law

books have called Major and Minor Barons ;—both of these subdivisions, as such, being opposed to the representatives of the progressive interest of the nation, yet the latter of them drawing more nearly to the antagonist order than the former. Upon these facts the principle of the Constitution of the State, in its narrower sense, was established. The balance of permanence and progression was secured by a legislature of two Houses ; the first, consisting wholly of the Major Barons or landholders ; the second, of the Minor Barons or knights, as the representatives of the remaining landed community, together with the Burgesses, as representing the commercial, manufacturing, distributive, and professional classes—the latter constituting the effectual majority in number. The King, in whom the executive power was vested, was in regard to the interests of the State, in its antithetic sense, the beam of the scales.

This is the Idea of that State, not its history ; it has been the standard or aim, the *Lex Legum*, which, in the very first law of State ever promulgated in the land, was pre-supposed as the ground of that first law.

III.—But the English Constitution results from the harmonious opposition of two institutions, the

State, in the narrower sense, and the Church. For as by the composition of the one provision was alike made for permanence, and progression in wealth and personal freedom; to the other was committed the only remaining interest of the State in its larger sense, that of maintaining and advancing the moral cultivation of the people themselves, without which neither of the former could continue to exist.

IV.—It was common, at least to the Scandinavian, Keltic, and Gothic, with the Semitic tribes, if not universal in all the primitive races, that in taking possession of a new country, and in the division of the land into heritable estates among the individual warriors or heads of families, a Reserve should be made for the Nation itself. The sum total of these heritable portions is called the Propriety, the Reserve the Nationalty. These were constituent factors of the commonwealth; the existence of the one being the condition of the rightfulness of the other. But the wealth appropriated was not so entirely a property as not to remain, to a certain extent, national; nor was the wealth reserved so exclusively national as not to admit an individual tenure. The settlement of the Nationalty in one tribe only of the Hebrew confederacy, subservient

as it was to a higher purpose, was in itself a deviation from the idea, and a main cause of the comparatively little effect which the Levitical establishment produced on the moral and intellectual character of the Jewish people during the whole period of their existence as an independent state.

V.—The Nationalty was reserved for the maintenance of a permanent class or order, the Clerisy, Clerks, Clergy, or Church of the Nation. This class comprised the learned of all denominations, the professors of all those arts and sciences, the possession and application of which constitute the civilisation of a country. Theology formed only a part of the objects of the National Church. The theologians took the lead, indeed, and deservedly so ;—not because they were priests, but because under the name of theology were contained the study of languages, history, logic, ethics, and a philosophy of ideas ; because the science of theology itself was the root of the knowledges that civilise man, and gave unity and the circulating sap of life to all other sciences ; and because, under the same name were comprised all the main aids, instruments, and materials of National Education. Accordingly, a certain smaller portion of the functionaries of the

Clerisy were to remain at the fountain heads of the humanities, cultivating and enlarging the knowledge already possessed, watching over the interests of physical and moral science, and the instructors of all the remaining more numerous classes of the order. These last were to be distributed throughout the country, so as not to leave even the smallest integral division without a resident guide, guardian, and teacher, diffusing through the whole community the knowledge indispensable for the understanding of its rights, and for the performance of the correspondent duties. But neither Christianity, nor *a fortiori*, any particular scheme of theology supposed to be deduced from it, forms any essential part of the being of a National Church, however conducive it may be to its well being. A National Church may exist, and has existed, without, because before, the institution of the Christian Church, as the Levitical Church in the Hebrew, and the Druidical in the Keltic, constitutions may prove.

VI.—But two distinct functions do not necessarily imply or require two different functionaries : on the contrary, the perfection of each may require the union of both in the same person. And in the instance now in question, as great and grievous errors have arisen from confounding the functions

of the National Church with those of the Church of Christ, so fearfully great and grievous will be the evils from the success of an attempt to separate them.

VII.—In process of time, however, and as a natural consequence of the expansion of the mercantile and commercial order, the students and professors of those sciences and sorts of learning, the use and necessity of which were perpetual to the Nation, but only occasional to the Individuals, gradually detached themselves from the National Clerisy, and passed over, as it were, to that order, with the growth and thriving condition of which their particular emoluments were found to increase in equal proportion. And hence by slow degrees the learned in the several departments of law, medicine, architecture and the like, contributed to form, under the common name of Professional, an intermediate link between the national clerisy and the simple burgesses.

VIII.—But this circumstance cannot alter the tenure, or annul the rights, of those who remained, and who, as members of the permanent learned class, were planted throughout the realm as the immediate agents and instruments in the work of increasing and perpetuating the civilisation of the

nation ; and who, thus fulfilling the purposes for which the Nationalty was reserved, are entitled to remain its usufructuary trustees. The proceeds of the Nationalty, might, indeed, in strictness, if it could ever be expedient, be rightfully transferred to functionaries other than such as are also ministers of the Church of Christ. But the Nationalty itself cannot, without foul wrong to the nation, be alienated from its original purposes ; and those who being duly appointed thereto, exercise the functions and perform the duties attached to the Nationalty, possess a right to the same by a title to which the thunders from Mount Sinai might give greater authority, but not additional evidence.

IX.—Previously to the sixteenth century, large masses were alienated from the heritable proprieties of the realm, and confounded with the Nationalty under the common name of Church property. At the period of the Reformation a re-transfer of these took place, and rightfully so : but together with, and under pretext of, this restoration to the State of what properly belonged to it, a wholesale usurpation took place of a very large portion of that which belonged to the Church. This was a sacrilegious robbery on the Nation, and a deadly wound on the constitution of the State at large. The

balance of the reserved and appropriated wealth of the Nation was deranged, and thus the former became unequal to the support of the entire burthen of popular civilisation originally intended to be borne by it.* Barely enough—indeed, less than enough—was left for the effectual maintenance of the primary class of the Clerisy, which had not fallen off into separate professions, but continued to be the proper servants of the public in producing and reproducing, in preserving, promoting, and perfecting all the necessary sources and conditions of the civilisation of the Nation itself.†

X.—Though many things may detract from the comparative fitness of individuals, or of particular classes, for the trust and functions of the Nationalty,

* “Give back to the Church what the Nation originally consecrated to its use, and it ought then to be charged with the education of the people; but half of the original revenue has been already taken by force from her, or lost to her through desuetude, legal decision, or public opinion: and are those whose very houses and parks are part and parcel of what the Nation designed for the general purposes of the Clergy, to be heard, when they argue for making the Church support, out of her diminished revenues, institutions, the intended means for maintaining which they themselves hold under the sanction of legal robbery?” *Table Talk*, Pref. p. xvi. 2nd edit.

† See an approach to an expression of the Author’s idea of the National Church thus regarded, in the Bishop of London’s late Charge, Oct. 1838, p. 2, &c.

there are only two absolute disqualifications;—allegiance to a foreign power, or the acknowledgment of any other visible head of the National Church but the King;—and compulsory celibacy, in connexion with, and dependence on, a foreign and extra-national head.

XI.—The legitimate objects of the power of the King and the two Houses of Parliament, as constituting the State, in its special and antithetic sense, comprise, according to the idea, all the interests and concerns of the Propriety, and rightfully those alone.

XII.—The King, again, is the Head of the National Clerisy, and the supreme trustee of the Nationalty; the power of which, in relation to its proper objects is rightfully exercised, according to the idea, by the King and the two Houses of Convocation, and by them alone. The proper objects of this power are mentioned in No. V.

XIII.—The Coronation Oath neither does, nor can, bind the conscience of the King in matters of faith. But it binds him to refuse his consent (without which no change in the existing law can be effected) to any measure subverting or tending to subvert the safety and independence of the National Church, or which may expose the realm to

the danger of a return of that foreign Usurper, misnamed spiritual, from which it has with so many sacrifices emancipated itself. And previously to the ceremonial act which announces the King the only lawful and sovereign head of both the Church and the State, this oath is administered to him religiously as the representative person and crowned majesty of the Nation ;—religiously ; for the mind of the Nation, existing only as an idea, can act distinguishably on the ideal powers alone,—that is, on the reason and conscience.

The several other points comprised in the remainder of this work, though of great interest and importance, require neither analysis nor comment for their perfect comprehension. But it will naturally occur to the reader to consider how far the idea of the Church and of its relation to the State presented in these pages coincides with either of the two celebrated systems, those of Hooker and Warburton, which, under one shape or another, have divided the opinions of thinking persons up to the present day.

According to Hooker, the Church is one body,—the essential unity of which consists in, and is known by, an external profession of Christianity,

without regard in any respect had to the moral virtues or spiritual graces of any member of that body. "If by external profession they be Christians, then are they of the visible Church of Christ: and Christians by external profession they are all, whose mark of recognisance hath in it those things which we have mentioned, yea, although they be impious idolaters, wicked heretics, persons excommunicable, yea, and cast out for notorious improbity. Such withal we deny not to be the imps and limbs of Satan, even as long as they continue such." (—E. P. III. c. i. s. 7. *Keble's* edit. vol. i. p. 431.)

With this Warburton and Coleridge in general terms agree. (*Alliance*, &c. II. c. ii. s. 2.—*Church and State*, p. 139.) And the words of the nineteenth Article, though apparently of a more restricted import, may be presumed not to mean less.

But, further, Hooker insists that the Church, existing in any particular country, and the State are one and the same society, contemplated in two different relations. "A Commonwealth we name it simply in regard of some regiment or policy under which men live; a Church for the truth of that religion which they profess. * * * When we oppose the Church, therefore, and the Commonwealth in a Christian society, we mean by the

Commonwealth that society with relation unto all the public affairs thereof, only the matter of true religion excepted ; by the Church, the same society with only reference unto the matter of true religion, without any other affairs besides: when that society, which is both a Church and a Commonwealth, doth flourish in those things which belong unto it as a Commonwealth, we then say, ‘the Commonwealth doth flourish ;’ when in those things which concern it as a Church, ‘the Church doth flourish ;’ when in both, then ‘the Church and Commonwealth flourish together.’” (E. P. VIII. c. i. s. 5. vol. iii. p. 420—1.)

To this view Warburton, as is well known, is directly opposed. He argues that, although two societies may be so closely related to each other as to have one common *suppositum*,—that is, the same natural persons being exclusively members of each,—the societies themselves, as such, are factitious bodies, and each of them must therefore of necessity be distinct in personality and will from the other. “The artificial man, society, is much unlike the natural ; who being created for several ends hath several interests to pursue, and several relations to consult, and may therefore be considered under several capacities, as a religious, a

civil, and a rational animal ; and yet they all make but one and the same man. But one and the same political society cannot be considered in one view, as a religious—in another, as a civil—and in another, as a literary—community. One society can be precisely but one of these communities.” (*Alliance*, &c. ii. c. v.) Accordingly Warburton insists, in opposition to Hooker, that the Puritan premiss,—that the Church and the State are distinct and originally independent societies,—was and is the truth ; but he denies the Puritan inference, that such independency must therefore be perpetual ;—affirming the existence of an alliance between these two societies upon certain terms ; and a resulting mutual inter-dependency of one on the other ; whereby the consequence from the position of the Puritans—an *imperium in imperio*, or subjugation of the State to the Church,—and the consequence from the position of Hooker—the enslavement of the Church by the State—are equally precluded. The Church subordinates itself to the State upon faith of certain stipulations for support by the latter ; and if the State violates, or withdraws from the fulfilment of, those stipulations, the Church is thereby remitted to her original independence.*

* It is worthy of remark that, if Warburton had lived in

Now so far as the distinct inter-dependency of the State and the Church is in question, Coleridge agrees with Warburton. But the peculiarity of his system, as expressly laid down in this work and incidentally mentioned in many of his other writings,—a peculiarity fruitful in the most important consequences—is grounded on a distinction taken between the visible Church of Christ, as localised in any Christian country, and the National or Established Church of that country. *Distinction*, be it observed, not separation,—for the two ideas

—*bene conveniunt, et in una sede morantur* ;

they not only may co-exist in the same *suppositum*, but may require an identity of subject in order to the complete development of the perfections of either. According to Coleridge, then, the Christian Church is not a kingdom or realm of this world, nor a member of any such kingdom or realm ; it is not opposed to any particular State in the large

these days, and had adhered to the principles advocated by him in this treatise, he must several years ago have declared the terms of convention between the Church and State in this country violated by the latter, and the alliance of the two at an end. See his third book, and especially the second chapter. It is to be observed, also, that Warburton confounds the Christian with the Established Church as much as Hooker. See B. II. c. iii. 3.

or narrow sense of the word; it is in no land national, and the national Reserve is not entrusted to its charge. It is, on the contrary, the opposite to the World only; the counterforce to the evils and defects of States, as such, in the abstract,—asking of any particular State neither wages nor dignities, but demanding protection, that is, to be let alone.

With so much therefore of the preceding and all other theories as considers any branch of the Church of Christ, *as such*, in the character of a National Establishment, and arrogates to it, *as such*, upon any ground, worldly riches, rank or power—Coleridge is directly at variance. But we have already seen (V. VI. VII. VIII.) that there is, nevertheless, in this and in almost every other country raised above the level of barbarism, a Church, which is strictly and indefeasibly National; and in the ideal history herein presented of its origin and primary elements, its endowment, its uses, duties, ends, and objects, its relation to the State, and its present representatives, a solemn warning is recorded of the fatal consequences of either confounding it with, or separating it from, the visible Church of Christ.

The Christian Church is a public and visible community, having ministers of its own, whom the

State can neither constitute nor degrade, and whose maintenance amongst Christians is as secure as the command of Christ can make it: for *so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel.* (1 Cor. ix. 14.) The National Church is a public and visible community, having ministers whom the Nation, through the agency of a Constitution, hath created trustees of a reserved national fund, upon fixed terms and with defined duties, and whom, in case of breach of those terms or dereliction of those duties, the Nation, through the same agency, may discharge. "If the former be *Ecclesia*, the communion of such as are called out of the World, that is, in reference to the especial ends and purposes of that communion; the latter might more expressively have been called *Enclesia*, or an order of men chosen in and of the realm, and constituting an estate of the realm."

Now there is no reason why the ministers of the one Church may not also be ministers of the other: there are many reasons why they should be.

When therefore it is objected that Christ's *kingdom is not of this world*, it is admitted to be true; but the text is shown to have no application in the way of impeachment of the titles, emoluments or authorities, of an institution which rightfully *is* of

this world, and would not answer the end of its constitution if it ceased to belong to, and in a certain sense to sympathise with, the world. When again it is alleged that “the best service which men of power can do to Christ is without any more ceremony to sweep all and leave the Church as bare as in the day it was first born”—“that if we give God our hearts and affections, our goods are better bestowed otherwise,”* the spirit and reason of that allegation are humbly submitted to God’s own judgment; but it is at the same time confidently charged in reply, that the notion of the Church, as the established instructress of the people, being improved in efficiency by the reduction of its ministers to a state bordering on mendicancy—can in its flagrant folly be alone attributed to that meanness of thought, which is at once the fruit and the punishment of minds enslaved to party and the world, and rendered indifferent to all truth by an affected toleration of every form of error. When further it is said that the Bishops of the Church of Christ have no vocation to interfere in the legislation of the country, it is granted; but with this parallel assertion, that the Prelates of a National Establishment, charged with the vast and awful

* Hooker, B. V. lxxiv. 17.

task of preserving, increasing and perpetuating the moral culture of the people, have a call to be present, advise, and vote in the National Council, which can only cease to be a right when the representatives of the dearest national interest are denied a voice in the national assembly; and which is no more impaired by the fact of those Prelates sustaining in their individual persons another and still more sacred character than by their being members of a literary club or a botanical society. When, finally, it is insisted to be contrary to justice to compel those who dissent from a religious system either as to its doctrines or its forms of worship, to contribute to the maintenance of its priests and ministers, it is not denied; but it is withal maintained, that a national dedication of funds for the support of a determinate class of men, with the duty of national civilisation to perform, can no more be vacated or qualified by reason of the voluntary secession of such dissenters from that religious system, because the seceders understand the character and obligation of that duty in a way of their own, than the rights of Parliament to levy taxes for the protection of our independence from foreign aggression can be affected by the dogma of rich philanthropists that war is unlawful, and to

pay a shilling towards its support an offence against God.

But after all, it is urged, the funds set apart by the Nation for the support of the National Church are now in fact received by the ministers of the Church of Christ in this country! True; but, according to the idea,—and that idea involves a history and a prophecy of the truth—it is not because they are *such* ministers that they receive those funds, but because, being now the only representatives, as formerly the principal constituents of the National Clerisy or Church, they alone have a commission to carry on the work of national cultivation on national grounds—transmuting and integrating all that the separate professions have achieved in science or art—but, with a range transcending the limits of professional views, or local or temporary interests, applying the product simple and defecated, to the strengthening and subliming of the moral life of the Nation itself.

Such a Church is a principal instrument of the divine providence in the institution and government of human society. But it is not that Church against which we know that Hell shall not prevail.

For when the Nation, fatigued with the weight of dear and glorious recollections, shall resolve to

repudiate its corporate existence and character, and to resolve its mystic unity into the breathing atoms that crowd the surface of the land,—then the national and ancestral Church of England will have an end. But it cannot be destroyed before. It lies within the folds of that marvellous Constitution, which patriots have out-watched the stars to develop and to protect, and is not separable from it. The time may come when it may seem fit to God that both shall perish, for ever, or for a season;—and the sure token of that time will be, when the divorce of scientific from religious education shall have had its full work throughout the length and the breadth of the land. Then although the Church of England may fall, the Church of Christ *in* England will stand erect; and the distinction, lost now in a common splendour, will be better seen and more poignantly felt by that darkening World to which the Christian Church must become a more conspicuous opposite.

———οὐ γὰρ νιν θνατὰ
 φύσις ἀνέρων ἔτικτεν, οὐδὲ
 μήν ποτε λάθα κατακοιμάσκει·
 μέγας ἐν τ α ὕ τ η ῒ Θεός,
 οὐδὲ γηράσκει.

H. N. C.

ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH
AND STATE,

ACCORDING TO THE IDEA OF EACH.

ADVERTISEMENT.*

THE occasion of this little work will be sufficiently explained by an extract from a letter addressed by me to a friend a few years ago :—"You express your wonder that I, who have so often avowed my dislike to the introduction even of the word, religion, in any special sense, in Parliament, or from the mouth of lawyer or statesman, speaking as such ; who have so earnestly contended that religion cannot take on itself the character of law, without *ipso facto* ceasing to be religion, and that law could neither recognise the obligations of religion for its principles, nor become the pretended guardian and protector of the Faith, without degenerating into inquisitorial tyranny ;—that I, who have avowed my belief, that if Sir Matthew Hale's doctrine,† that the Bible was a part of the law

* To the first edition.—*Ed.*

† Hale's expression was "that Christianity is part of the laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion, is to speak in subversion of the law. *The King*

of the land, had been uttered by a Puritan divine instead of a Puritan judge, it would have been quoted at this day as a specimen of Puritanical nonsense and bigotry ;—you express your wonder that I, with all these heresies on my head, should yet withstand the measure of Roman Catholic emancipation, as it is called, and join in opposing Sir Francis Burdett's intended Bill for the repeal of the disqualifying statutes ! And you conclude by asking : but is this true ?

“My answer is : Here are two questions. To the first, namely, is it true that I am unfriendly to what you call Catholic emancipation ?—I reply ; No, the contrary is the truth. There is no inconsistency, however, in approving the thing, and yet having my doubts respecting the manner ; in desiring the same end, and yet scrupling the means proposed for its attainment. When you are called in to a consultation, you may perfectly agree with another physician respecting the existence of the malady and the expedience of its removal, and yet differ respecting the medicines and the method of cure. To your second question, namely, am I unfriendly to the present measure ?—I shall return an answer no less explicit. Why I cannot return as brief a one, you will learn from the following pages transcribed, for the greater

v. Taylor, Ventr. 293, Keble, 607. But Sir Edward Coke had many years before said that “Christianity is part and parcel of the Common Law.”—*Ed.*

part, from a paper drawn up by me some years ago, at the request of a gentleman *—(that I have been permitted to call him my friend, I place among the highest honours of my life),—an old and intimate acquaintance of the late Mr. Canning's; and which paper, had it been finished before he left England, it was his intention to have laid before the late Lord Liverpool.

“From the period of the Union with Ireland, to the present hour, I have neglected no opportunity of obtaining correct information from books and from men respecting the facts that bear on the question, whether they regard the existing state of things, or the causes and occasions of it; nor, during this time, has there been a single speech of any note, on either side, delivered, or reported as delivered, in either House of Parliament, which I have not heedfully and thoughtfully perused, abstracting and noting down every argument that was not already on my list, which, I need not say, has for many years past had but few accessions to number. Lastly, my conclusion I have subjected, year after year, to a fresh revisal, conscious but of one influence likely to warp my judgment: and this is the pain, I might with truth add the humiliation, of differing from men whom I loved and revered, and whose superior competence to judge aright in this momentous cause I knew and

* The Right Honourable John Hookham Frere.—*Ed.*

delighted to know ; and this aggravated by the reflection, that in receding from the Burkes, Cannings, and Lansdownes, I did not move a step nearer to the feelings and opinions of their antagonists. With this exception, it is scarcely possible, I think, to conceive an individual less under the influences of the ordinary disturbing forces of the judgment than your poor friend ; or from situation, pursuits, and habits of thinking, from age, state of health and temperament, less likely to be drawn out of his course by the undercurrents of hope or fear, of expectation or wish. But least of all by predilection for any particular sect or party : for wherever I look, in religion or in politics, I seem to see a world of power and talent wasted on the support of half truths, too often the most mischievous, because least suspected of errors. This may result from the spirit and habit of partisanship, the supposed inseparable accompaniment of a free state, which pervades all ranks, and is carried into all subjects. But whatever may be its origin, one consequence seems to be, that every man is in a bustle, and, except under the sting of excited or alarmed self-interest, scarcely any one in earnest."

I had collected materials for a third part under the title of "What is to be done now ?"—consisting of illustrations, from the history of the English and Scottish Churches, of the consequences of the ignorance or contravention of the principles, which I have attempted

to establish in the first part of this work ; and of practical deductions from these principles, addressed chiefly to the English clergy. But I felt the embers glowing under the white ashes ; and, on reflection, I have considered it more expedient that the contents of this volume should be altogether in strict conformity with the title ; that they should be, and profess to be, no more and no other than ideas of the constitution in Church and State. And thus I may without inconsistency entreat the friendly reader to bear in mind the distinction enforced in these pages, between the exhibition of an idea, and the way of acting on the same ; and that the scheme or diagram best suited to make the idea clearly understood may be very different from the form in which it is or may be most adequately realised. And if the reasonings of this work should lead him to think that a strenuous opponent of the former attempts in Parliament may have given his support to the Bill lately passed into law without inconsistency, and without meriting the name of apostate, it may be to the improvement of his charity and good temper, and not detract a tittle from his good sense or political penetration.

PART I.



ON

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH
AND STATE,

ACCORDING TO THE IDEA OF EACH.

THERE IS A MYSTERY IN THE SOUL OF STATE,
WHICH HATH AN OPERATION MORE DIVINE
THAN OUR MERE CHRONICLERS DARE MEDDLE WITH.

(Troil. and Cress. act iv. sc. 3, altered.—*Ed.*)

ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH
AND STATE,

ACCORDING TO THE IDEA OF EACH.

CHAPTER I.

Prefatory remarks on the true import of the word, Idea; and what the Author means by the expression, "according to the idea."

THE Act lately passed for the admission of Roman Catholics into the Legislature* comes so near the mark to which my convictions and wishes have through my whole life, since earliest manhood, unwaveringly pointed, and has so agreeably disappointed my fears, that my first impulse was to suppress the pages, which I had written while the particulars of the Bill were yet unknown, in compliance with the request of an absent friend, who

* 10 Geo. IV. c. 7. "An Act for the relief of his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects."—*Ed.*

had expressed an anxiety "to learn from myself the nature and grounds of my apprehension, that the measure would fail to effect the object immediately intended by its authors."

In answer to this I reply that the main ground of that apprehension is certainly much narrowed ; but as certainly not altogether removed. I refer to the securities. And, let it be understood, that in calling a certain provision hereafter specified, a security, I use the word comparatively, and mean no more, than that it has at least an equal claim to be so called, with any of those that have been hitherto proposed as such. Whether either one or the other deserve the name ; whether the thing itself is possible ; I leave undetermined. This premised, I resume my subject, and repeat that the main objection from which my fears as to the practical results of the proposed Bill were derived, applies with nearly the same force to the Act itself ; though the fears themselves have, by the spirit and general character of the clauses, been considerably mitigated. The principle, the solemn recognition of which I deem indispensable as a security, and should be willing to receive as the only security—superseding the necessity, though possibly not the expediency, of any other, but itself by no other superseded—this principle is not formally recognised. It may perhaps be implied in one

of the clauses (that which forbids the assumption of local titles by the Romish bishops);* but this implication, even if really contained in the clause, and actually intended by its framers, is not calculated to answer the ends, and utterly inadequate to supply the place, of the solemn and formal declaration which I had required, and which, with my motives and reasons for the same, it will be the object of the following pages to set forth.

But to enable the reader fully to understand, and fairly to appreciate, my arguments, I must previously state (what I at least judge to be) the true idea of a Constitution, and, likewise, of a national Church. And in giving the essential character of the latter, I shall briefly specify its distinction from the Church of Christ, and its contra-distinction from a third form, which is neither national nor Christian, but irreconcilable with, and subversive of, both. By an idea I mean (in this instance) that conception of a thing, which is not abstracted from any particular state,

* See ss. 24-5-6, prohibiting under a penalty the assumption of the titles of the bishoprics and other ecclesiastical dignities and offices; the exhibition of the *insignia* of Romish priesthood, and the performance of any part of Romish worship or religious service, elsewhere than in the usual chapels. These enactments have been openly violated with impunity from the passing of the Relief Act to this day.—*Ed.*

form, or mode, in which the thing may happen to exist at this or at that time; nor yet generalised from any number or succession of such forms or modes; but which is given by the knowledge of its ultimate aim.

Only one observation I must be allowed to add; that this knowledge, or sense, may very well exist, aye, and powerfully influence a man's thoughts and actions, without his being distinctly conscious of the same, much more without his being competent to express it in definite words. This, indeed, is one of the points which distinguish ideas from conceptions, both terms being used in their strict and proper significations. The latter, that is, a conception, consists in a conscious act of the understanding, bringing any given object or impression into the same class with any number of other objects or impressions by means of some character or characters common to them all. *Concipimus id est, capimus hoc cum illo*;—we take hold of both at once, we comprehend a thing, when we have learned to comprise it in a known class. On the other hand, it is the privilege of the few to possess an idea: of the generality of men, it might be more truly affirmed that they are possessed by it.

What is here said, will, I hope, suffice as a popular explanation. For some of my readers,

however, the following definition may not, perhaps, be useless or unacceptable. That which, contemplated objectively, that is, as existing externally to the mind, we call a law; the same contemplated subjectively (that is, as existing in a subject or mind), is an idea. Hence Plato often names ideas laws; and Lord Bacon, the British Plato, describes the laws of the material universe as the ideas in nature.* *Quod in natura naturata lex, in natura naturante idea, dicitur.* By way of illustration take the following. Every reader of Rousseau, or of Hume's Essays, will understand me when I refer to the original social contract assumed by Rousseau, and by other and wiser men before him, as the basis of all legitimate government. Now, if this be taken as the assertion of an historical fact, or as the application of a conception, generalised from ordinary compacts between man and man, or nation and nation, to an alleged actual occurrence in the first ages of the world; namely, the formation of a first contract, in which men should have covenanted with each other to associate, or in which a multitude should have entered into a compact with a few, the one

* *Hæ autem (divinæ mentis ideæ) sunt vera signacula Creatoris super creaturas, prout in materie per lineas veras et exquisitas imprimuntur et terminantur.* Nov. Org. P. II. 124.
—Ed.

to be governed and the other to govern under certain declared conditions; I shall run little hazard at this time of day in declaring the pretended fact a pure fiction, and the conception of such a fact an idle fancy. It is at once false and foolish.* For what if an original contract had actually been entered into and formally recorded? Still I cannot see what addition of moral force would be gained by the fact. The same sense of moral obligation which binds us to keep it, must have pre-existed in the same force and in relation to the same duties, impelling our ancestors to make it. For what could it do more than bind the contracting parties to act for the general good, according to their best lights and opportunities? It is evident that no specific scheme or constitution can derive any other claim to our reverence, than that which the presumption of its necessity or fitness for the general good shall give it; and which claim of course ceases, or rather is reversed, as soon as this general presumption of its utility

* I am not indeed certain that some operational farce, under the name of a social contract or compact, may not have been acted by the Illuminati and constitution-manufacturers at the close of the eighteenth century; a period which how far it deserved the name, so complacently affixed to it by contemporaries, of "this enlightened age," may be doubted. That it was an age of enlighteners no man will deny.

has given place to as general a conviction of the contrary. It is true, indeed, that from duties anterior to the formation of the contract, because they arise out of the very constitution of our humanity, which supposes the social state—it is true, that in order to a rightful removal of the institution or law thus agreed on, it is required that the conviction of its inexpediency shall be as general as the presumption of its fitness was at the time of its establishment. This, the first of the two great paramount interests of the social state, that of permanence, demands; but to attribute more than this to any fundamental articles, passed into law by any assemblage of individuals, is an injustice to their successors, and a high offence against the other great interest of the social state, namely, its progressive improvement. The conception, therefore, of an original contract, is, I repeat, incapable of historic proof as a fact, and it is senseless as a theory.

But if instead of the conception or theory of an original social contract, we say the idea of an ever-originating social contract, this is so certain and so indispensable, that it constitutes the whole ground of the difference between subject and serf, between a commonwealth and a slave plantation. And this, again, is evolved out of the yet higher idea of person in contra-distinction to thing; all

social law and justice being grounded on the principle that a person can never, but by his own fault, become a thing, or, without grievous wrong, be treated as such ; and the distinction consisting in this, that a thing may be used altogether and merely as the means to an end ; but the person must always be included in the end ; his interest must form a part of the object, a mean to which he by consent, that is, by his own act, makes himself. We plant a tree and we fell it ; we breed the sheep and we shear or we kill it ; in both cases wholly as means to our ends ; for trees and animals are things. The wood-cutter and the hind are likewise employed as means, but on agreement, and that too an agreement of reciprocal advantage, which includes them as well as their employer in the end ; for they are persons. And the government, under which the contrary takes place, is not worthy to be called a state, if, as in the kingdom of Dahomey, it be unprogressive ; or only by anticipation, where, as in Russia, it is in advance to a better and more man-worthy order of things. Now, notwithstanding the late wonderful spread of learning through the community, and though the schoolmaster and the lecturer are abroad, the hind and the woodman may, very conceivably, pass from cradle to coffin without having once contemplated this idea, so as to be conscious of the same. And there would

be even an improbability in the supposition that they possessed the power of presenting this idea to the minds of others, or even to their own thoughts, verbally as a distinct proposition. But no man, who has ever listened to labourers of this rank, in any alehouse, over the Saturday night's jug of beer, discussing the injustice of the present rate of wages, and the iniquity of their being paid in part out of the parish poor-rates, will doubt for a moment that they are fully possessed by the idea.

In close, though not perhaps obvious, connection with this is the idea of moral freedom, as the ground of our proper responsibility. Speak to a young Liberal, fresh from Edinburgh or Hackney or the hospitals, of free-will as implied in free-agency, he will perhaps confess with a smile that he is a necessitarian,—proceed to assure his hearer that the liberty of the will is an impossible conception, a contradiction in terms,* and finish by recommending a perusal of the works of Jonathan Edwards or Dr. Crombie; or as it may happen he may declare the will itself a mere delusion, a

* In fact, this is one of the distinguishing characters of ideas, and marks at once the difference between an idea (a truth-power of the reason) and a conception of the understanding; namely, that the former, as expressed in words, is always, and necessarily, a contradiction in terms.—See *Aids to Reflection*. 3rd edit. p. 206.—*Ed*.

nonentity, and advise the study of Mr. Lawrence's Lectures. Converse on the same subject with a plain, single-minded, yet reflecting, neighbour, and he may probably say, (as St. Augustine had said long before him, in reply to the question, What is time?) "I know it well enough when you do not ask me." But alike with both the supposed parties, the self-complacent student, just as certainly as with our less positive neighbour; if we attend to their actions, their feelings, and even to their words, we shall be in ill luck, if ten minutes pass without having full and satisfactory proof that the idea of man's moral freedom possesses and modifies their whole practical being, in all they say, in all they feel, in all they do and are done to; even as the spirit of life, which is contained in no vessel, because it permeates all.

Just so is it with the Constitution.* Ask any of our politicians what is meant by the Constitution. and it is ten to one that he will give a false explanation; as for example, that it is the body of our laws, or that it is the Bill of Rights; or perhaps,

* I do not say, with the idea: for the Constitution itself is an idea. This will sound like a paradox or a sneer to those with whom an idea is but another word for a fancy, a something unreal; but not to those who in the ideas contemplate the most real of all realities, and of all operative powers the most actual.

if he have read Thomas Payne, he may say that we do not yet possess one ; and yet not an hour may have elapsed, since we heard the same individual denouncing, and possibly with good reason, this or that code of laws, the excise and revenue laws, or those for including pheasants, or those for excluding Roman Catholics, as altogether unconstitutional ; and such and such acts of Parliament as gross outrages on the Constitution. Mr. Peel, who is rather remarkable for groundless and unlucky concessions, owned that the late Act broke in on the Constitution of 1688 : whilst in 1689 a very imposing minority of the then House of Lords, with a decisive majority in the Lower House of Convocation, denounced this very Constitution of 1688, as breaking in on the English Constitution.

But a Constitution is an idea arising out of the idea of a State ; and because our whole history from Alfred onwards demonstrates the continued influence of such an idea, or ultimate aim, on the minds of our forefathers, in their characters and functions as public men, alike in what they resisted and in what they claimed ; in the institutions and forms of polity, which they established, and with regard to those against which they more or less successfully contended ; and because the result has been a progressive, though not always a direct or equable, advance in the gradual realisation of the

idea ; and because it is actually, though even because it is an idea not adequately, represented in a correspondent scheme of means really existing ; we speak, and have a right to speak, of the idea itself, as actually existing, that is, as a principle existing in the only way in which a principle can exist,—in the minds and consciences of the persons whose duties it prescribes, and whose rights it determines. In the same sense that the sciences of arithmetic and of geometry, that mind, that life itself, have reality ; the Constitution has real existence, and does not the less exist in reality, because it both is, and exists as, an idea.

There is yet another ground for the affirmation of its reality ; that, as the fundamental idea, it is at the same time the final criterion by which all particular frames of government must be tried : for here only can we find the great constructive principles of our representative system—(I use the term in its widest sense, in which the crown itself is included as representing the unity of the people, the true and primary sense of the word majesty) ;—those principles, I say, in the light of which it can alone be ascertained what are excrescences, symptoms of distemperature, and marks of degeneration ; and what are native growths, or changes naturally attendant on the progressive development of the original germ, symptoms of immaturity

perhaps, but not of disease ; or, at worst, modifications of the growth by the defective or faulty, but remediless, or only gradually remediable, qualities of the soil and surrounding elements.

There are two other characters, distinguishing the class of substantive truths, or truth-powers here spoken of, that will, I trust, indemnify the reader for the delay of the two or three short sentences required for their explanation. The first is, that in distinction from the conception of a thing,—which being abstracted or generalised from one or more particular states, or modes, is necessarily posterior in order of thought to the thing thus conceived,—an idea, on the contrary, is in order of thought always and of necessity contemplated as antecedent. In the idea or principle, life, for instance, the vital functions are the result of the organisation ; but this organisation supposes and pre-supposes the vital principle. The bearings of the planets on the sun are determined by the ponderable matter of which they consist ; but the principle of gravity, the law in the material creation, the idea of the Creator, is pre-supposed in order to the existence, yea, to the very conception of the existence, of matter itself.

This is the first. The other distinctive mark may be most conveniently given in the form of a caution. We should be made aware, namely, that

the particular form, construction, or model, that may be best fitted to render the idea intelligible, and most effectually serve the purpose of an instructive diagram, is not necessarily the mode or form in which it actually arrives at realisation. In the works both of man and of nature—in the one by the imperfection of the means and materials, in the other by the multitude and complexity of simultaneous purposes—the fact is most often otherwise. A naturalist, (in the infancy of physiology, we will suppose, and before the first attempts at comparative anatomy,)—whose knowledge had been confined exclusively to the human frame, or to that of animals similarly organised, and who by this experience had been led inductively to the idea of respiration, as the *copula* and mediator of the vascular and the nervous systems,—might, very probably, have regarded the lungs, with their appurtenances, as the only form in which this idea, or ultimate aim, was realisable. Ignorant of the functions of the *spiracula* in insects, and of the gills of fish, he would, perhaps, with great confidence degrade both to the class of non-respirants. But alike in the works of nature and the institutions of man, there is no more effectual preservative against pedantry and the positiveness of sciolism, than to meditate on the law of compensation and the principle of compromise; and to be fully

impressed with the wide extent of the one, the necessity of the other, and the frequent occurrence of both.

Having (more than sufficiently, I fear,) exercised my reader's patience with these preparatory remarks, for which the anxiety to be fully understood is my best excuse, though in a moment of less excitement they might not have been without some claim to attention for their own sake, I return to the idea which forms the present subject, the English Constitution, which an old writer calls, "*lex sacra, mater legum*, than which nothing can be proposed more certain in its grounds, more pregnant in its consequences, or that hath more harmonical reason within itself: and which is so connatural and essential to the genius and innate disposition of this nation, it being formed (silk-worm-like) as that no other law can possibly regulate it; a law not to be derived from Alured, or Alfred, or Canute, or other elder or later promulgators of particular laws, but which might say of itself,—When reason and the laws of God first came, then came I with them."

As according to an old saying, "an ill foreknown is half disarmed," I will here notice an inconvenience in our language, which, without a greater inconvenience, I could not avoid, in the use of the term "State" in a double sense; a larger, in which it is

equivalent to realm, and includes the Church, and a narrower, in which it is distinguished *quasi per antithesin* from the Church, as in the phrase, Church and State. But the context, I trust, will in every instance prevent ambiguity.

CHAPTER II.

The Idea of a State in the larger sense of the term, introductory to the constitution of the State in the narrower sense, as it exists in this country.

A CONSTITUTION is the attribute of a State, that is, of a body politic having the principle of its unity within itself, whether by concentration of its forces, as a constitutional pure monarchy, which, however, has hitherto continued to be *ens rationale*, unknown in history ;* or, with which we are alone concerned, by equipoise and interdependency ;—the *lex equilibrii*, the principle prescribing the means and conditions by and under which this balance is to be established and preserved, being the constitution of the State. It is the chief of many blessings derived from the insular character and circumstances of our country, that our social institutions have formed themselves out of our proper needs and interests ; that long and fierce as the birth-struggle and the growing pains have been, the antagonist powers have been of our own system,

* Spinozæ Tract. Pol. cap. vi. *De Monarchia ex rationis præscripto.*

and have been allowed to work out their final balance with less disturbance from external forces, than was possible in the continental states.

Not yet enslaved, not wholly vile,
 O Albion ! O my mother Isle !
 Thy valleys, fair as Eden's bowers,
 Glitter green with sunny showers ;
 Thy grassy uplands' gentle swells
 Echo to the bleat of flocks ;
 (Those grassy hills, those glittering dells,
 Proudly ramparted with rocks ;)
 And OCEAN mid his uproar wild
 Speaks safety to his Island-child !
 Hence for many a fearless age
 Has social freedom loved the quiet shore,
 Nor ever proud invader's rage
 Or sack'd thy towers, or stain'd thy fields with gore.*

Now, in every country of civilised men, acknowledging the rights of property, and by means of determined boundaries and common laws united into one people or nation, the two antagonist powers or opposite interests of the State, under which all other state interests are comprised, are those of permanence and of progression.†

* Ode to the Departing Year. Poet. Works, vol. i., p. 126.—*Ed.*

† Let me call attention to the essential difference between "opposite" and "contrary." Opposite powers are always of the same kind, and tend to union, either by equipoise or by a common product. Thus the + and — poles of the magnet, thus positive and negative electricity, are opposites.

It will not be necessary to enumerate the several causes that combine to connect the permanence of a state with the land and the landed property. To found a family, and to convert his wealth into land, are twin thoughts, births of the same moment, in the mind of the opulent merchant, when he thinks of reposing from his labours. From the class of the *novi homines* he redeems himself by becoming the staple ring of the chain, by which the

Sweet and sour are opposites; sweet and bitter are contraries. The feminine character is opposed to the masculine; but the effeminate is its contrary. Even so in the present instance, the interest of permanence is opposed to that of progressiveness; but so far from being contrary interests, they, like the magnetic forces, suppose and require each other. Even the most mobile of creatures, the serpent, makes a rest of its own body, and, drawing up its voluminous train from behind, on this *fulcrum* propels itself onward. On the other hand, it is a proverb in all languages, that (relatively to man at least) what would stand still must in fact be retrograde.

Many years ago, in conversing with a friend, I expressed my belief that in no instance had the false use of a word become current without some practical ill consequence, of far greater moment than would *primo aspectu* have been thought possible. That friend, very lately referring to this remark, assured me that not a month had passed since then, without some instance in proof of its truth having occurred in his own experience; and added, with a smile, that he had more than once amused himself with the thought of a verbarian Attorney-General, authorised to bring informations *ex officio* against the writer or editor of any work in extensive circulation, who, after due notice issued, should persevere in misusing a word.

present will become connected with the past, and the test and evidence of permanency be afforded. To the same principle appertain primogeniture and hereditary titles, and the influence which these exert in accumulating large masses of property, and in counteracting the antagonist and dispersive forces, which the follies, the vices, and misfortunes of individuals can scarcely fail to supply. To this, likewise, tends the proverbial obduracy of prejudices characteristic of the humbler tillers of the soil, and their aversion even to benefits that are offered in the form of innovations. But why need I attempt to explain a fact which no thinking man will deny, and where the admission of the fact is all that my argument requires?

On the other hand, with as little chance of contradiction, I may assert that the progression of a State in the arts and comforts of life, in the diffusion of the information and knowledge, useful or necessary for all; in short, all advances in civilisation, and the rights and privileges of citizens, are especially connected with, and derived from, the four classes, the mercantile, the manufacturing, the distributive, and the professional. To early Rome, war and conquest were the substitutes for trade and commerce. War was their trade.* As

* " War in Republican Rome was the offspring of its intense aristocracy of spirit, and stood to the state in lieu of

these wars became more frequent, on a larger scale, and with fewer interruptions, the liberties of the plebeians continued increasing: for even the sugar plantations of Jamaica would (in their present state, at least), present a softened picture of the hard and servile relation, in which the plebeians at one time stood to their patrician superiors.

Italy is supposed at present to maintain a larger number of inhabitants than in the days of Trajan or in the best and most prosperous of the Roman empire. With the single exception of the Ecclesiastical State, the whole country is cultivated like a garden. You may find there every gift of God—only not freedom. It is a country rich in the proudest records of liberty, illustrious with the names of heroes, statesmen, legislators, philosophers. It hath a history all alive with the virtues and crimes of hostile parties, when the glories and the struggles of ancient Greece were acted over again in the proud republics of Venice, Genoa, and Florence. The life of every eminent citizen was in constant hazard from the furious factions of his native city, and yet life had no charm out of its dear and honoured walls. All the splendours of

trade. As long as there was any thing *ab extra* to conquer, the state advanced: when nothing remained but what was Roman, then, as a matter of course, civil war began.”—*Table-Talk*, 2d edit., p. 169.—*Ed.*

the hospitable palace, and the favour of princes, could not soothe the pining of Dante or Machiavel, exiles from their free, their beautiful Florence. But scarcely a pulse of true liberty survives. It was the profound policy of the Spanish and Austrian courts to degrade by every possible means the profession of trade; and even in Pisa and Florence themselves to introduce the feudal pride and prejudice of less happy, less enlightened, countries. Agriculture, meanwhile, with its attendant population and plenty, was cultivated with increasing success; but from the Alps to the Straits of Messina the Italians became slaves.

I have thus divided the subjects of the State into two orders, the agricultural or possessors of land; and the mercantile, manufacturing, distributive, and professional bodies, under the common name of citizens. And I have now to add that by the nature of things common to every civilised country, at all events by the course of events in this country, the first order is subdivided into two classes, which, in imitation of our old law books, we may call the Major and Minor Barons; both these, either by their interests or by the very effect of their situation, circumstances, and the nature of their employment, vitally connected with the permanency of the State, its institutions, rights, customs, manners, privileges, and as such, opposed

to the second order, the inhabitants of ports, towns, and cities, who are in like manner and from like causes more especially connected with its progression. I scarcely need say, that in a very advanced stage of civilisation, the two orders of society will more and more modify and leaven each other, yet never so completely but that the distinct character will remain legible, and, to use the words of the Roman Emperor, even in what is struck out the erasure will be manifest. At all times the Franklins, or the lower of the two ranks of which the first order consists, will, in their political sympathies, draw more nearly to the antagonist order than the first rank. On these facts, which must at all times have existed, though in very different degrees of prominence or maturity, the principle of our Constitution was established. The total interests of the country, the interests of the State, were entrusted to a great Council or Parliament, composed of two Houses. The first consisted exclusively of the Major Barons, who at once stood as the guardians and sentinels of their several estates and privileges, and the representatives of the common weal. The Minor Barons, or Franklins, too numerous, and indeed individually too weak, to sit and maintain their rights in person, were to choose among the worthiest of their own body representatives, and these in such number as to

form an important though minor proportion of a second House, the majority of which was formed by the representatives of the second order chosen by the cities, ports, and boroughs; which representatives ought on principle to have been elected not only by, but from among, the members of the manufacturing, mercantile, distributive, and professional classes.

These four last mentioned classes, by an arbitrary but convenient use of the phrase, I will designate by the name of the Personal Interest, as the exponent of all moveable and personal possessions, including skill and acquired knowledge, the moral and intellectual stock in trade of the professional man and the artist, no less than the raw materials, and the means of elaborating, transporting, and distributing them.

Thus in the theory of the Constitution it was provided that even though both divisions of the Landed Interest should combine in any legislative attempt to encroach on the rights and privileges of the Personal Interest, yet the representatives of the latter forming the clear and effectual majority of the lower House, the attempt must be abortive; the majority of votes in both Houses being indispensable in order to the presentation of a bill for the complectory act; that is to make it a law of the land. By force of the same mechanism must

every attack be baffled that should be made by the representatives of the minor land-holders, in concert with the burgesses, on the existing rights and privileges of the peerage, and of the hereditary aristocracy, of which the peerage is the summit and the natural protector. Lastly, should the nobles join to invade the rights and franchises of the Franklins and the Yeomanry, the sympathy of interest, by which the inhabitants of cities, towns, and sea-ports are linked to the great body of their agricultural fellow-commoners, who supply their markets, and form their principal customers, could not fail to secure a united and successful resistance. Nor would this affinity of interest find a slight support in the sympathy of feeling between the burgess senators and the county representatives, as members of the same House; and in the consciousness which the former have of the dignity conferred on them by the latter. For the notion of superior dignity will always be attached in the minds of men to that kind of property with which they have most associated the idea of permanence; and the land is the synonyme of country.

That the burgesses were not bound to elect representatives from among their own order, individuals *bona fide* belonging to one or other of the four divisions above enumerated; that the elective franchise of the cities, towns, and ports first

invested with borough-rights, was not made conditional, and to a certain extent at least dependent, on their retaining the same comparative wealth and independence, and rendered subject to a periodical revisal and re-adjustment; that, in consequence of these and other causes, the very weights intended for the effectual counterpoise of the great landholders, have, in the course of events, been shifted into the opposite scale; that they now constitute a large proportion of the political power and influence of the very class of men whose personal cupidity and whose partial views of the Landed Interest at large they were meant to keep in check;—these things are no part of the Constitution, no essential ingredients in the idea, but apparent defects and imperfections in its realisation; which, however, we need neither regret nor set about amending, till we have seen whether an equivalent force has not arisen to supply the deficiency;—a force great enough to have destroyed the *equilibrium*, had not such a transfer taken place previously to, or at the same time with, the operation of the new forces. Roads, canals, machinery, the press, the periodical and daily press, the might of public opinion, the consequent increasing desire of popularity among public men and functionaries of every description, and the increasing necessity of public character, as the means

or condition of political influence ;—I need but mention these to stand acquitted of having started a vague and naked possibility in extenuation of an evident and palpable abuse.

But whether this conjecture be well or ill grounded, the principle of the Constitution remains the same. That harmonious balance of the two great correspondent, at once supporting and counterpoising, interests of the State, its permanence, and its progression ; that balance of the Landed and the Personal Interests was to be secured by a legislature of two Houses ; the first consisting wholly of barons or landholders, permanent and hereditary senators ; the second of the knights or minor barons, elected by, and as the representatives of, the remaining landed community, together with the burgesses, the representatives of the commercial, manufacturing, distributive, and professional classes,—the latter (the elected burgesses) constituting the major number. The King, meanwhile, in whom the executive power is vested, it will suffice at present to consider as the beam of the constitutional scales. A more comprehensive view of the kingly office must be deferred, till the remaining problem (the idea of a national Church) has been solved.

I here again entreat the reader to bear in mind what I have before endeavoured to impress on him,

that I am not giving an historical account of the legislative body; nor can I be supposed to assert that such was the earliest mode or form in which the national council was constructed. My assertion is simply this, that its formation has advanced in this direction. The line of evolution, however sinuous, has still tended to this point, sometimes with, sometimes without, not seldom, perhaps, against, the intention of the individual actors, but always as if a power, greater and better than the men themselves, had intended it for them. Nor let it be forgotten that every new growth, every power and privilege, bought or extorted, has uniformly been claimed by an antecedent right; not acknowledged as a boon conferred, but both demanded and received as what had always belonged to them, though withheld by violence and the injury of the times: and this too, in cases, where, if documents and historical records, or even consistent traditions, had been required in evidence, the monarch would have had the better of the argument. But, in truth, it was no more than a practical way of saying: "this or that is contained in the idea of our government, and it is a consequence of the *lex, mater legum*, which, in the very first law of state ever promulgated in the land, was pre-supposed as the ground of that first law."

Before I conclude this part of my subject, I must

press on the reader's attention, that the preceding is offered only as the constitutional idea of the State. In order to correct views respecting the Constitution, in the more enlarged sense of the term, namely, the constitution of the nation, we must, in addition to a grounded knowledge of the State, have the right idea of the national Church. These are two poles of the same magnet; the magnet itself, which is constituted by them, is the constitution of the nation.

CHAPTER III.

On the National Church.

THE reading of histories may dispose a man to satire ; but the science of history, history studied in the light of philosophy, as the great drama of an ever unfolding Providence, has a very different effect. It infuses hope and reverential thoughts of man and his destination. It will, therefore, I trust, be no unwelcome result, if it should be made appear that something deeper and better than priestcraft and priest-ridden ignorance was at the bottom of the phrase, Church and State, and entitled it to be the form in which so many thousands of the men of England clothed the wish for their country's weal. But many things have conspired to draw off attention from its true origin and import, and have led us to seek the reasons for thus connecting the two words in facts and motives that lie nearer the surface. I will mention one only, because, though less obvious than many other causes that have favoured the general misconception on this point, and though its action is indirect and negative, it is by no means the least operative. The immediate

effect, indeed, may be confined to the men of education. But what influences these will finally influence all. I am referring to the noticeable fact arising out of the system of instruction pursued in all our classical schools and universities, that the annals of ancient Greece, and of republican and imperial Rome, though they are, in truth, but brilliant exceptions from history generally, do yet, partly from the depth and intensity of all early impressions, and in part from the number and splendour of individual characters and particular events and exploits, so fill the imagination as almost to be,—during the period when the groundwork of our minds is principally formed, and the direction given to our modes of thinking,—what we mean by history. Hence things, of which no instance or analogy is recollected in the customs, policy, and jurisprudence of Greece and Rome, lay little hold on our attention. Among these, I know not one more worthy of notice than the principle of the division of property, which, if not, as I however think, universal in the earliest ages, was, at all events, common to the Scandinavian, Keltic, and Gothic tribes with the Semitic, or the tribes descended from Shem.

It is not the least among the obligations which the antiquarian and the philosophic statist owe to a tribe of the last-mentioned race, the Hebrew,

that in the institutes of their great legislator, who first formed them into a state or nation, they have preserved for us a practical illustration of the principle in question, which was by no means peculiar to the Hebrew people, though in their case it received a peculiar sanction.

To confound the inspiring spirit with the informing word, and both with the dictation of sentences and formal propositions; and to confine the office and purpose of inspiration to the miraculous immission or infusion of novelties, *res nusquam prius visæ vel auditæ*,—these, alas! are the current errors of Protestants without learning, and of bigots in spite of it; but which I should have left unnoticed, but for the injurious influence which certain notions in close connexion with these errors have had on the present subject. The notion, I mean, that the Levitical institution was not only enacted by an inspired law-giver, not only a work of revealed wisdom, (which who denies?) but that it was a part of revealed religion, having its origin in this particular revelation, as a something which could not have existed otherwise; yet, on the other hand, a part of the religion that had been abolished by Christianity. Had these reasoners contented themselves with asserting that it did not belong to the Christian religion, they would have said nothing more than the truth; and for this plain

reason, that it forms no part of religion at all in the Gospel sense of the word,—that is, religion as contra-distinguished from law; the spiritual as contra-distinguished from the temporal or political.

In answer to all these notions, it is enough to say that not the principle itself, but the superior wisdom with which the principle was carried into effect, the greater perfection of the machinery, forms the true distinction, the peculiar worth, of the Hebrew constitution. The principle itself was common to Goth and Kelt, or rather, I would say, to all the tribes that had not fallen off to either of the two *aphelia*, or extreme distances from the generic character of man, the wild or the barbarous state; but who remained either constituent parts or appendages of the *stirps generosa seu historica*, as a philosophic friend has named that portion of the Semitic and Japetic races which had not degenerated below the conditions of progressive civilisation:—it was, I say, common to all the primitive races, that in taking possession of a new country, and in the division of the land into heritable estates among the individual warriors or heads of families, a reserve should be made for the nation itself.

The sum total of these heritable portions, appropriated each to an individual lineage, I take leave to name the Propriety; and to call the reserve above-

mentioned the Nationalty ; and likewise to employ the term wealth in that primary and wide sense which it retains in the term, commonwealth. In the establishment, then, of the landed proprieties, a Nationalty was at the same time constituted ; as a wealth not consisting of lands, but yet derivative from the land, and rightfully inseparable from the same. These, the Propriety and the Nationalty, were the two constituent factors, the opposite, but correspondent and reciprocally supporting, counterweights of the commonwealth ; the existence of the one being the condition and the perfecting of the rightfulness of the other. Now as all polar forces,—that is, opposite, not contrary, powers,—are necessarily *unius generis*, homogeneous, so in the present instance each is that which it is called, relatively, by predominance of the one character or quality, not by the absolute exclusion of the other. The wealth appropriated was not so entirely a property as not to remain, to a certain extent, national ; nor was the wealth reserved so exclusively national as not to admit of individual tenure. It was only necessary that the mode and origin of the tenure should be different, and, as it were, *in antithesi*. If the one be hereditary, the other must be elective ; if the one be lineal, the other must be circulative.

CHAPTER IV.

Illustration of the preceding Chapter from history, and principally from that of the Hebrew Commonwealth.

IN the unfolding and exposition of any idea we naturally seek assistance and the means of illustration from the historical instance, in which it has been most nearly realised, or of which we possess the most exact and satisfactory records. Both of these recommendations are found in the formation of the Hebrew Commonwealth. But in availing ourselves of examples from history there is always danger lest that which was to assist us in attaining a clear insight into truth should be the means of disturbing or falsifying it, so that we attribute to the object what was but the effect of flaws or other accidents in the glass, through which we looked at it. To secure ourselves from this danger, we must constantly bear in mind that in the actual realisation of every great idea or principle there will always exist disturbing forces, modifying the product, either from the imperfection of the agents, or from especial circumstances overruling them ;

or from the defect of the materials; or lastly, and which most particularly applies to the instances I have here in view, from the co-existence of some yet greater idea, some yet more important purpose, with which the former must be combined, but likewise subordinated. Nevertheless, these are no essentials of the idea, no exemplary parts in the particular construction adduced for its illustration. On the contrary, they are deviations from the idea, which we must abstract and put aside before we can make a safe and fearless use of the example.

Such, for instance, was the settlement of the Nationalty in one tribe, which, to the exclusion of the other eleven divisions of the Hebrew confederacy, was to be invested with its rights, and to be alone capable of discharging its duties. This was, indeed, in some measure, corrected by the institution of the *Nabim*, or prophets, who might be of any tribe, and who formed a numerous body, uniting the functions and three-fold character of the Roman Censors, the Tribunes of the people, and the sacred college of Augurs; protectors of the nation and privileged state-moralists, whom Milton has already compared to the orators of the Greek democracies.* Still the most satisfactory

* The lines which our sage and learned poet puts in the Saviour's mouth, both from their truth and from their appositeness to the present subject, well deserve to be quoted:—

“ Their orators thou then extoll'st, as those

justification of this exclusive policy is to be found, I think, in the fact, that the Jewish theocracy itself was but a mean to a further and greater end ; and that the effects of the policy were subordinated to an interest far more momentous than that of any single kingdom or commonwealth could be. The unfitness and insufficiency of the Jewish character for the reception and execution of the great legislator's scheme were not less important parts of the sublime purpose of Providence, in the separation of the chosen people, than their characteristic virtues. Their frequent relapses, and the never-failing return of a certain number to the national faith and customs, were alike subservient to the ultimate object, the final cause, of the Mosaic dispensation. Without pain or reluctance, therefore, I should state this provision, by which a particular lineage was made a necessary qualification for the trustees and functionaries of the reserved Nationalty, as the main cause of the comparatively

The top of eloquence :—Statists indeed
And lovers of their country as may seem ;
But herein to our prophets far beneath,
As men divinely taught and better teaching
The solid rules of civil government,
In their majestic, unaffected style,
Than all the oratory of Greece and Rome.
In them is plainest taught and easiest learnt
What makes a nation happy, and keeps it so."

Par. Reg. B. iv.

little effect, which the Levitical establishment produced on the moral and intellectual character of the Jewish people during the whole period of their existence as an independent state.

With this exception, however, the scheme of the Hebrew polity may be profitably used as the diagram or illustrative model of a principle which actuated the primitive races generally under similar circumstances. With this and one other exception, likewise arising out of the peculiar purpose of Providence, namely, the discouragement of trade and commerce in the Hebrew policy,—a principle so inwoven in the whole fabric, that the revolution in this respect effected by Solomon had, perhaps, no small share in the quickly succeeding dissolution of the confederacy,—it may be profitably considered even under existing circumstances.

And first let me observe that with the Keltic, Gothic, and Scandinavian, equally as with the Hebrew, tribes property by absolute right existed only in a tolerated alien ; and that there was everywhere a prejudice against the occupation expressly directed to its acquirement, namely, the trafficking with the current representatives of wealth. Even in that species of possession, in which the right of the individual was the prominent relative character, the institution of the Jubilee provided against its degenerating into the merely personal ; reclaimed

it for the State, that is, for the line, the heritage, as one of the permanent units or integral parts, the aggregate of which constitutes the State, in that narrower and especial sense in which it has been distinguished from the nation. And to these permanent units the calculating and governing mind of the State directs its attention, even as it is the depths, breadths, bays, and windings or reaches of a river that are the subject of the hydrographer, not the water-drops that at any one moment constitute the stream. And on this point the greatest stress should be laid; this should be deeply impressed, and carefully borne in mind, that the abiding interests, the estates, and ostensible tangible properties, not the persons as persons, are the proper subjects of the State in this sense, or of the power of the parliament or supreme council, as the representatives and plenipotentiaries of the State, that is, of the Propriety, and in distinction from the commonwealth, in which I comprise both the Propriety and the Nationalty.

And here let me further remark that the records of the Hebrew polity are rendered far less instructive as lessons of political wisdom by the disposition to regard the Jehovah in that universal and spiritual acceptation, in which we use the word as Christians. For relatively to the Jewish polity the Jehovah was their covenanted king: and if we draw any inference

from the former or Christian sense of the term, it should be this;—that God is the unity of every nation; that the convictions and the will, which are one, the same, and simultaneously acting in a multitude of individual agents, are not the birth of any individual; that when the people speak loudly and unanimously, it is from their being strongly impressed by the godhead or the demon. Only exclude the (by no means extravagant) supposition of a demoniac possession, and then *vox populi vox Dei*.* So thought Sir Philip Sidney, who in the great revolution of the Netherlands considered the universal and simultaneous adoption of the same principles as a proof of the divine presence; and on that belief, and on that alone, grounded his assurance of its successful result. And that I may apply this to the present subject, it was in the character of the king, as the majesty or symbolic unity of the whole nation, both of the State and of the persons; it was in the name of the king, in whom both the Propriety and the Nationalty ideally centered, and from whom, as

* “I never said that the *vox populi* was of course the *vox Dei*. It may be; but it may be, and with equal probability *a priori*, *vox Diaboli*. That the voice of ten millions of men calling for the same thing is a spirit, I believe; but whether that be a spirit of Heaven or Hell, I can only know by trying the thing called for by the prescript of reason and God’s will.” *Table Talk*, 2nd edit. p. 163.—*Ed.*

from a fountain, they are ideally supposed to flow ; it was in the name of the king, that the proclamation throughout the land, by sound of trumpet, was made to all possessors : *The land is not yours, saith the Lord, the land is mine. To you I lent it.* The voice of the trumpets is not, indeed, heard in this country. But no less intelligibly is it declared by the spirit and history of our laws that the possession of a property, not connected with especial duties, a property not fiduciary or official, but arbitrary and unconditional, was in the sight of our forefathers the brand of a Jew and an alien ; not the distinction, nor the right, nor the honour, of an English baron or gentleman.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Church of England, or National Clergy, according to the Constitution; its characteristic ends, purposes and functions; and of the persons comprehended under the Clergy, or the functionaries of the National Church.

AFTER these introductory preparations, I can have no difficulty in setting forth the right idea of a national Church as in the language of Queen Elizabeth the third great venerable estate of the realm; the first being the estate of the land-owners or possessors of fixed property, consisting of the two classes of the Barons and the Franklins; and the second comprising the merchants, the manufacturers, free artizans, and the distributive class. To comprehend, therefore, the true character of this third estate, in which the reserved Nationalty was vested, we must first ascertain the end or national purpose, for which such reservation was made.

Now, as in the first estate the permanency of the nation was provided for; and in the second estate its progressiveness and personal freedom;

while in the king the cohesion by interdependence, and the unity of the country, were established; there remains for the third estate only that interest which is the ground, the necessary antecedent condition, of both the former. These depend on a continuing and progressive civilisation. But civilisation is itself but a mixed good, if not far more a corrupting influence, the hectic of disease, not the bloom of health, and a nation so distinguished more fitly to be called a varnished than a polished people, where this civilisation is not grounded in cultivation, in the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise our humanity. We must be men in order to be citizens.

The Nationalty, therefore, was reserved for the support and maintenance of a permanent class or order with the following duties. A certain smaller number were to remain at the fountain heads of the humanities, in cultivating and enlarging the knowledge already possessed, and in watching over the interests of physical and moral science; being, likewise, the instructors of such as constituted, or were to constitute, the remaining more numerous classes of the order. The members of this latter and far more numerous body were to be distributed throughout the country, so as not to leave even the smallest integral part or division without a resident

guide, guardian, and instructor; the objects and final intention of the whole order being these—to preserve the stores and to guard the treasures of past civilisation, and thus to bind the present with the past, to perfect and add to the same, and thus to connect the present with the future; but especially to diffuse through the whole community and to every native entitled to its laws and rights that quantity and quality of knowledge which was indispensable both for the understanding of those rights, and for the performance of the duties correspondent: finally, to secure for the nation, if not a superiority over the neighbouring states, yet an equality at least, in that character of general civilisation, which equally with, or rather more than, fleets, armies, and revenue, forms the ground of its defensive and offensive power. The object of the two former estates of the realm, which conjointly form the State, was to reconcile the interests of permanence with that of progression—law with liberty. The object of the national Church, the third remaining estate of the realm, was to secure and improve that civilisation, without which the nation could be neither permanent nor progressive.

That, in all ages, individuals who have directed their meditations and their studies to the nobler characters of our nature, to the cultivation of those powers and instincts which constitute the man, at

least separate him from the animal, and distinguish the nobler from the animal part of his own being, will be led by the supernatural in themselves to the contemplation of a power which is likewise superhuman ; that science, and especially moral science, will lead to religion, and remain blended with it,—this, I say, will in all ages be the course of things. That in the earlier ages, and in the dawn of civility, there will be a twilight in which science and religion give light, but a light refracted through the dense and the dark, a superstition;—this is what we learn from history, and what philosophy would have taught us to expect. But I affirm that in the spiritual purpose of the word, and as understood in reference to a future state, and to the abiding essential interest of the individual as a person, and not as the citizen, neighbour, or subject, religion may be an indispensable ally, but is not the essential constitutive end, of that national institute, which is unfortunately, at least improperly, styled the Church ; a name which in its best sense is exclusively appropriate to the Church of Christ. If this latter be *ecclesia*, the communion of such as are called out of the world, that is, in reference to the especial ends and purposes of that communion ; this other might more expressly have been entitled *enclesia*, or an order of men chosen in and of the realm, and constituting an estate of that

realm. And, in fact, such was the original and proper sense of the more appropriately named clergy. It comprehended the learned of all names, and the clerk was the synonyme of the man of learning. Nor can any fact more strikingly illustrate the conviction entertained by our ancestors respecting the intimate connexion of this clergy with the peace and weal of the nation, than the privilege formerly recognised by our laws, in the well-known phrase, "benefit of clergy."

Deeply do I feel, for clearly do I see, the importance of my theme. And had I equal confidence in my ability to awaken the same interest in the minds of others, I should dismiss as affronting to my readers all apprehension of being charged with prolixity, while I am labouring to compress in two or three brief chapters the principal sides and aspects of a subject so large and multilateral as to require a volume for its full exposition;—with what success will be seen in what follows, commencing with the Churchmen, or (a far apter and less objectionable designation,) the national Clerisy.

The Clerisy of the nation, or national Church, in its primary acceptation and original intention, comprehended the learned of all denominations, the sages and professors of the law and jurisprudence, of medicine and physiology, of music, of

military and civil architecture, of the physical sciences, with the mathematical as the common organ of the preceding: in short, all the so-called liberal arts and sciences, the possession and application of which constitute the civilisation of a country, as well as the theological. The last was, indeed, placed at the head of all; and of good right did it claim the precedence. But why? Because under the name of theology or divinity were contained the interpretation of languages, the conservation and tradition of past events, the momentous epochs and revolutions of the race and nation, the continuation of the records, logic, ethics, and the determination of ethical science, in application to the rights and duties of men in all their various relations, social and civil; and lastly, the ground-knowledge, the *prima scientia* as it was named,—philosophy, or the doctrine and discipline of ideas.*

* That is, of knowledges immediate, yet real, and herein distinguished in kind from logical and mathematical truths, which express not realities, but only the necessary forms of conceiving and perceiving, and are therefore named the formal, or abstract sciences. Ideas, on the other hand, or the truths of philosophy, properly so called, correspond to substantial beings, to objects the actual subsistence of which is implied in their idea, though only by the idea revealable. To adopt the language of the great philosophic Apostle, they are *spiritual realities that can only spiritually be discerned*, and the inherent aptitude and moral preconfiguration to which

Theology formed only a part of the objects, the theologians formed only a portion of the clerks or clergy, of the national Church. The theological order had precedence indeed, and deservedly ; but not because its members were priests, whose office was to conciliate the invisible powers, and to superintend the interests that survive the grave ; nor as being exclusively, or even principally, sacerdotal or templar, which, when it did occur, is to be considered as an accident of the age, a misgrowth of ignorance and oppression, a falsification of the constitutive principle, not a constituent part of the same. No, the theologians took the lead, because the science of theology was the root and the trunk of the knowledges that civilised man, because it gave unity and the circulating sap of life to all other sciences, by virtue of which alone they could be contemplated as forming, collectively,

constitutes what we mean by ideas, and by the presence of ideal truth and of ideal power, in the human being. They, in fact, constitute his humanity. For try to conceive a man without the ideas of God, eternity, freedom, will, absolute truth, of the good, the true, the beautiful, the infinite. An animal endowed with a memory of appearances and of facts might remain. But the man will have vanished, and you have instead a creature, *more subtle than any beast of the field*, but likewise *cursed above every beast of the field ; upon the belly must it go and dust must it eat all the days of its life*. But I recal myself from a train of thoughts little likely to find favour in this age of sense and selfishness.

the living tree of knowledge. It had the precedency because, under the name theology, were comprised all the main aids, instruments, and materials of national education, the *nisus formativus* of the body politic, the shaping and informing spirit, which, educing or eliciting the latent man in all the natives of the soil, trains them up to be citizens of the country, free subjects of the realm. And lastly, because to divinity belong those fundamental truths, which are the common ground-work of our civil and our religious duties, not less indispensable to a right view of our temporal concerns, than to a rational faith respecting our immortal well-being. Not without celestial observations can even terrestrial charts be accurately constructed. And of especial importance is it to the objects here contemplated, that only by the vital warmth diffused by these truths throughout the many, and by the guiding light from the philosophy, which is the basis of divinity, possessed by the few, can either the community or its rulers fully comprehend, or rightly appreciate, the permanent distinction and the occasional contrast between cultivation and civilisation; or be made to understand this most valuable of the lessons taught by history, and exemplified alike in her oldest and her most recent records—that a nation can never be a too cultivated, but may easily become an over-civilised, race.

CHAPTER VI.

Secessions or offsets from the National Clerisy. Usurpations and abuses previous to the Reformation. Henry VIII., what he might and should have done. The main end and final cause of the Nationalty ; and the duties, which the State may demand of the National Clerisy. A question, and the answer to it.

As a natural consequence of the full development and expansion of the mercantile and commercial order, which in the earlier epochs of the constitution only existed, as it were, potentially and in the bud ; the students and possessors of those sciences, and those sorts of learning, the use and necessity of which were indeed constant and perpetual to the nation, but only accidental and occasional to individuals, gradually detached themselves from the Nationalty and the national clergy, and passed to the order, with the growth and thriving condition of which their emoluments were found to increase in equal proportion. Rather, perhaps, it should be said that under the common name of professional, the learned in the departments of law, medicine

and the like, formed an intermediate link between the established clergy and the burgesses.

This circumstance, however, can in no way affect the principle, nor alter the tenure, nor annul the rights of those who remained, and who, as members of the permanent learned class, were planted throughout the realm, each in his appointed place, as the immediate agents and instruments in the great and indispensable work of perpetuating, promoting, and increasing the civilisation of the nation, and who thus fulfilling the purposes for which the determinate portion of the total wealth from the land had been reserved, are entitled to remain its trustees and usufructuary proprietors. But I do not assert that the proceeds from the Nationalty cannot be rightfully vested, except in what we now mean by clergymen and the established clergy. I have everywhere implied the contrary. But I do assert, that the Nationalty cannot rightfully, and that without foul wrong to the nation it never has been, alienated from its original purposes. I assert that those who, being duly elected and appointed thereto, exercise the functions, and perform the duties, attached to the Nationalty, possess collectively an inalienable, indefeasible, title to the same; and this by a *jus divinum*, to which the thunders from Mount Sinai might give additional authority, but not additional evidence.

COROLLARY.—During the dark times, when the *incubus* of superstition lay heavy across the breast of the living and the dying; and when all the familiar tricky spirits in the service of an alien, self-expatriated and anti-national priesthood were at work in all forms and in all directions to aggrandise and enrich a *kingdom of this world*; large masses were alienated from the heritable proprieties of the realm, and confounded with the Nationalty under the common name of Church property. Had every rood, every peppercorn, every stone, brick, and beam been re-transferred and made heritable at the Reformation, no right would have been invaded, no principle of justice violated. What the State by law—that is, by the collective will of its functionaries at any one time assembled—can do or suffer to be done; that the State by law can undo or inhibit. And in principle, such bequests and donations were vicious *ab initio*, implying in the donor an absolute property in land, unknown to the constitution of the realm, and in defeasance of that immutable reason which, in the name of the nation and the national majesty, proclaims:—"The land is not yours; it was vested in your lineage in trust for the nation." And though, in change of times and circumstances, the interest of progression, with the means and motives for the same—hope, industry, enterprise—may render it the

wisdom of the State to facilitate the transfer from line to line, still it must be within the same scale and with preservation of the balance. The most honest of our English historians, and with no superior in industry and research, Mr. Sharon Turner, has laboured successfully in detaching from the portrait of our first Protestant king the layers of soot and blood, with which pseudo-Catholic hate and pseudo-Protestant candour had coated it. But the name of Henry VIII. would have outshone that of Alfred, and with a splendour which not even the ominous shadow of his declining life would have eclipsed, had he retained the will and possessed the power of effecting, what in part he promised and proposed to do ; that is, if he had availed himself of the wealth and landed masses that had been unconstitutionally alienated from the State, namely, transferred from the scale of heritable lands and revenues, to purchase and win back whatever had been alienated from the opposite scale of the Nationalty ;—wrongfully alienated ; for it was a possession, in which every free subject in the nation has a living interest, a permanent, and likewise a possible personal and reversionary, interest ;—sacrilegiously alienated ; for it had been consecrated τῷ θεῷ οἰκεῖον, to the potential divinity in every man, which is the ground and condition of his civil existence, that without which a man can

be neither free nor obliged, and by which alone, therefore, he is capable of being a free subject or a citizen: and if, I say, having thus righted the balance on both sides, Henry had then directed the Nationalty to its true national purposes, (in order to which, however, a different division and subdivision of the kingdom must have superseded the present barbarism, which forms an obstacle to the improvement of the country, of much greater magnitude than men are generally aware); and the Nationalty had been distributed in proportionate channels to the maintenance;—1, of the universities and great schools of liberal learning;—2, of a pastor, presbyter, or parson* in every parish;—3, of a school-master in every parish, who in due time, and under condition of a faithful performance of his arduous duties should succeed to the pastorate;

* *Persona κατ' ἐξοχήν; persona exemplaris*; the representative and exemplar of the personal character of the community or parish; of their duties and rights, of their hopes, privileges and requisite qualifications, as moral persons, and not merely living things. But this the pastoral clergy cannot be other than imperfectly; they cannot be that which it is the paramount end and object of their establishment and distribution throughout the country that they should be—each in his sphere the germ and *nucleus* of the progressive civilisation—unless they are in the rule married men and heads of families. This, however, is adduced only as an accessory to the great principle stated in a following page, as an instance of its beneficial consequences, not as the grounds of its validity.

so that both should be labourers in different compartments of the same field, workmen engaged in different stages of the same process, with such difference of rank, as might be suggested in the names pastor and sub-pastor, or as now exists between rector and curate, elder and deacon. Both alike, I say, being members and ministers of national Clerisy or Church, working to the same end, and determined in the choice of their means and the direction of their labours by one and the same object—namely, the production and reproduction, the preservation, continuance, and perfection of the necessary sources and conditions of national civilisation; this being itself an indispensable condition of national safety, power and welfare, the strongest security and the surest provision, both for the permanence and the progressive advance of whatever as laws, institutions, tenures, rights, privileges, freedoms, obligations, and the like, constitutes the public weal:—these parochial clerks being the great majority of the national clergy, the comparatively small remainder being principally *

* Considered, I mean, in their national relations, and in that which forms their ordinary, their most conspicuous purpose and utility; for God forbid, I should deny or forget that the sciences, and not only the sciences both abstract and experimental, but the *literæ humaniores*, the products of genial power, of whatever name, have an immediate and positive value even in their bearings on the national interests.

in ordine ad hos, Cleri doctores ut Clerus populi.

I may be allowed, therefore, to express the final cause of the whole by the office and purpose of the greater part; and this is, to form and train up the people of the country to be obedient, free, useful, organisable subjects, citizens, and patriots, living to the benefit of the State, and prepared to die for its defence. The proper object and end of the national Church is civilisation with freedom; and the duty of its ministers, could they be contemplated merely and exclusively as officiators of the national Church, would be fulfilled in the communication of that degree and kind of knowledge to all, the possession of which is necessary for all in order to their civility. By civility I mean all the qualities essential to a citizen, and devoid of which no people or class of the people can be calculated on by the rulers and leaders of the State for the conservation or promotion of its essential interests.

It follows, therefore, that in regard to the grounds and principles of action and conduct, the State has a right to demand of the national Church that its instructions should be fitted to diffuse throughout the people legality, that is, the obligations of a well calculated self-interest, under the conditions of a common interest determined by

common laws. At least, whatever of higher origin and nobler and wider aim the ministers of the national Church, in some other capacity, and in the performance of other duties, might labour to implant and cultivate in the minds and hearts of their congregations and seminaries, should include the practical consequences of the legality above-mentioned. The State requires that the basin should be kept full, and that the stream which supplies the hamlet and turns the mill, and waters the meadow-fields, should be fed and kept flowing. If this be done the State is content, indifferent for the rest, whether the basin be filled by the spring in its first ascent, and rising but a hand's-breadth above the bed; or whether, drawn from a more elevated source, shooting aloft in a stately column, that reflects the light of heaven from its shaft, and bears the *Iris, cæli decus, promissumque Jovis lucidum* on its spray, it fills the basin in its descent.

“In what relation, then, do you place Christianity to the national Church?” Though unwilling to anticipate what belongs to a part of my subject yet to come, namely, the Idea of the Catholic or Christian Church, I am still more averse to leave this question, even for a moment, unanswered. And this is my answer.

In relation to the national Church, Christianity,

or the Church of Christ, is a blessed accident,* a providential boon, a grace of God, a mighty and faithful friend, the envoy, indeed, and liege subject of another State, but which can neither administer the laws nor promote the ends of this other State, which is not of the world, without advantage, direct and indirect, to the true interests of the States, the aggregate of which is what we mean by the world, that is, the civilised world. As the olive tree is said in its growth to fertilise the surrounding soil, to invigorate the roots of the vines in its immediate neighbourhood, and to improve the strength and flavour of the wines; such is the relation of the Christian and the national Church. But as the olive is not the same plant with the vine, or with the elm or poplar (that is, the State) with which the vine is wedded; and as the vine with its prop may exist, though in less perfection, without the olive, or previously to its implantation;—even so is Christianity, and *à fortiori* any particular scheme of theology derived and supposed by its partizans to be deduced from Christianity, no essential part of the being of the national Church, however conducive or even indispensable it may be

* Let not the religious reader be offended with this phrase. I mean only that Christianity is an aid and instrument which no State or realm could have produced out of its own elements, which no State had a right to expect. It was, most awfully, a GOD-SEND !

to its well being. And even so a national Church might exist, and has existed, without, because before the institution of, the Christian Church ;—as the Levitical Church in the Hebrew constitution, and the Druidical in the Keltic, would suffice to prove.

But here I earnestly entreat that two things may be remembered—first, that it is my object to present the Idea of a national Church, as the only safe criterion by which the judgment can decide on the existing state of things; for when we are in full and clear possession of the ultimate aim of an institution, it is comparatively easy to ascertain in what respects this aim has been attained in other ways arising out of the growth of the nation, and the gradual and successive expansion of its germs; in what respects the aim has been frustrated by errors and diseases in the body politic; and in what respects the existing institution still answers the original purpose, and continues to be a mean to necessary or most important ends, for which no adequate substitute can be found. First, I say, let it be borne in mind that my object has been to present the idea of a national Church, not the history of the Church established in this nation. Secondly, that two distinct functions do not necessarily imply or require two different functionaries: nay, the perfection of each may require the union

of both in the same person. And in the instance now in question, great and grievous errors have arisen from confounding the functions ; and fearfully great and grievous will be the evils from the success of an attempt to separate them—an attempt long and passionately pursued, in many forms, and through many various channels, by a numerous party which has already the ascendancy in the State ; and which, unless far other minds and far other principles than those which the opponents of this party have hitherto allied with their cause, are called into action, will obtain the ascendancy in the nation.

I have already said that the subjects, which lie right and left of my road, or even jut into it, are so many and so important that I offer these pages but as a catalogue of texts and theses, which will have answered their purpose if they excite a certain class of readers to desire or to supply the commentary. But there will not be wanting among my readers men who are no strangers to the ways in which my thoughts travel : and the jointless sentences that make up the following chapter or inventory of regrets and apprehensions will suffice to possess them of the chief points that press on my mind.

The commanding knowledge, the power of truth, given or obtained by contemplating the subject in

the fontal mirror of the idea, is in Scripture ordinarily expressed by *vision* : and no dissimilar gift, if not rather in its essential characters the same, does a great living poet speak of, as

The vision and the faculty divine.

Indeed of the many political ground-truths contained in the Old Testament, I cannot recall one more worthy to be selected as the moral and *l'envoy* of a Universal History, than the text in Proverbs,* *Where no vision is, the people perisheth.*

It is now thirty years since the diversity of reason and the understanding, of an idea and a conception, and the practical importance of distinguishing the one from the other, were first made evident to me. And scarcely a month has passed during this long interval in which either books, or conversation, or the experience of life, have not supplied or suggested some fresh proof and instance of the mischiefs and mistakes derived from that ignorance of this truth, which I have elsewhere called the queen-bee in the hive of error.

Well and truly has the understanding been defined—*facultas mediata et mediorum*—the faculty of means to medial ends, that is, to such purposes or ends as are themselves but means to some ulterior end.

* xxix. 18.

My eye at this moment rests on a volume newly read by me, containing a well-written history of the inventions, discoveries, public improvements, docks, railways, canals, and the like, for about the same period, in England and Scotland. I closed it under the strongest impressions of awe, and admiration akin to wonder. We live, I exclaimed, under the dynasty of the understanding : and this is its golden age.

It is the faculty of means to medial ends. With these the age, this favoured land, teems : they spring up, the armed host,—*seges clypeata*—from the serpent's teeth sown by Cadmus :—

———— *mortalia semina, dentes.*

In every direction they advance, conquering and to conquer. Sea and land, rock, mountain, lake and moor, yea nature and all her elements, sink before them, or yield themselves captive ! But the ultimate ends ? Where shall I seek for information concerning these ? By what name shall I seek for the historiographer of reason ? Where shall I find the annals of her recent campaigns ? the records of her conquests ? In the facts disclosed by the Mendicity Society ? In the reports on the increase of crimes, commitments ? In the proceedings of the Police ? Or in the accumulating volumes on the horrors and perils of population ?

O voice, once heard
Delightfully, Increase and multiply !
Now death to hear ! For what can *we* increase
Or multiply,* *but woe, crime, penury.*

Alas ! for a certain class, the following chapter will, I fear, but too vividly show *the burden of the valley of vision*,—even the burden upon the crowned isle, *whose merchants are princes, whose traffickers are the honourable of the earth* ;—who *stretcheth out her hand over the sea*,—and *she is the mart of nations* ! †

* P. L. x. 729.—*Ed.*

† Isaiah, xxii., xxiii.

CHAPTER VII.

Regrets and Apprehensions.

THE National Church was deemed in the dark age of Queen Elizabeth, in the unenlightened times of Burleigh, Hooker, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Lord Bacon, a great venerable estate of the realm; but now by all the intellect of the kingdom it has been determined to be one of the many theological sects or communities established in the realm; yet distinguished from the rest by having its priesthood endowed, *durante bene placito*, by favour of the Legislature, that is, of the majority, for the time being, of the two houses of Parliament. The Church being thus reduced to a religion, religion *in genere* is consequently separated from the Church, and made a subject of Parliamentary determination, independently of this Church. The poor are withdrawn from the discipline of the Church. The education of the people is detached from the ministry of the Church. Religion becomes a noun of multitude, or *nomen collectivum*, expressing the aggregate of all the different groups of notions and

ceremonies connected with the invisible and supernatural. On the plausible (and in this sense on the word unanswerable) pretext of the multitude and variety of religions, and for the suppression of bigotry and negative persecution, national education is to be finally sundered from all religion, but speedily and decisively emancipated from the superintendence of the national Clergy. Education is to be reformed, and defined as synonymous with instruction. The axiom of education so defined is—knowledge being power, those attainments, which give a man the power of doing what he wishes in order to obtain what he desires, are alone to be considered as knowledge, or to be admitted into the scheme of national education. The subjects to be taught in the national schools are to be, reading, writing, arithmetic, the mechanic arts, elements and results of physical science, but to be taught, as much as possible, empirically. For all knowledge being derived from the senses, the closer men are kept to the fountain head, the more knowing they must become.

Popular ethics consist of a digest of the criminal laws, and the evidence requisite for conviction under the same: lectures on diet, on digestion, on infection, and the nature and effects of a specific *virus* incidental to and communicable by living bodies in the intercourse of society. And note, that in

order to balance the interests of individuals and the interests of the State, the dietetic and peptic text books are to be under the censorship of the Board of Excise.

Then we have game laws, corn laws, cotton factories, Spitalfields, the tillers of the land paid by poor rates, and the remainder of the population mechanised into engines for the manufactory of new rich men;—yea, the machinery of the wealth of the nation made up of the wretchedness, disease and depravity of those who should constitute the strength of the nation! Disease, I say, and vice, while the wheels are in full motion; but at the first stop the magic wealth-machine is converted into an intolerable weight of pauperism. But this partakes of history. The head and neck of the huge serpent are out of the den: the voluminous train is to come. What next? May I not whisper as a fear, what senators have promised to demand as a right? Yes! the next in my filial bodings is spoliation;—spoliation of the Nationalty, half thereof to be distributed among the land-owners, and the other half among the stock-brokers, and stock-owners, who are to receive it in lieu of the interest formerly due to them.

But enough. I will ask only one question. Has the national welfare, have the weal and happiness of the people, advanced with the increase

of the circumstantial prosperity? Is the increasing number of wealthy individuals that which ought to be understood by the wealth of the nation? In answer to this, permit me to annex the following chapter of contents of the moral history of the last 130 years.

A. A declarative act respecting certain parts of the Constitution, with provisions against further violation of the same, erroneously intituled, The Revolution of 1688.

B. The mechanico-corpuscular theory raised to the title of the mechanic philosophy, and espoused as a revolution in philosophy, by the actors and partizans of the (so called) Revolution in the State.

C. Result illustrated, in the remarkable contrast between the acceptation of the word, idea, before the Restoration, and the present use of the same word. Before 1660, the magnificent Son of Cosmo was wont to discourse with Ficini, Politian and the princely Mirandula on the ideas of will, God, freedom. Sir Philip Sidney, the star of serenest brilliance in the glorious constellation of Elizabeth's court, communed with Spenser on the idea of the beautiful; and the younger Algernon—soldier, patriot, and statesman—with Harrington, Milton, and Nevil on the idea of the State: and in what sense it may be more truly affirmed, that

the People, that is, the component particles of the body politic, at any moment existing as such, are in order to the State, than that the State exists for the sake of the People.

As to the present use of the word.

Dr. Holofernes, in a lecture on metaphysics, delivered at one of the Mechanics' Institutions, explodes all ideas but those of sensation; and his friend, Deputy Costard, has no idea of a better flavoured haunch of venison than he dined off at the London Tavern last week. He admits (for the Deputy has travelled) that the French have an excellent idea of cooking in general; but holds that their most accomplished *maîtres de cuisine* have no more idea of dressing a turtle than the Parisian *gourmands* themselves have any real idea of the true taste and colour of the fat.

D. Consequences exemplified. A state of nature, or the Ouran Outang theology of the origin of the human race, substituted for the first ten chapters of the Book of Genesis; rights of nature for the duties and privileges of citizens; idealess facts, misnamed proofs from history, grounds of experience, and the like, for principles and the insight derived from them. Our state-policy a Cyclops with one eye, and that in the back of the head; our measures become either a series of anachronisms, or a truckling to events instead of the science,

that should command them ; for all true insight is foresight. (Take as documents, the measures of the British Cabinet from the Boston Port-Bill, March, 1774 ; but particularly from 1789, to the Union with Ireland, and the Peace of Amiens.) Meantime, behold the true historical feeling, the immortal life of the nation, generation linked to generation by faith, freedom, heraldry, and ancestral fame, languishing, and giving place to the superstitions of wealth and newspaper reputation.

E. Talents without genius : a swarm of clever, well-informed men : an anarchy of minds, a despotism of maxims. Hence despotism of finance in government and legislation—of vanity and sciolism in the intercourse of life—of presumption, temerity, and hardness of heart in political economy.

F. The guess-work of general consequences substituted for moral and political philosophy, and its most familiar exposition adopted as a text-book in one of the Universities, and cited as authority in the Legislature. Hence *plebs pro senatu populoque* ; and the wealth of the nation (that is, of the wealthy individuals thereof,) and the magnitude of the revenue mistaken for the well-being of the people.

G. Gin consumed by paupers to the value of

about eighteen millions yearly: government by clubs of journeymen; by saint and sinner societies, committees, institutions; by reviews, magazines, and above all by newspapers: lastly, crimes quadrupled for the whole country, and in some counties decupled.

Concluding address to the Parliamentary leaders of the Liberalists and Utilitarians.

I respect the talents of many, and the motives and character of some, among you too sincerely to court the scorn which I anticipate. But neither shall the fear of it prevent me from declaring aloud, and as a truth which I hold it the disgrace and calamity of a professed statesman not to know and acknowledge, that a permanent, nationalised, learned order, a national clerisy or Church is an essential element of a rightly constituted nation, without which it wants the best security alike for its permanence and its progression; and for which neither tract societies nor conventicles, nor Lancasterian schools, nor mechanics' institutions, nor lecture bazaars under the absurd name of universities, nor all these collectively, can be a substitute. For they are all marked with the same asterisk of spuriousness, show the same distemper-spot on the front, that they are empirical specifics for morbid symptoms that help to feed and continue the disease.

But you wish for general illumination: you would spur-arm the toes of society: you would enlighten the higher ranks *per ascensum ab imis*. You begin, therefore, with the attempt to popularise science: but you will only effect its plebification. It is folly to think of making all, or the many, philosophers, or even men of science and systematic knowledge. But it is duty and wisdom to aim at making as many as possible soberly and steadily religious; inasmuch as the morality which the State requires in its citizens for its own well-being and ideal immortality, and without reference to their spiritual interest as individuals, can only exist for the people in the form of religion. But the existence of a true philosophy, or the power and habit of contemplating particulars in the unity and fontal mirror of the idea,—this in the rulers and teachers of a nation is indispensable to a sound state of religion in all classes. In fine, religion, true or false, is and ever has been the centre of gravity in a realm, to which all other things must and will accommodate themselves.

CHAPTER VIII.

The subject resumed, namely, the proper aims and characteristic directions and channels of the Nationalty. The benefits of the National Church in time past. The present beneficial influences and workings of the same.

THE deep interest which, during the far larger portion of my life since early manhood, I have attached to these convictions has, I perceive, hurried me onwards as in a rush from the letting forth of accumulated waters by the sudden opening of the sluice gates. It is high time that I should return to my subject. And I have no better way of taking up the thread of my argument than by re-stating my opinion, that our eighth Henry would have acted in correspondence with the great principles of our constitution, if, having restored the original balance on both sides, he had determined the Nationalty to the following objects : 1st. To the maintenance of the Universities and the great liberal schools : 2ndly. To the maintenance of a pastor and schoolmaster in every parish : 3rdly. To the raising and keeping in

repair of the churches, schools, and other buildings of that kind; and, lastly, to the maintenance of the proper, that is, the infirm, poor, whether from age or sickness: one of the original purposes of the national reserve being the alleviation of those evils, which in the best forms of worldly States must arise, and must have been foreseen as arising, from the institution of individual properties and primogeniture. If these duties were efficiently performed, and these purposes adequately fulfilled, the very increase of the population (which would, however, by these very means have been prevented from becoming a vicious population), would have more than counterbalanced those savings in the expenditure of the Nationalty occasioned by the detachment of the practitioners of Law, Medicine, and the like from the national clergy. That this transfer of the national reserve from what had become national evils to its original and inherent purpose of national benefits, instead of the sacrilegious alienation which actually took place—that this was impracticable, is historically true: but no less true is it philosophically, that this impracticability,—arising wholly from moral causes, that is, from loose manners and corrupt principles—does not rescue this wholesale sacrilege from deserving the character of the first and deadliest wound inflicted on the constitution of the kingdom:

which term, constitution, in the body politic, as in bodies natural, expresses not only what has been actually evolved from, but likewise whatever is potentially contained in, the seminal principle of the particular body, and would in its due time have appeared but for emasculation or disease. Other wounds, by which indeed the constitution of the nation has suffered, but which much more immediately concern the constitution of the Church, I shall perhaps find another place to mention.

The mercantile and commercial class, in which I here comprise all the four classes that I have put in antithesis to the landed order, the guardian and depository of the permanence of the realm, as more characteristically conspiring to the interests of its progression, the improvement and general freedom of the country — this class, as I have already remarked, in the earlier states of the constitution existed but as in the bud. Yet during all this period of potential existence, or what we may call the minority of the burgess order, the National Church was the substitute for the most important national benefits resulting from the same. The National Church presented the only breathing-hole of hope. The Church alone relaxed the iron fate by which feudal dependency, primogeniture, and entail would otherwise have predestined every

native of the realm to be lord or vassal. To the Church alone could the nation look for the benefits of existing knowledge, and for the means of future civilisation. Lastly, let it never be forgotten, that under the fostering wing of the Church the class of free citizens and burghers were reared. To the feudal system we owe the forms, to the Church the substance, of our liberty. I mention only two of many facts that would form the proof and comment of the above; first, the origin of towns and cities in the privileges attached to the vicinity of churches and monasteries, and which, preparing an asylum for the fugitive vassal and oppressed franklin, thus laid the first foundation of a class of freemen detached from the land;—secondly, the holy war, which the national clergy, in this instance faithful to their national duties, waged against slavery and villenage, and with such success, that in the reign of Charles II., the law* which declared every native of the realm free by birth had merely to sanction an *opus jam consummatum*. Our Maker has distinguished man from the brute that perishes, by making hope first

* The Author means the Act passed at the Restoration, 12 C. II. c. 24. “And these encroachments grew to be so universal, that when tenure in villenage was virtually abolished, (though copyholds were preserved) by the statute of Charles II., there was hardly a pure villein left in the nation.” Blackstone II. c. 6. 96.—*Ed.*

an instinct of his nature, and, secondly, an indispensable condition of his moral and intellectual progression :

For every gift of noble origin
Is breathed upon by Hope's perpetual breath.

WORDSWORTH.

But a natural instinct constitutes a right, as far as its gratification is compatible with the equal rights of others. And this principle may be expanded and applied to the idea of the National Church.

Among the primary ends of a State (in that highest sense of the word, in which it is equivalent to the nation, considered as one body politic, and therefore including the National Church), there are two, of which the National Church (according to its idea) is the especial and constitutional organ and means. The one is, to secure to the subjects of the realm, generally, the hope, the chance of bettering their own or their children's condition. And though during the last three or four centuries, the National Church has found a most powerful surrogate and ally for the effectuation of this great purpose in her former wards and foster-children, that is, in trade, commerce, free industry, and the arts ; yet still the Nationalty, under all its defalcations, continues to feed the higher ranks by drawing up whatever is worthiest from below, and

thus maintains the principle of hope in the humblest families, while it secures the possessions of the rich and noble. This is one of the two ends. The other is, to develop in every native of the country those faculties, and to provide for every native that knowledge and those attainments, which are necessary to qualify him for a member of the State, the free subject of a civilised realm. I do not mean those degrees of moral and intellectual cultivation which distinguish man from man in the same civilised society, much less those that separate the Christian from the this-worldian; but those only that constitute the civilised man in contradistinction from the barbarian, the savage, and the animal.

I have now brought together all that seemed requisite to put the intelligent reader in full possession of (what I believe to be) the right idea of the National Clergy, as an estate of the realm. But I cannot think my task finished without an attempt to rectify the too frequent false feeling on this subject, and to remove certain vulgar errors—errors, alas! not confined to those whom the world call the vulgar. *Ma nel mondo non è se non volgo*, says Machiavel. I shall make no apology, therefore, for interposing between the preceding statements and the practical conclusion from them the following paragraph extracted from a work long

out of print,* and of such very limited circulation that I might have stolen from myself with little risk of detection, had it not been my wish to show that the convictions expressed in the preceding pages are not the offspring of the moment, brought forth for the present occasion; but an expansion of sentiments and principles publicly avowed in the year 1817.

Among the numerous blessings of the English Constitution, the introduction of an established Church makes an especial claim on the gratitude of scholars and philosophers; in England, at least, where the principles of Protestantism have conspired with the freedom of the government to double all its salutary powers by the removal of its abuses.

That the maxims of a pure morality, and those sublime truths of the divine unity and attributes, which a Plato found hard to learn and more difficult to reveal; that these should have become the almost hereditary property of childhood and poverty, of the hovel and the workshop; that even to the unlettered they sound as common-place; this is a fact which must withhold all but minds of the most vulgar cast from undervaluing the services even of the pulpit and the reading-desk. Yet he who should confine the efficiency of an established

* Biog. Lit. Vol. I. chap. xi.—*Ed.*

Church to these can hardly be placed in a much higher rank of intellect. That to every parish throughout the kingdom there is transplanted a germ of civilisation; that in the remotest villages there is a *nucleus*, round which the capabilities of the place may crystallise and brighten; a model sufficiently superior to excite, yet sufficiently near to encourage and facilitate, imitation; this inobtrusive, continuous agency of a Protestant Church Establishment, this it is which the patriot and the philanthropist, who would fain unite the love of peace with a faith in the progressive amelioration of mankind, cannot estimate at too high a price. *It cannot be valued with the gold of Ophir, with the precious onyx, or the sapphire. No mention shall be made of coral or of pearls; for the price of wisdom is above rubies.* The clergyman is with his parishioners and among them; he is neither in the cloistered cell, nor in the wilderness, but a neighbour and family-man, whose education and rank admit him to the mansion of the rich-landholder while his duties make him the frequent visiter of the farm-house and the cottage. He is, or he may become, connected with the families of his parish or its vicinity by marriage. And among the instances of the blindness or at best of the short-sightedness, which it is the nature of cupidity to inflict, I know few more striking than the clamours

of the farmers against Church property. Whatever was not paid to the clergymen would inevitably at the next renewal of the lease be paid to the landholder, while, as the case at present stands, the revenues of the Church are in some sort the reversionary property of every family that may have a member educated for the Church or a daughter that may marry a clergyman. Instead of being foreclosed and immoveable, it is, in fact, the only species of landed property that is essentially moving and circulative. That there exist no inconveniences, who will pretend to assert? But I have yet to expect the proof that the inconveniences are greater in this than in any other species; or that either the farmers or the clergy would be benefited by forcing the latter to become either Trullibers or salaried placemen. Nay, I do not hesitate to declare my firm persuasion that whatever reason of discontent the farmers may assign, the true cause is that they may cheat the parson but cannot cheat the steward: and that they are disappointed if they should have been able to withhold only two pounds less than the legal claim, having expected to withhold five.

CHAPTER IX.

Practical Conclusion : What unfits for, and what excludes from, the National Church.

THE Clerisy, or National Church, being an estate of the realm, the Church and State, with the King as the sovereign head of both, constituting the body politic, the State in the larger sense of the word, or the nation dynamically considered (*ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα*, that is, as an ideal, but not the less actual and abiding, unity); and in like manner, the Nationalty being one of the two constitutional modes or species, of which the common wealth of the nation consists; it follows by immediate consequence, that of the qualifications and preconditions for the trusteeship, absolutely to be required of the order collectively, and of every individual person as the conditions of his admission into this order, and of his capability of the usufruct or life-interest of any part or parcel of the Nationalty, the first and most indispensable, that without which all others are null and void, is, that the national Clergy and every member of the same from the highest to the lowest, shall be fully and exclusively citizens of the

State, neither acknowledging the authority, nor within the influence, of any other state in the world ;—full and undistracted subjects of this kingdom, and in no capacity, and under no pretences, owning any other earthly sovereign or visible head but the King, in whom alone the majesty of the nation is apparent, and by whom alone the unity of the nation in will and in deed is symbolically expressed and impersonated.

The full extent of this first and absolutely necessary qualification will be best seen in stating the contrary, that is, the absolute disqualifications, the existence of which in any individual, and in any class or order of men, constitutionally incapacitates such individual and class or order from being inducted into the national trust: and this on a principle so vitally concerning the health and integrity of the body politic, as to render the voluntary transfer of the Nationalty, whole or in part, direct or indirect, to an order notoriously thus disqualified, a foul treason against the most fundamental rights and interests of the realm, and of all classes of its citizens and free subjects, the individuals of the very order itself, as citizens and subjects, not excepted. Now there are two things, and but two, which evidently and predeterminably disqualify for this great trust: the first absolutely; and the second,—which in its collective operation,

and as an attribute of the whole class, would, of itself, constitute the greatest possible unfitness for the proper ends and purposes of the National Church, as explained and specified in the preceding paragraphs, and the heaviest drawback from the civilising influence of the national Clergy in their pastoral and parochial character—the second, I say, by implying the former, becomes likewise an absolute ground of disqualification. It is scarcely necessary to add, what the reader will have anticipated, that the first absolute disqualification is allegiance to a foreign power: the second, the abjuration—under the command and authority of this power, and as by the rule of their order its professed lieges (*alligati*) — of that bond, which more than all other ties connects the citizen with his country; which beyond all other securities affords the surest pledge to the State for the fealty of its citizens, and that which (when the rule is applied to any body or class of men, under whatever name united, where the number is sufficiently great to neutralise the accidents of individual temperament and circumstances,) enables the State to calculate on their constant adhesion to its interests, and to rely on their faith and singleness of heart in the due execution of whatever public or national trust may be assigned to them.

But I shall, perhaps, express the nature of this

security more adequately by the negative. The marriage tie is a bond the preclusion of which by an antecedent obligation, that overrules the accidents of individual character and is common to the whole order, deprives the State of a security with which it cannot dispense. I will not say that it is a security which the State may rightfully demand of all its adult citizens, competently circumstanced, by positive enactment: though I might shelter the position under the authority of the great publicists and state-lawyers of the Augustan age, who, in the *Lex Papia Poppæa** enforced anew a principle common to the old Roman Constitution with that of Sparta. But without the least fear of confutation, though in the full foresight of vehement contradiction, I do assert that the State may rightfully demand of any number of its subjects united in one body or order the absence of all customs, initiative vows, covenants and by-laws in that order, precluding the members of such body collectively and individually from affording this security. In strictness of principle, I might here conclude the sentence, though as it now stands it would involve the assertion of a right in the State to suppress any order confederated under laws so

* A.U.C. 762.—*inditi custodes, et lege Papia Poppæa præmiis inducti, ut, si a privilegiis parentum cessaretur, velut parens omnium populus vacantia teneret.* Tac. Ann. III. 28.—Ed.

anti-civic. But I am no friend to any rights that can be disjoined from the duty of enforcing them. I therefore at once confine and complete the sentence thus:—The State not only possesses the right of demanding, but is in duty bound to demand, the above as a necessary condition of its entrusting to any order of men, and to any individual as a member of a known order, the titles, functions, and investments of the National Church.

But if any doubt could attach to the proposition, whether thus stated or in the perfectly equivalent converse, that is, that the existence and known enforcement of the injunction or prohibitory by-law, before described, in any order or incorporation, constitutes an *a priori* disqualification for the trusteeship of the Nationalty, and an insuperable obstacle to the establishment of such an order or of any members of the same as a national Clergy, —such doubt would be removed, as soon as this injunction, or vow exacted and given, or whatever else it may be, by which the members of the order, collectively and as such, incapacitate themselves from affording this security for their full, faithful, and unbiassed application of a national trust to its proper and national purposes, is found in conjunction with, and aggravated by, the three following circumstances: — First, that this incapacitation originates in, and forms part of, the allegiance of

the order to a foreign sovereignty: secondly, that it is notorious that the canon or prescript, on which it is grounded, was first enforced on the secular clergy universally, after long and obstinate reluctance on their side, and on that of their natural sovereigns in the several realms, to which as subjects they belonged; and that it is still retained in force, and its revocation inflexibly refused, as the direct and only adequate means of supporting that usurped and foreign sovereignty, and of securing by virtue of the expatriating and insulating effect of its operation, the devotion and allegiance of the order* to their visible head and sovereign: and thirdly, that the operation of the interdict precludes one of the most constant and influential ways and means of promoting the great paramount end of a National Church, the progressive civilisation of the community.

Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.

* For the fullest and ablest exposition of this point, I refer to the Rev. Joseph Blanco White's "Practical and Internal Evidence against Catholicism," and to that admirable work, "*Riforma d'Italia*," written by a professed and apparently sincere Roman Catholic, a work which well merits translation. I know no work so well fitted to soften the prejudices against the theoretical doctrines of the Latin Church, and to deepen our reprobation of what it actually, and practically is in all countries where the expediency of keeping up appearances, as in Protestant neighbourhoods, does not operate.

And now let me conclude these preparatory notices by compressing the sum and substance of my argument into this one sentence. Though many things may detract from the comparative fitness of individuals or of particular classes for the trust and functions of the Nationalty, there are only two absolute disqualifications: and these are, allegiance to a foreign power, or the acknowledgment of any other visible head of the Church, but our sovereign lord the King: and compulsory celibacy in connection with, and in dependence on, a foreign and extra-national head.

CHAPTER X.

On the King and the Nation.

A TREATISE? why, the subjects might, I own, excite some apprehension of the sort. But it will be found like sundry Greek treatises among the tinder-rolls of Herculaneum, with titles of as large promise, somewhat largely and irregularly abbreviated in the process of unrolling. In fact, neither my purpose nor my limits permit more than a few hints which may prepare the reader for some of the positions assumed in the second part of this volume.

Of the King with the two Houses of Parliament, as constituting the State (in the especial and antithetic sense of the word) I have already spoken: and what remains is only to determine the proper and legitimate objects of its superintendence and control. On what is the power of the State rightfully exercised? Now, I am not arguing in a court of law; and my purpose would be grievously misunderstood if what I say should be taken as intended for an assertion of the fact. Neither of

facts, nor of statutory and demandable rights do I speak : but exclusively of the State according to the idea. And in accordance with the idea of the State, I do not hesitate to answer that the legitimate objects of its power comprise all the interests and concerns of the Proprietage, both landed and personal, and whether inheritably vested in the lineage or in the individual citizen ; and these alone. Even in the lives and limbs of the lieges the King, as the head and arm of the State, has an interest of property : and in any trespass against them the King appears as plaintiff.

The chief object for which men, who from the beginning existed as a social bond, first formed themselves into a state, and on the social superinduced the political relation, was not the protection of their lives but of their property. The natural man is too proud an animal to admit that he needs any other protection for his life than what his own courage and that of his clan can bestow. Where the nature of the soil and climate has precluded all property but personal, and admitted that only in its simplest forms, as in Greenland for instance,—there men remain in the domestic state and form neighbourhoods, not governments. And in North America the chiefs appear to exercise government in those tribes only which possess individual landed property. Among the rest the

chief is the general, a leader in war ; not a magistrate. To property and to its necessary inequalities must be referred all human laws, that would not be laws without and independent of any conventional enactment ; that is, all State-legislation.*

Next comes the King, as the head of the National Church or Clerisy, and the protector and supreme trustee of the Nationalty : the power of the same in relation to its proper objects being exercised by the King and the Houses of Convocation, of which, as before of the State, the King is the head and arm. And here if it had been my purpose to enter at once on the development of this position, together with the conclusions to be drawn from it, I should need with increased earnestness remind the reader that I am neither describing what the National Church now is, nor determining what it ought to be. My statements respect the idea alone as deduced from its original purpose and ultimate aim : and of the idea only must my assertions be understood. But the full exposition of this point is not necessary for the appreciation of the late Bill which is the subject of the following part of the volume. It belongs indeed to the chapter with which I had intended to conclude this volume, and which, should my health permit, and the circumstances warrant it, it is still my intention to let

* See the Friend, i. p. 275. 4th edit.—*Ed.*

follow the present work—namely, my humble contribution towards an answer to the question, What is to be done now? For the present, therefore, it will be sufficient, if I recall to the reader's recollection that formerly the national Clerisy, in the two Houses of Convocation duly assembled and represented, taxed themselves. But as to the proper objects, on which the authority of the Convocation with the King at its head was to be exercised,—these the reader will himself without difficulty decipher by referring to what has been already said respecting the proper and distinguishing ends and purposes of a National Church.

I pass, therefore, at once to the relations of the Nation, or the State in the larger sense of the word, to the State especially so named, and to the Crown. And on this subject again I shall confine myself to a few important, yet, I trust, not common nor obvious, remarks respecting the conditions requisite or especially favourable to the health and vigour of the realm. From these again I separate those, the nature and importance of which cannot be adequately exhibited but by adverting to the consequences which have followed their neglect or inobservance, reserving them for another place: while for the present occasion I select two only; but these, I dare believe, not unworthy the name of political principles, or maxims, that is, *regulæ quæ*

inter maximas numerari merentur. And both of them forcibly confirm and exemplify a remark, often and in various ways suggested to my mind, that with, perhaps, one* exception, it would be difficult in the whole compass of language to find a metaphor so commensurate, so pregnant, or suggesting so many points of elucidation, as that of body politic, as the exponent of a State or Realm. I have little admiration for the many-jointed similitudes of Flavel, and other finders of moral and spiritual meanings in the works of art and nature, where the proportion of the likeness to the difference not seldom reminds me of the celebrated comparison of the morning twilight to a boiled lobster.† But the correspondence between the body politic and the body natural holds even in the detail of application. Let it not, however, be supposed that I expect to derive any proof of my positions from this analogy. My object in thus prefacing them is answered, if I have shown cause for the use of the physiological terms by which I have sought to render my meaning intelligible.

The first condition then required, in order to a sound constitution of the body politic, is a due proportion of the free and permeative life and

* That namely of the WORD (*John* i. 1.) for the Divine Alterity; the *Deus Alter et Idem* of Philo; *Deitas Objectiva*.

† Hudibras, Pt. II. c. 2, v. 29.—*Ed.*

energy of the nation to the organised powers brought within containing channels. What those vital forces that seem to bear an analogy to the imponderable agents, magnetic, or galvanic, in bodies inorganic, if indeed, they are not the same in a higher energy and under a different law of action—what these, I say, are in the living body in distinction from the fluids in the glands and vessels—the same, or at least holding a like relation, are the indeterminable, but yet actual, influences of intellect, information, prevailing principles and tendencies (to which we must add the influence of property, or income, where it exists without right of suffrage attached thereto), to the regular, definite, and legally recognised powers in the body politic. But as no simile runs on all four legs (*nihil simile est idem*), so here the difference in respect to the body politic is, that in sundry instances the former, that is, the permeative, species of force is capable of being converted into the latter, of being as it were organised and rendered a part of the vascular system, by attaching a measured and determinate political right or privilege thereto.

What the exact proportion, however, of the two kinds of force should be, it is impossible to predetermine. But the existence of a disproportion is sure to be detected sooner or later by the effects.

Thus: the ancient Greek democracies, the hot-beds of art, science, genius, and civilisation, fell into dissolution from the excess of the former, the permeative power deranging the functions, and by explosions shattering the organic structures, which they should have enlivened. On the contrary, the Republic of Venice fell by the contrary extremes. For there all political power was confined to the determinate vessels, and these becoming more and more rigid, even to an ossification of the arteries, the State, in which the people were nothing, lost all power of resistance *ad extra*.

Under this head, in short, there are three possible sorts of malformation to be noticed. The first is, the adjunction or concession of direct political power to personal force and influence, whether physical or intellectual, existing in classes or aggregates of individuals, without those fixed or tangible possessions, freehold, copyhold, or leasehold, in land, house, or stock. The power resulting from the acquisition of knowledge or skill, and from the superior development of the understanding is, doubtless, of a far nobler kind than mere physical strength and fierceness; the one being peculiar to the animal man, the other common to him with the bear, the buffalo, and the mastiff. And if superior talents, and the mere possession of knowledges, such as can be learned at Mechanics'

Institutions, were regularly accompanied with a will in harmony with the reason, and a consequent subordination of the appetites and passions to the ultimate ends of our being;—if intellectual gifts and attainments were infallible signs of wisdom and goodness in the same proportion, and the knowing and clever were always rational;—if the mere facts of science conferred or superseded the softening humanising influences of the moral world, that habitual presence of the beautiful or the seemly, and that exemption from all familiarity with the gross, the mean, and the disorderly, whether in look or language, or in the surrounding objects, in which the main efficacy of a liberal education consists;—and if, lastly, these acquirements and powers of the understanding could be shared equally by the whole class, and did not, as by a necessity of nature they ever must do, fall to the lot of two or three in each several group, club, or neighbourhood;—then, indeed, by an enlargement of the Chinese system, political power might not unwisely be conferred as the *honorarium* or privilege on having passed through all the forms in the national schools, without the security of political ties, without those fastenings and radical fibres of a collective and registrable property, by which the citizen inheres in and belongs to the commonwealth, as a constituent part either of the Proprietage, or of the

Nationalty ; either of the State or of the National Church. But as the contrary of all these suppositions may be more safely assumed, the practical conclusion will be—not that the requisite means of intellectual development and growth should be withholden from any native of the soil, which it was at all times wicked to wish, and which it would be now silly to attempt ; but that the gifts of the understanding, whether the boon of a genial nature, or the reward of more persistent application, should be allowed fair play in the acquiring of that proprietorship, to which a certain portion of political power belongs as its proper function. For in this way there is at least a strong probability that intellectual power will be armed with political power, only where it has previously been combined with and guarded by the moral qualities of prudence, industry, and self-control. And this is the first of the three kinds of mal-organisation in a state ;—namely, direct political power without cognisable possession.

The second is, the exclusion of any class or numerous body of individuals, who have notoriously risen into possession, and the influence inevitably connected with known possession, under pretence of impediments that do not directly or essentially affect the character of the individuals as citizens, or absolutely disqualify them for the performance

of civic duties. Imperfect, yet oppressive and irritating, ligatures these that peril the trunk, the circulating current of which they would withhold, even more than the limb which they would fain excommunicate.

The third and last is, a gross incorrespondency, in relation to our own country, of the proportion of the antagonist interests of the body politic in the representative body, in the two Houses of Parliament, to the actual proportion of the same interests and of the public influence exerted by the same in the nation at large. Whether in consequence of the gradual revolution which has transferred to the *magnates* of the landed interest so large a portion of that borough representation which was to have been its counterbalance; whether the same causes which have deranged the *equilibrium* of the landed and the* monied interests in the

* *Monied*, used arbitrarily, as in preceding pages the words, *Personal* and *Independent*, from my inability to find any one self-interpreting word, that would serve for the generic name of the four classes, on which I have stated the interest of progression more especially to depend, and with it the freedom which is the indispensable condition and propelling force of all national progress: even as the counter-pole, the other great interest of the body politic, its permanency, is more especially committed to the landed order, as its natural guardian and depository. I have therefore had recourse to the convenient figure of speech, by which a conspicuous part or feature of a subject is used to express the whole; and

Legislature have not likewise deranged the balance between the two unequal divisions of the landed

the reader will be so good as to understand, that the monied order in this place comprehends and stands for the commercial, manufacturing, distributive, and professional classes of the community.

Only a few days ago, an accident placed in my hand a work of which, from my very limited opportunities of seeing new publications, I had never before heard,—Mr. Crawford's *History of the Indian Archipelago*—the work of a wise as well as of an able and well-informed man. Need I add that it was no ordinary gratification to find that in respect of certain prominent positions, maintained in this volume, I had unconsciously been fighting behind the shield of one whom I deem it an honour to follow. But the sheets containing the passages having been printed off, I avail myself of this note to insert the sentences from Mr. Crawford's *History*, rather than lose the confirmation which a coincidence with so high an authority has produced on my own mind, and the additional weight which my sentiments will receive in the judgment of others. The first of the two extracts the reader will consider as annexed to pp. 27—29 of this volume; the second to the paragraph (p. 97) on the protection of property, as the end chiefly proposed in the formation of a fixed government, quoted from a work of my own, published ten or eleven years before the appearance of Mr. Crawford's *History*, which I notice in order to give the principle in question that probability of its being grounded in fact, which is derived from the agreement of two independent minds. The first extract Mr. Crawford introduces by the remark that the possession of wealth, derived from a fertile soil, encouraged the progress of absolute power in Java. He then proceeds—

EXTRACT I.

The devotion of a people to agricultural industry, by rendering themselves more tame and their property more tan-

interest itself, namely, the Major Barons, or great land-owners, with or without title, and the great body of the agricultural community, and thus given to the real or imagined interests of the comparatively few the imposing name of the interest of the whole, the landed interest ;—these are questions, to which the obdurate adherence to the jail-crowding game laws, (which, during the reading of the Litany, I have sometimes been tempted to include, by a sort of *sub intellige*, in the petitions—*from envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness ; from battle, murder, and sudden death, Good Lord, deliver us !*) to which the old corn laws, and the exclusion of the produce of our own colonies from our distilleries, during the war, against the earnest recommendation of the government, the retention of the statutes against usury, and other points of minor importance or of less safe handling, may seem at a first view to suggest

gible, went still farther towards it : for wherever agriculture is the principal pursuit, there it may certainly be reckoned, that the people will be found living under an absolute government.—Vol. iii. p. 24.

EXTRACT II.

In cases of murder, no distinction is made (in the ancient laws of the Indian Islanders) between wilful murder and chance-medley. It is the loss, which the family or tribe sustains, that is considered, and the pecuniary compensation was calculated to make up that loss.—Ib. p. 123.

an answer in the affirmative; but which, for reasons before assigned, I shall leave unresolved, content if only I have made the principle itself intelligible.

The following anecdote, for I have no means of ascertaining its truth, and no warrant to offer for its accuracy, I give not as a fact in proof of an overbalance of the landed interest, but as an indistinctly remembered hearsay, in elucidation of what is meant by the words. Some eighteen or twenty years ago—for so long I think it must have been, since the circumstance was first related to me—my illustrious (alas! I must add, I fear, my late) friend, Sir Humphrey Davy, at Sir Joseph Banks's request, analysed a portion of an East Indian import, known by the names of cutch, and *terra Japonica*; but which he ascertained to be a vegetable extract, consisting almost wholly of pure tannin; and further trials, with less pure specimens, still led to the conclusion that the average product would be seven parts in ten of the tanning principle. This discovery was * communicated to

* And, (if I recollect right, though it was not from him, that I received the anecdote) by a friend of Sir Humphrey's, whom I am proud to think my friend likewise, and by an elder claim:¹—a man whom I have seen now in his harvest

¹ The late excellent Thomas Poole of Nether Stowey, Somerset.—*Ed.*

the trade ; and on inquiry made at the India House, it was found that this cutch could be prepared in large quantities, and imported at a price which, after an ample profit to the importers, it would very well answer the purposes of the tanners to give. The trade, itself, too, was likely to be greatly

field, or the market, now in a committee-room with the Rickmans and Ricardos of the age ; at another time with Davy, Wollaston, and the Wedgwoods ; now with Wordsworth, Southey, and other friends not unheard of in the republic of letters ; now in the drawing-rooms of the rich and the noble, and now presiding at the annual dinner of a village benefit society ; and in each seeming to be in the very place he was intended for, and taking the part to which his tastes, talents, and attainments gave him an admitted right. And yet this is not the most remarkable, not the individualising, trait of my friend's character. It is almost overlooked in the originality and raciness of his intellect ; in the life, freshness, and practical value of his remarks and notices, truths plucked as they are growing, and delivered to you with the dew on them, the fair earnings of an observing eye, armed and kept on the watch by thought and meditation ; and above all, in the integrity or entireness of his being, (*integrum et sine cera vas*), the steadiness of his attachments, and the activity and persistency of a benevolence, which so graciously presses a warm temper into the service of a yet warmer heart, and so lights up the little flaws and imperfections, incident to humanity in its choicest specimens, that were their removal at the option of his friends, (and few have, or deserve to have so many) not a man among them but would vote for leaving him as he is.

This is a note digressive ; but, as the height of the offence is, that the garnish is too good for the dish, I shall confine my apology to a confession of the fault.

benefited and enlarged by being rendered less dependent on particular situations; while the reduction of the price at which it could be offered to the foreign consumer, acting in conjunction with the universally admitted superiority of the English leather, might be reasonably calculated on as enabling us to undersell our foreign rivals in their own markets. Accordingly, an offer was made on the part of the principal persons interested in the leather trade to purchase, at any price below the sum that had been stated to them as the highest or extreme price, as large a quantity as it was probable that the Company would find it feasible or convenient to import in the first instance. Well! the ships went out, and the ships returned, again and again: and no increase in the amount of the said *desideratum* appearing among the imports, enough only being imported to meet the former demand of the druggists, and (it is whispered) of certain ingenious transmuters of Bohea into Hyson, — my memory does not enable me to determine whether the inquiry into the occasion of this disappointment was made, or whether it was anticipated by a discovery that it would be useless. But it was generally understood that the tanners had not been the only persons, whose attention had been drawn to the qualities of the article, and the consequences of its importation; and that a very

intelligible hint had been given to persons of known influence in Leadenhall-street, that in case any such importation were allowed, the East India Company must not expect any support from the landed interest in Parliament at the next renewal, or motion for the renewal of their Charter. The East India Company might reduce the price of bark, one half or more; and the British navy, and the grandsons of our present senators, might thank them for thousands and myriads of noble oaks, left unstript in consequence—this may be true; but no less true is it, that the free merchants would soon reduce the price of good tea in the same proportion, and monopolists ought to have a feeling for each other.

CHAPTER XI.

The relations of the potential to the actual. The omnipotence of Parliament;—of what kind.

So much in explanation of the first of the two conditions* of the health and vigour of a body politic: and far more, I must confess, than I had myself reckoned on. I will endeavour to indemnify the reader by despatching the second in a few sentences, which could not so easily have been accomplished without the explanations given in the preceding paragraphs. For as we have found the first condition in the due proportion of the free and permeative life of the State to the powers organised, and severally determined by their appropriate containing or conducting nerves, or vessels; the second condition is a due proportion of the potential, that is, latent or dormant power to the actual power. In the first condition, both powers alike are awake and in act. The balance is produced by the polarisation of the actual power, that is, the opposition of the actual power organised to the

* See *ante*, p. 100.—*Ed.*

actual power free and permeating the organs. In the second, the actual power, *in toto*, is opposed to the potential. It has been frequently and truly observed that in England, where the ground plan, the skeleton, as it were, of the government is a monarchy, at once buttressed and limited by the aristocracy, (the assertions of its popular character finding a better support in the harangues and theories of popular men, than in state-documents and the records of clear history,) a far greater degree of liberty is, and long has been, enjoyed than ever existed in the ostensibly freest, that is, most democratic, commonwealths of ancient or of modern times ;—greater, indeed, and with a more decisive predominance of the spirit of freedom than the wisest and most philanthropic statesmen of antiquity, or than the great Commonwealth's-men, (the stars of that narrow interspace of blue sky between the black clouds of the first and second Charles's reigns) believed compatible, the one with the safety of the State, the other with the interests of morality.

Yes! for little less than a century and a half Englishmen have collectively and individually lived and acted with fewer restraints on their free-agency than the citizens of any known * republic, past or

* It will be thought, perhaps, that the United States of North America should have been excepted. But the identity

present. The fact is certain. It has been often boasted of, but never, I think, clearly explained. The solution must, it is obvious, be sought for in the combination of circumstances, to which we owe the insular privilege of a self-evolving Constitution: and the following will, I think, be found the main cause of the fact in question. Extremes meet—an adage of inexhaustible exemplification. A democratic republic and an absolute monarchy agree in this; that, in both alike, the nation or people delegates its whole power. Nothing is left obscure, nothing suffered to remain in the idea, unevolved and only acknowledged as an existing, yet indeterminable right. A Constitution such states can scarcely be said to possess. The whole will of the body politic is in act at every moment. But in the constitution of England according to the idea, (which in this instance has demonstrated its actuality by its practical influence, and this too though counter-worked by fashionable errors and maxims, that left their validity behind in the law-

of stock, language, customs, manners and laws scarcely allows me to consider this an exception: even though it were quite certain both that it is and that it will continue such. It was, at all events, a remark worth remembering, which I once heard from a traveller (a prejudiced one I must admit), that where every man may take liberties, there is little liberty for any man;—or, that where every man takes liberties, no man can enjoy any.

courts, from which they were borrowed) the nation has delegated its power, not without measure and circumscription, whether in respect of the duration of the trust, or of the particular interests entrusted.

The omnipotence of Parliament, in the mouth of a lawyer, and understood exclusively of the restraints and remedies within the competence of our law-courts, is objectionable only as bombast. It is but a puffing pompous way of stating a plain matter of fact. Yet in the times preceding the Restoration even this was not universally admitted. And it is not without a fair show of reason that the shrewd and learned author of "The Royalist's Defence," printed in the year 1648, (a tract of 172 pages, small quarto, from which I now transcribe,) thus sums up his argument and evidences :

"Upon the whole matter clear it is, the Parliament itself (that is, the King, the Lords, and Commons) although unanimously consenting, are not boundless : the Judges of the realm by the fundamental law of England have power to determine which Acts of Parliaments are binding and which void." p. 48.—That a unanimous declaration of the judges of the realm that any given Act of Parliament was against right reason and the fundamental law of the land (that is, the constitution of the realm), would render such Act null and void, was a principle that did not want defenders among

the lawyers of elder times. And in a state of society in which the competently informed and influential members of the community (the national Clerisy not included), scarcely perhaps trebled the number of the members of the two Houses, and Parliaments were so often tumultuary congresses of a victorious party rather than representatives of the State, the right and power here asserted might have been wisely vested in the judges of the realm: and with at least equal wisdom, under change of circumstances, has the right been suffered to fall into abeyance. "Therefore let the potency of Parliament be that highest and uttermost, beyond which a court of law looketh not: and within the sphere of the Courts *quicquid Rex cum Parlamento voluit, fatum sit!*"

But if the strutting phrase be taken, as from sundry recent speeches respecting the fundamental institutions of the realm it may be reasonably inferred that it has been taken, that is, absolutely, and in reference, not to our courts of law exclusively, but to the nation, to England with all her venerable heir-looms, and with all her germs of reversionary wealth,—thus used and understood, the omnipotence of Parliament is an hyberbole that would contain mischief in it, were it only that it tends to provoke a detailed analysis of the materials of the joint-stock company, to which so

terrific an attribute belongs, and the competence of the shareholders in this earthly omnipotence to exercise the same. And on this head the observations and descriptive statements given in the fifth chapter of the old tract, just cited, retain all their force; or if any have fallen off, their place has been abundantly filled up by new growths. The degree and sort of knowledge, talent, probity, and prescience, which it would be only too easy, were it not too invidious, to prove from acts and measures presented by the history of the last half century, are but scant measure even when exerted within the sphere and circumscription of the constitution, and on the matters properly and peculiarly appertaining to the State according to the idea;—this portion of moral and mental endowment placed by the side of the *plusquam*-gigantic height and amplitude of power, implied in the unqualified use of the phrase, omnipotence of Parliament, and with its dwarfdom intensified by the contrast, would threaten to distort the countenance of truth itself with the sardonic laugh of irony.*

* I have not in my possession the morning paper in which I read it, or I should with great pleasure transcribe an admirable passage from the present King of Sweden's Address to the Storthing, or Parliament of Norway, on the necessary limits of Parliamentary power, consistently with the existence of a constitution. But I can with confidence refer the reader to the speech, as worthy of an Alfred. Every

The non-resistance of successive generations has ever been, and with evident reason, deemed equivalent to a tacit consent, on the part of the nation, and as finally legitimating the act thus acquiesced in, however great a dereliction of principle, and breach of trust, the original enactment may have been. I hope, therefore, that without offence I may venture to designate the Septennial Act as an act of usurpation, tenfold more dangerous to the true liberty of the nation than the pretext for the measure, namely, the apprehended Jacobite leaven from a new election, was at all likely to have proved: and I repeat the conviction which I have expressed in reference to the practical suppression of the Convocation, that no great principle was ever invaded or trampled on, that did not sooner or later avenge itself on the country, and even on the governing classes themselves, by the consequences of the precedent. The statesman who has not learned this from history has missed its most valuable result, and might in my opinion as profitably, and far more delightfully, have devoted his hours of study to Sir Walter Scott's Novels.*

thing indeed that I have heard or read of this sovereign, has contributed to the impression on my mind, that he is a good and a wise man, and worthy to be the king of a virtuous people, the purest specimen of the Gothic race.

* This would not be the first time that these fascinating

But I must draw in my reins. Neither my limits permit, nor does my present purpose require, that I should do more than exemplify the limitation resulting from that latent or potential power, a due proportion of which to the actual powers I have stated as the second condition of the health and vigor of a body politic, by an instance bearing directly on the measure which in the following section I am to aid in appreciating, and which was the occasion of the whole work. The principle itself,—which, as not contained within the rule and compass of law, its practical manifestations being indeterminable and inappreciable *a priori*, and then only to be recorded as having manifested itself, when the predisposing causes and the enduring effects prove the unific mind and energy of the nation to have been in travail; when they have made audible to the historian that voice of the people which is the voice of God;—this principle, I say, (or the power, that is the subject of it) which by its very essence existing and working as an idea only, except in the rare and predestined epochs of growth and reparation, might seem to

volumes had been recommended as a substitute for history—a ground of recommendation, to which I could not conscientiously accede; though some half dozen of these Novels, with a perfect recollection of the contents of every page, I read over more often in the course of a year than I can honestly put down to my own credit.

many fitter matter for verse than for sober argument,—I will, by way of compromise, and for the amusement of the reader, sum up in the rhyming prose of an old Puritan poet, consigned to contempt by Mr. Pope, but whose writings, with all their barren flats and dribbling common-place, contain nobler principles, profounder truths, and more that is properly and peculiarly poetic, than are to be found in his own works.* The passage in question, however, I found occupying the last page on a flying-sheet of four leaves, entitled, *England's Misery and Remedy, in a judicious Letter from an Utter-Barrister to his Special Friend, concerning Lieut.-Col. Lilburne's Imprisonment in Newgate*; and I beg leave to borrow the introduction, together with the extract, or that part at least, which suited my purpose.

“Christian Reader, having a vacant place for

* If it were asked whether I consider the works of the one of equal value with those of the other, or hold George Withers to be as great a writer as Alexander Pope,—my answer would be that I am as little likely to do so as the querist would be to put no greater value on a highly wrought vase of pure silver from the hand of a master, than on an equal weight of copper ore that contained a small per centage of separable gold scattered through it. The reader will be pleased to observe that in the passage here cited, the “State” is used in the largest sense, and as synonymous with the realm, or entire body politic, including Church and State in the narrower and special sense of the latter term.

some few lines, I have made bold to use some of Major George Withers his verses out of *Vox Pacifica*, page 199.

“ Let not your King and Parliament in one,
Much less apart, mistake themselves for that
Which is most worthy to be thought upon :
Nor think they are, essentially, the State.
Let them not fancy, that th’ authority
And privileges upon them bestown,
Conferr’d are to set up a majesty,
A power, or a glory, of their own !
But let them know, ’twas for a deeper life,
Which they but represent——
That there’s on earth a yet auguster thing,
Veil’d tho’ it be, than Parliament and King.”

CHAPTER XII.

The preceding position exemplified. The origin and meaning of the Coronation Oath, in respect of the National Church. In what its moral obligation consists. Recapitulation.

AND here again the "Royalist's Defence" furnishes me with the introductory paragraph; and I am always glad to find in the words of an elder writer, what I must otherwise have said in my own person—*otium simul et auctoritatem*.

"All Englishmen grant, that arbitrary power is destructive of the best purposes for which power is conferred: and in the preceding chapter it has been shown, that to give an unlimited authority over the fundamental laws and rights of the nation, even to the King and two Houses of Parliament jointly, though nothing so bad as to have this boundless power in the King alone, or in the Parliament alone, were nevertheless to deprive Englishmen of the security from arbitrary power, which is their birth-right.

"Upon perusal of former statutes it appears, that the members of both Houses have been

frequently drawn to consent, not only to things prejudicial to the Commonwealth, but, (even in matters of greatest weight) to alter and contradict what formerly themselves had agreed to, and that, as it happened to please the fancy of the present Prince, or to suit the passions and interests of a prevailing faction. Witness the statute by which it was enacted that the proclamation of King Henry VIII. should be equivalent to an Act of Parliament; another declaring both Mary and Elizabeth bastards; and a third statute empowering the King to dispose of the Crown of England by will and testament. Add to these the several statutes in the times of King Henry VIII., Edward VI., Queen Mary, and Queen Elizabeth, setting up and pulling down each other's religion, every one of them condemning even to death the profession of the one before established."—*Royalist's Defence*, p. 41.

So far my anonymous author, evidently an old Tory lawyer of the genuine breed, too enlightened to obfuscate and incense-blacken the shrine, through which the kingly idea should be translucent, into an idol to be worshipped in its own right; but who, considering both the reigning Sovereign and the Houses, as limited and representative functionaries, thought he saw reason, in some few cases, to place more confidence in the former than

in the latter; while there were points, which he wished as little as possible to trust to either. With this experience, however, as above stated, (and it would not be difficult to increase the catalogue,) can we wonder that the nation grew sick of Parliamentary religions;—or that the idea should at last awake and become operative, that what virtually concerned their humanity and involved yet higher relations than those of the citizen to the State, duties more awful, and more precious privileges, while yet it stood in closest connection with all their civil duties and rights, as their indispensable condition and only secure ground—that this was not a matter to be voted up or down, off or on, by fluctuating majorities;—that it was too precious an inheritance to be left at the discretion of an omnipotency which had so little claim to omniscience? No interest this of a single generation, but an entailed boon too sacred, too momentous, to be shaped and twisted, pared down or plumped up, by any assemblage of Lords, Knights, and Burgesses for the time being;—men perfectly competent, it may be, to the protection and management of those interests in which, as having so large a stake, they may be reasonably presumed to feel a sincere and lively concern, but who, the experience of ages might teach us, are not the class of persons most likely to study or feel a deep concern

in the interests here spoken of, in either sense of the term Church;—that is, whether the interests be of a kingdom *not of the world*, or those of an estate of the realm, and a constituent part, therefore, of the same system with the State, though as the opposite pole. The results at all events have been such, whenever the representatives of the one interest have assumed the direct control of the other, as gave occasion long ago to the rhyming couplet, quoted as proverbial by Luther :

*Cum mare siccatur, cum Dæmon ad astra levatur,
Tunc clero laicus fidus amicus erit.*

But if the nation willed to withdraw the religion of the realm from the changes and revolutions incident to whatever is subjected to the suffrages of the representative assemblies, whether of the State or of the Church, the trustees of the Proprietary or those of the Nationalty, the first question is, how this reservation is to be declared and by what means to be effected. These means, the security for the permanence of the established religion, must, it may be foreseen, be imperfect; for what can be otherwise that depends on human will? but yet it may be abundantly sufficient to declare the aim and intention of the provision. Our ancestors did the best it was in their power to do. Knowing by recent experience that multitudes

never blush, that numerous assemblies, however respectably composed, are not exempt from temporary hallucinations and the influences of party passion; that there are things, for the conservation of which—

Men safer trust to heaven, than to themselves,
 When least themselves, in storms of loud debate,
 Where folly is contagious, and too oft
 Even wise men leave their better sense at home
 To chide and wonder at them, when return'd.*

Knowing this, our ancestors chose to place their reliance on the honour and conscience of an individual, whose comparative height, it was believed, would exempt him from the gusts and shifting currents that agitate the lower region of the political atmosphere. Accordingly, on a change of dynasty they bound the person, who had accepted the crown in trust,—bound him for himself and his successors by an oath to refuse his consent (without which no change in the existing law can be effected,) to any measure subverting or tending to subvert the safety and independence of the National Church, or which exposed the realm to the danger of a return of that foreign usurper misnamed spiritual, from which it had with so many sacrifices emancipated itself. However unconstitutional therefore the royal *veto* on a Bill presented

* Poet. Works, Vol. ii. p. 258.—*Ed.*

by the Lords and Commons may be deemed in all ordinary cases, this is clearly an exception. For it is no additional power conferred on the King; but a limit imposed on him by the constitution itself for its own safety. Previously to the ceremonial act, which announces him the only lawful and sovereign head of both the Church and the State, the oath is administered to him religiously as the representative person and crowned majesty of the nation. Religiously, I say;—for the mind of the nation, existing only as an idea, can act distinguishably on the ideal powers alone—that is, on the reason and conscience.

It only remains then to determine what it is to which the Coronation oath obliges the conscience of the King. And this may be best done by considering what in reason and in conscience the nation had a right to impose. Now that the nation had a right to decide for the King's conscience and reason, and for the reason and conscience of all his successors, and of his and their counsellors and ministers, laic and ecclesiastic, on questions of theology, and controversies of faith,—for example, that it is not allowable in directing our thoughts to a departed Saint, the Virgin Mary for instance, to say *Ora pro nobis, beata Virgo*, though there might, peradventure, be no harm in saying, *Oret pro nobis, precor, beata Virgo*; whether certain

books are to be holden canonical; whether the text, *They shall be saved as through fire*, refers to a purgatorial process in the body, or during the interval between its dissolution and the day of judgment; whether the words, *This is my body*, are to be understood literally, and if so, whether it is by consubstantiation with, or transubstantiation of, bread and wine; and that the members of both Houses of Parliament, together with the Privy Councillors and all the Clergy shall abjure and denounce the theory last mentioned—this I utterly deny. And if this were the whole and sole object and intention of the oath, however large the number might be of the persons who imposed or were notoriously favourable to the imposition, so far from recognising the nation in their collective number, I should regard them as no other than an aggregate of intolerant mortals, from bigotry and presumption forgetful of their fallibility, and not less ignorant of their own rights than callous to those of succeeding generations. If the articles of faith therein disclaimed and denounced were the substance and proper intention of the oath, and not to be understood, as in all common sense they ought to be, as temporary marks, because the known accompaniments, of other and legitimate grounds of disqualification; and which only in reference to these, and only as long as they implied

their existence, were fit objects of political interference; it would be as impossible for me, as for the late Mr. Canning, to attach any such sanctity to the Coronation oath as should prevent it from being superannuated in times of clearer light and less heat. But that these theological articles, and the open profession of the same by a portion of the King's subjects as parts of their creed, are not the evils which it is the true and legitimate purpose of the oath to preclude, and which constitute and define its obligation on the royal conscience; and what the real evils are, that do indeed disqualify for offices of national trust, and give the permanent obligatory character to the engagement—this,—in which I include the exposition of the essential characters of the Christian or Catholic Church; and of a very different Church, which assumes the name; and the application of the premises to an appreciation on principle of the late Bill, now the law of the land,—will occupy the remaining portion of the volume.

And now I may be permitted to look back on the road we have passed: in the course of which, I have placed before the reader a small part indeed of what might, on a suitable occasion, be profitably said; but it is all that for my present purpose I deem it necessary to say respecting three out of the five themes that were to form the subjects of

the first part of this little work. But let me avail myself of the pause to repeat my apology to the reader for any *extra* trouble I may have imposed on him, by employing the same term, the State, in two senses; though I flatter myself I have in each instance so guarded it as to leave scarcely the possibility that a moderately attentive reader should understand the word in one sense, when I had meant it in the other, or confound the State as a whole and comprehending the Church, with the State as one of the two constituent parts, and in contradistinction from the Church.

BRIEF RECAPITULATION.

First, then, I have given briefly but, I trust, with sufficient clearness, the right idea of a State, or body politic; the word State being here synonymous with a constituted realm, kingdom, commonwealth, or nation; that is, where the integral parts, classes, or orders are so balanced, or interdependent as to constitute, more or less, a moral unit, an organic whole; and as arising out of the idea of a State I have added the idea of a Constitution, as the informing principle of its coherence and unity. But in applying the above to our own kingdom (and with this qualification the reader is requested

to understand me as speaking in all the following remarks), it was necessary to observe, and I willingly avail myself of this opportunity to repeat the observation,—that the constitution, in its widest sense as the constitution of the realm, arose out of, and in fact consisted in, the co-existence of the constitutional State (in the second acceptance of the term) with the King as its head, and of the Church, that is, the National Church, with the King likewise as its head; and lastly of the King, as the head and majesty of the whole nation. The reader was cautioned therefore not to confound it with either of its constituent parts; that he must first master the true idea of each of these severally; and that in the *synopsis* or conjunction of the three the idea of the English constitution, the constitution of the realm, will rise of itself before him. And in aid of this purpose and following this order, I have given according to my best judgment, first, the idea of the State in the second or special sense of the term; of the State-legislature; and of the two constituent orders, the Landed, with its two classes, the Major Barons, and the Franklins; and the Personal, consisting of the mercantile, or commercial, the manufacturing, the distributive and the professional; these two orders corresponding to the two great all-including interests of the State,—the Landed, namely, to the

permanence,—the Personal to the progression. The possessions of both orders, taken collectively, form the* Proprietage of the realm. In contradistinction from this and as my second theme, I have explained (and it being the principal object of this work, more diffusely) the Nationalty, its nature and purposes, and the duties and qualifications of its trustees and functionaries. In the same sense in which I at once oppose and conjoin the Nationalty to the Proprietage; in the same *antithesis* and conjunction I use and understand the phrase, Church and State. Lastly, I have essayed to determine the constitutional idea of the Crown, and its relations to the nation, to which I have added a few sentences on the relations of the nation to the State.

To the completion of this first part of my undertaking, two subjects still remain to be treated of—and to each of these I shall devote a small section; the title of the first being, “On the idea of the Christian Church;” that of the other, “On a third

* To convey his meaning precisely is a debt which an Author owes to his readers. He therefore who, to escape the charge of pedantry, will rather be misunderstood than startle a fastidious critic with an unusual term, may be compared to the man who should pay his creditor in base or counterfeit coin, when he had gold or silver ingots in his possession, to the precise amount of the debt; and this under the pretence of their unshapeliness and want of the mint impression.

Church:” the name of which I withhold for the present, in the expectation of deducing it by contrast from the contradistinguishing characters of the former.

IDEA OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

“WE (said Luther), tell our Lord God plainly: If he will have his Church, then he must look how to maintain and defend it; for we can neither uphold nor protect it. And well for us, that it is so! For in case we could, or were able to defend it, we should become the proudest asses under heaven. Who is the Church’s protector, that hath promised to be with her to the end, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against her? Kings, Diets, Parliaments, Lawyers? Marry, no such cattle.”—*Luther’s Table Talk with additions.*—Ed.

IDEA OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.



THE practical conclusion from our inquiries respecting the origin and idea of the National Church, the paramount end and purpose of which is the continued and progressive civilisation of the community, (*emollit mores nec sinit esse feros*,) was this: that though many things may be conceived of a tendency to diminish the fitness of particular men, or of a particular class, to be chosen as trustees and functionaries of the same; though there may be many points more or less adverse to the perfection of the establishment; there are yet but two absolute disqualifications; namely, allegiance to a foreign power, or an acknowledgment of any other visible head of the Church but our sovereign lord the King; and compulsory celibacy in connection with, and dependence on, a foreign and extra-national head. I now call the reader to a different contemplation, to the idea of the Christian Church.

Of the Christian Church, I say, not of Christianity.

To the ascertainment and enucleation of the latter, of the great redemptive process which began in the separation of light from Chaos (*Hades*, or the indistinction), and has its end in the union of life with God, the whole summer and autumn and now commenced winter of my life have been dedicated. *Hic labor, hoc opus est*, on which alone I rest my hope that I shall be found not to have lived altogether in vain. Of the Christian Church only, and of this no further than is necessary for the distinct understanding of the National Church, it is my purpose now to speak: and for this purpose it will be sufficient to enumerate the essential characters by which the Christian Church is distinguished.

I.—The Christian Church is not a kingdom, realm (*royaume*), or state (*sensu latiori*), of the world, that is, of the aggregate or total number of the kingdoms, states, realms, or bodies politic, (these words being, as far as the present argument is concerned, perfectly synonymous), into which civilised man is distributed; and which, collectively taken, constitute the civilised world. The Christian Church, I say, is no state, kingdom, or realm of this world; nor is it an estate of any such realm, kingdom or state; but it is the appointed opposite to them all collectively—the sustaining, correcting, befriending opposite of the world; the compensating

counterforce to the inherent* and inevitable evils and defects of the State, as a State, and without reference to its better or worse construction as a particular state; while whatever is beneficent and humanising in the aims, tendencies, and proper objects of the State, the Christian Church collects in itself as in a *focus*, to radiate them back in a higher quality; or to change the metaphor, it completes and strengthens the edifice of the State, without interference or commixture, in the mere act of laying and securing its own foundations. And for these services the Church of Christ asks of the State neither wages nor dignities. She asks only protection and to be let alone. These indeed she demands; but even these only on the ground that there is nothing in her constitution or in her discipline inconsistent with the interests of the State,

* It is not without pain that I have advanced this position, without the accompanying proofs and documents which it may be thought to require, and without the elucidations which I am sure it deserves; but which are precluded alike by the purpose and the limits of the present work. I will, however, take this opportunity of earnestly recommending to such of my readers as understand German, Lessing's *Ernst und Falk : Gespräche für Freymäurer*. They will find it in Vol. vii. of the Leipsic edition of Lessing's Works. I know no finer example of the point, elegance, and exquisite, yet effortless, precision and conciseness of Lessing's philosophic and controversial writings. I remember nothing that is at once like them, and equal to them, but the Provincial Letters of Pascal.

nothing resistant or impedimental to the State in the exercise of its rightful powers, in the fulfilment of its appropriate duties, or in the effectuation of its legitimate objects. It is a fundamental principle of all legislation, that the State shall leave the largest portion of personal free agency to each of its citizens, that is compatible with the free agency of all, and not subversive of the ends of its own existence as a state. And though a negative, it is a most important distinctive, character of the Church of Christ, that she asks nothing for her members as Christians, which they are not already entitled to demand as citizens and subjects.

II.—The Christian Church is not a secret community. In the once current (and well worthy to be re-issued) terminology of our elder divines, it is objective in its nature and purpose, not mystic or subjective, that is, not like reason or the court of conscience, existing only in and for the individual. Consequently the Church here spoken of is not *the kingdom of God which is within, and which cometh not with observation*,* but is most observable,—*a city built on a hill*, and not to be hid—an institution consisting of visible and public communities. In one sentence it is the Church visible and militant under Christ. And this

* Luke xvii. 21—20. See ib. xxi. 28, 31.—*Ed.*

visibility, this publicity, is its second distinctive character.

III.—The third character reconciles the two preceding and gives the condition, under which their co-existence in the same subject becomes possible. Antagonist forces are necessarily of the same kind. It is an old rule of logic, that only concerning two subjects of the same kind can it be properly said that they are opposites. *Inter res heterogeneas non datur oppositio*; that is, contraries cannot be opposites. Alike in the primary and the metaphorical use of the word, rivals (*rivales*) are those only who inhabit the opposite banks of the same stream.

Now, in conformity to the first character, the Christian Church is not to be considered as a counterpole to any particular State, the word being here taken in the largest sense. Still less can it, like the National Clerisy, be opposed to the State in the narrower sense. The Christian Church, as such, has no Nationalty entrusted to its charge. It forms no counter-balance to the collective Heritage of the realm. The phrase, Church and State, has a sense and a propriety in reference to the National Church alone. The Church of Christ cannot be placed in this conjunction and *antithesis* without forfeiting the very name of Christian. The true and only contra-position of the Christian

Church is to the World. Her paramount aim and object, indeed, is another world, not a world to come exclusively, but likewise another world that now is,* and to the concerns of which alone the epithet spiritual can, without a mischievous abuse of the word, be applied. But as the necessary consequence and accompaniments of the means by which she seeks to attain this especial end, and as a collateral object, it is her office to counteract the evils that result by a common necessity from all bodies politic, the system or aggregate of which is the world. And observe that the *nisus*, or counter-agency, of the Christian Church is against the evil results only, and not (directly, at least, or by primary intention) against the defective institutions that may have caused or aggravated them.

But on the other hand, by virtue of the second character, the Christian Church is to exist in every kingdom and state of the world, in the form of public communities, and is to exist as a real and ostensible power. The consistency of the first and second character depends on, and is fully effected by, the third character of the Church of Christ; namely,—

The absence of any visible head or sovereign, and by the non-existence, nay the utter preclusion,

* See Appendix to this Treatise.—*Ed.*

of any local or personal centre of unity, of any single source of universal power. This fact may be thus illustrated. Kepler and Newton, substituting the idea of the infinite for the conception of a finite and determined world, assumed, in the Ptolemaic astronomy, superseded and drove out the notion of a one central point or body of the universe. Finding a centre in every point of matter and an absolute circumference no where, they explained at once the unity and the distinction that co-exist throughout the creation by focal instead of central bodies: the attractive and restraining power of the sun or focal orb, in each particular system, supposing and resulting from an actual power, present in all and over all, throughout an indeterminable multitude of systems. And this, demonstrated as it has been by science, and verified by observation, we rightly name the true system of the heavens. And even such is the scheme and true idea of the Christian Church. In the primitive times, and as long as the churches retained the form given them by the Apostles and Apostolic men, every community, or in the words of a Father of the second century, (for the pernicious fashion of assimilating the Christian to the Jewish, as afterwards to the Pagan, ritual by false analogies was almost coeval with the Church itself,) every altar had its own bishop, every flock its own pastor,

who derived his authority immediately from Christ, the universal Shepherd, and acknowledged no other superior than the same Christ, speaking by his spirit in the unanimous decision of any number of bishops or elders, according to his promise, *Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.**

* Questions of dogmatic divinity do not enter into the purpose of this work; and I am even anxious not to give it a theological character. It is, however, within the scope of my argument to observe that, as may be incontrovertibly proved by other equivalent declarations of our Lord, this promise is not confined to houses of worship and prayer-meetings exclusively. And though I cannot offer the same justification for what follows, yet the interest and importance of the subject will, I trust, excuse me if I remark that, even in reference to meetings for divine worship, the true import of these gracious, soul-awing, words is too generally overlooked. It is not the comments or harangues of unlearned and fanatical preachers that I have in my mind, but sermons of great and deserved celebrity, and divines whose learning, well-regulated zeal, and sound Scriptural views are as honourable to the Church, as their piety, beneficence, and blameless life, are to the Christian name, when I say that passages occur which might almost lead one to conjecture that the authors had found the words, "I will come and join you," instead of, *I am in the midst of you*,—passages from which it is at least difficult not to infer that they had interpreted the promise, as of a corporal co-presence, instead of a spiritual immanence (ὅτι μένει ἐν ἡμῖν) as of an individual coming in or down, and taking a place, as soon as the required number of petitioners was completed; as if, in short, this presence, this actuation of the I AM, (εἰμι ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν) were an after-consequence, an accidental and separate result and

Hence the unitive relation of the churches to each other, and of each to all, being equally actual

reward of the contemporaneous and contiguous worshipping—and not the total act itself, of which the spiritual Christ, one and the same in all the faithful, is the originating and perfective focal unity. Even as the physical life is in each limb and organ of the body, all in every part; but is manifested as life, by being one in all and thus making all one; even so with Christ, our spiritual life. He is in each true believer, in his solitary prayer and during his silent communion in the watches of the night, no less than in the congregation of the faithful; but he manifests his indwelling presence more characteristically, with especial evidence, when many, convened in his name, whether for prayer or for council, do through him become one.

I would that these preceding observations were as little connected with the main subject of this volume, as to some they will appear to be. But as the mistaking of symbols and analogies for metaphors has been a main occasion and support of the worst errors in Protestantism: so the understanding the same symbols in a literal or phenomenal sense, notwithstanding the most earnest warnings against it, the most express declarations of the folly and danger of interpreting sensually what was delivered of objects supersensual—this was the rank wilding, on which *the prince of this world*, the lust of power and worldly aggrandizement, was enabled to graft, one by one, the whole branchery of Papal superstition and imposture. A truth not less important might be conveyed by reversing the image;—by representing the Papal monarchy as the stem or trunk circulating a poison-snap through the branches successively grafted thereon, the previous and natural fruit of which was at worst only mawkish and innutritious. Yet among the dogmas or articles of belief that contra-distinguish the Roman from the Reformed Churches, the most important and, in their practical effects and consequences, the most pernicious

indeed, but likewise equally ideal, that is, mystic and supersensual, as the relation of the whole

I cannot but regard as refracted and distorted truths, profound ideas sensualised into idols, or at the lowest rate lofty and affecting imaginations, safe while they remained general and indefinite, but debased and rendered noxious by their application in detail: for example, the doctrine of the Communion of Saints, or the sympathy between all the members of the universal Church, which death itself doth not interrupt, exemplified in St. Anthony and the cure of sore eyes, St. Boniface and success in brewing, and other such follies. What the same doctrines now are, used as the pretexts and shaped into the means and implements of priestly power and revenue: or rather, what the whole scheme is of Romish rites, doctrines, institutions, and practices in their combined and full operation, where it exists in undisputed sovereignty, neither repressed by the prevalence, nor modified by the light, of a purer faith, nor holden in check by the consciousness of Protestant neighbours and lookers-on;—this is a question which cannot be kept too distinct from the former. And, as at the risk of passing for a secret favourer of superannuated superstitions, I have spoken out my thoughts of the Roman theology, so, and at a far more serious risk of being denounced as an intolerant bigot, I will declare what, after a two years' residence in exclusively Popish countries, and in situations and under circumstances that afforded more than ordinary means of acquainting myself with the workings and the proceeds of the machinery, was the impression left on my mind as to the effects and influences of the Romish (most un-Catholic) religion,—not as even according to its own canons and authorized decisions it ought to be; but, as it actually and practically exists. This impression, and the convictions grounded thereon, which have assuredly not been weakened by the perusal of Mr. Blanco White's most affecting statements, and by the recent history of Spain and Portugal, I cannot convey more satisfactorily to myself than

Church to its one invisible Head, the Church with and under Christ, as a one kingdom or state, is hidden: while in all its several component monads, (the particular visible churches I mean,) Cæsar receiving the things that are Cæsar's, and confronted by no rival Cæsar, by no authority, which existing locally, temporally, and in the person of a fellow mortal, must be essentially of the same kind with his own, notwithstanding any attempt to belie its true nature under the perverted and contradictory name of spiritual, sees only so many loyal groups, who,

by repeating the answer, which I long since returned to the same question put by a friend, that is to say,—

When I contemplate the whole system, as it affects the great fundamental principles of morality, the *terra firma*, as it were, of our humanity; then trace its operation on the sources and conditions of national strength and well-being; and lastly, consider its woful influences on the innocence and sanctity of the female mind and imagination, on the faith and happiness, the gentle fragrancy and unnoticed ever-present verdure of domestic life,—I can with difficulty avoid applying to it what the Rabbins fable of the fratricide Cain, after the curse: that *the firm earth trembled wherever he strode, and the grass turned black beneath his feet.*

Indeed, if my memory does not cheat me, some of the mystic divines, in their fond humour of allegorizing, tell us that in Gen. iv. 3—8, is correctly narrated the history of the first apostate Church, that began by sacrificing amiss, appropriating the fruit of *the ground* or temporal possessions under spiritual pretexts; and ended in slaying the shepherd brother who brought *the firstlings of his fold*, holy and without blemish, to the Great Shepherd, and presented them as *new creatures*, before the Lord and Owner of the flocks.

claiming no peculiar rights, make themselves known to him as Christians, only by the more scrupulous and exemplary performance of their duties as citizens and subjects. And here let me add a few sentences on the use, abuse, and misuse of the phrase, spiritual power. In the only appropriate sense of the words, spiritual power is a power that acts on the spirits of men. Now the spirit of a man, or the spiritual part of our being, is the intelligent will: or (to speak less abstractly) it is the capability, with which the Father of Spirits hath endowed man, of being determined to action by the ultimate ends, which the reason alone can present. The understanding, which derives all its materials from the senses, can dictate purposes only, that is, such ends as are in their turn means to other ends. The ultimate ends, by which the will is to be determined, and by which alone the will, not corrupted, *the spirit made perfect*, would be determined, are called, in relation to the reason, moral ideas. Such are the ideas of the eternal, the good, the true, the holy, the idea of God as the absoluteness and reality (or real ground) of all these, or as the supreme Spirit in which all these substantially are, and are one: lastly, the idea of the responsible will itself; of duty, of guilt, or evil in itself without reference to its outward and separable consequences.

A power, therefore, that acts on the appetites and passions, which we possess in common with the beasts, by motives derived from the senses and sensations has no pretence to the name; nor can it without the grossest abuse of the word be called a spiritual power. Whether the man expects the *auto da fe*, the fire and faggots, with which he is threatened, to take place at Lisbon or Smithfield, or in some dungeon in the centre of the earth, makes no difference in the kind of motive by which he is influenced; nor of course in the nature of the power which acts on his passions by means of it. It would be strange indeed if ignorance and superstition, the dense and rank fogs that most strangle and suffocate the light of the spirit in man, should constitute a spirituality in the power which takes advantage of them!

This is a gross abuse of the term, spiritual. The following, sanctioned as it is by custom and statute, yet (speaking exclusively as a philologist and without questioning its legality) I venture to point out as a misuse of the term. Our great Church dignitaries sit in the Upper House of the Convocation as Prelates of the National Church: and as Prelates may exercise ecclesiastical power. In the House of Lords they sit as barons and by virtue of the baronies which, much against the will of those haughty prelates, our Kings forced upon them:

and as such, they exercise a Parliamentary power. As Bishops of the Church of Christ only can they possess, or exercise (and God forbid ! I should doubt, that as such, many of them do faithfully exercise) a spiritual power, which neither King can give, nor King and Parliament take away. As Christian Bishops, they are spiritual pastors, by power of the spirits ruling the flocks committed to their charge ; but they are temporal Peers and Prelates.

The Fourth Character of the Christian Church, and a necessary consequence of the first and third, is its universality. It is neither Anglican, Gallican, nor Roman, neither Latin nor Greek. Even the Catholic and Apostolic Church of England is a less safe expression than the Church of Christ in England : though the Catholic Church in England, or (what would be still better), the Catholic Church under Christ throughout Great Britain and Ireland is justifiable and appropriate : for through the presence of its only Head and Sovereign, entire in each and one in all, the Church Universal is spiritually perfect in every true Church, and of course in any number of such Churches, of which from circumstance of place, or the community of country or of language, we have occasion to speak collectively. I have already, here and elsewhere, observed, and scarcely a day passes

without some occasion to repeat the observation, that an equivocal term, or a word with two or more different meanings, is never quite harmless. Thus, it is at least an inconvenience in our language that the term church, instead of being confined to its proper sense kirk, *ædes Kyriacæ*, or the Lord's house, should likewise be the word by which our forefathers rendered the *Ecclesia*, or the ἑκκλητοί, or *evocati*, the called out of the world, named collectively; and likewise our term for the clerical establishment. To the Called at Rome—to the Church of Christ at Corinth, or in Philippi—such was the language of the Apostolic age; and the change since then has been no improvement. The true Church of England is the National Church or Clerisy. There exists, God be thanked! a Catholic and Apostolic Church in England: and I thank God also for the constitutional and ancestral Church of England.

These are the four distinctions, or peculiar and essential marks, by which the Church with Christ as its head is distinguished from the National Church, and separated from every possible counterfeit, that has, or shall have, usurped its name. And as an important comment on the same, and in confirmation of the principle which I have attempted to establish, I earnestly recommend for the reader's perusal the following transcript from

Henry More's Modest Inquiry, or True Idea of Antichristianism.

“We will suppose some one prelate, who had got the start of the rest, to put in for the title and authority of Universal Bishop : and for the obtaining of this sovereignty, he will first pretend that it is unfit that the visible Catholic Church, being one, should not be united under one visible head, which reasoning, though it makes a pretty show at first sight, will yet, being closely looked into, vanish into smoke. For this is but a quaint concinnity urged in behalf of an impossibility. For the erecting such an office for one man, which no one man in the world is able to perform, implies that to be possible which is indeed impossible. Whence it is plain that the head will be too little for the body ; which therefore will be a piece of mischievous asymmetry or inconcinnity also. No one mortal can be a competent head for that Church which has a right to be Catholic, and to overspread the face of the whole earth. There can be no such head but Christ, who is not mere man, but God in the Divine humanity, and therefore present with every part of the Church, and every member thereof, at what distance soever. But to set some one mortal Bishop over the whole Church, were to suppose that great Bishop of our spirit absent from it, who has promised that he *will be with her to the*

end of the world. Nor does the Church Catholic on earth lose her unity thereby. For rather hereby only is or can she be one.*

“Such and so futile is the first pretence. But if this will not serve the turn, there is another in reserve. And notwithstanding the demonstrated impossibility of the thing, still there must be one visible head of the Church universal, the successor and vicar of Christ, for the slaking of controversies, for the determination of disputed points! We will not stop here to expose the weakness of the argument (not alas! peculiar to the sophists of Rome, nor employed in support of Papal infallibility only), that this or that must be, and consequently is, because sundry inconveniences would result from the want of it; and this without considering whether these inconveniences have been prevented or removed by its alleged presence; whether they do not continue in spite of this pretended remedy or antidote; whether these inconveniences were intended by Providence to be precluded, and not rather for wise purposes permitted to continue; and lastly, whether the remedy may not be worse than the disease, like the sugar of lead administered

* As rationally might it be pretended that it is not the life, the *rector spiritus præsens per totum et in omni parte*, but the crown of the skull, or some one convolute of the brain, that causes and preserves the unity of the body natural.

by the empiric, who cured a fever fit by exchanging it for the dead palsy. Passing by this sophism, therefore, it is sufficient to reply that all points necessary are so plain and so widely known, that it is impossible that a Christian, who seeks those aids which the true Head of the Church has promised shall never be sought in vain, should err therein from lack of knowing better. And those who, from defects of head or heart, are blind to this widely diffused light, and who neither seek nor wish those aids, are still less likely to be influenced by a minor and derivative authority. But for other things, whether ceremonies or conceits, whether matters of discipline or of opinion, their diversity does not at all break the unity of the outward and visible Church, as long as they do not subvert the fundamental laws of Christ's kingdom nor contradict the terms of admission into his Church, nor contravene the essential characters by which it subsists and is distinguished as the Christian Catholic Church."

To these sentiments, borrowed from one of the most philosophical of our learned elder divines, I have only to add an observation as suggested by them; that as many and fearful mischiefs have ensued from the confusion of the Christian with the National Church, so have many and grievous practical errors, and much unchristian intolerance, arisen from confounding the outward and visible

Church of Christ with the spiritual and invisible Church, known only to the Father of all Spirits. The perfection of the former is to afford every opportunity, and to present no obstacle, to a gradual advancement of the latter. The different degrees of progress, the imperfections, errors and accidents of false perspective, which lessen indeed with our advance—our spiritual advance—but to a greater or lesser amount are inseparable from all progression; these, the interpolated half-truths of the twilight, through which every soul must pass from darkness to the spiritual sunrise, belong to the visible Church as objects of hope, patience, and charity alone.

ON

THE THIRD POSSIBLE CHURCH,

OR

THE CHURCH OF ANTICHRIST.

Ecclesia Cattolica non, ma il Papismo denunciavamo, perchè suggerito dal interesse, perchè fortificato dalla menzogna, perchè radicato dal piu abbominabile despotismo, perchè contrario al diritto e ai titoli incommunicabili di Cristo, ed alla tranquillità d'ogni Chiesa e d'ogni Stato.—SPANZOTTI.

Thus, on the depluming of the Pope, every bird had his own feather: in the partage whereof, what he had gotten by sacrilege was restored to Christ; what by usurpation, was given to the King, the (National) Church and the State; what by oppression, was remitted to each particular Christian.—*Fuller's Church History of Britain, Book v.*

ON THE CHURCH,

NEITHER NATIONAL NOR UNIVERSAL.

IF our forefathers were annoyed with the cant of over-boiling zeal, arising out of the belief, that the Pope is Antichrist, and likewise (*sexu mutato*) the Harlot of Babylon: we are more endangered by the twaddle of humid charity, which (some years ago at least) used to drizzle, a something between mist and small rain, from the higher region of our Church atmosphere. It was sanctioned, I mean, both in the pulpit and the senate by sundry dignitaries, whose horror of Jacobinism during the then panic of property led them to adopt the principles and language of Laud and his faction. And once more the Church of Rome, in contrast with Protestant dissenters, became "a right dear, though erring sister." And the heaviest charge against the Romish Pontificate was, that the Italian politics and nepotism of a series of Popes had converted so great a good into an intolerable grievance. We were reminded that Grotius and Leibnitz had

regarded a visible head of the Catholic Church as most desirable; that they, and with them more than one Primate of our own Church, yearned for a conciliating settlement of the differences between the Romish and Protestant Churches; and mainly in order that there might exist really, as well as nominally, a visible head of the Church Universal, a fixt centre of unity. Of course the tenet that the Pope was in any sense the Antichrist predicted by Paul was decried as fanatical and Puritanical cant.

Now it is a duty of Christian charity to presume that the men, who in the present day employ this language, are, or believe themselves to be, Christians; and that they do not privately think that St. Paul, in the two celebrated passages of his First and Second Epistles to the Church at Thessalonica, (I. iv., 13—18; II. ii. 1—12), practised a *ruse de guerre*, and meant only by throwing the fulfilment beyond the life of the present generation, and by a terrific detail of the horrors and calamities that were to precede it, to damp the impatience, and silence the objections, excited by the expectation and the delay of our Lord's personal re-appearance. Again: as the persons, of whom I have been speaking, are well-educated men, and men of sober minds, it may be safely taken for granted that they do not understand by Antichrist any nondescript monster,

or suppose it to be the proper name or designation of some one individual man or devil exclusively. The Christians of the second century, sharing in a delusion that prevailed over the whole Roman Empire, believed that Nero would come to life again, and be Antichrist: and I have been informed that a learned clergyman of our own times, endowed with the gift of prophecy by assiduous study of the Book of Daniel and the Apocalypse, asserts the same thing of Napoleon Buonaparte.

But, as before said, it would be calumnious to attribute such pitiable fanaticism to the parties here in question. And to them I venture to affirm that if by Antichrist be meant—what alone can rationally be meant—a power in the Christian Church, which in the name of Christ, and at once pretending and usurping his authority, is systematically subversive of the essential and distinguishing characters and purposes of the Christian Church: then, if the Papacy, and the Romish hierarchy as far as it is Papal, be not Antichrist, the guilt of schism in its most aggravated form lies on the authors of the Reformation. For nothing less than this could have justified so tremendous a rent in the Catholic Church with all its foreseen most calamitous consequences. And so Luther himself thought; and so thought Wicliff before him. Only in the conviction that Christianity itself was at stake,—

that the cause was that of Christ in conflict with Antichrist,—could, or did, even the lion-hearted Luther with unquailed spirit avow to himself;—I bring not peace, but a sword into the world.

It is my full conviction, a conviction formed after a long and patient study of the subject in detail; and if in support of this competence I only add that I have read, and with care, the *Summa Theologiæ* of Aquinas, and compared the system with the statements of Arnauld and Bossuet, the number of those who in the present much-reading, but not very hard-reading, age would feel themselves entitled to dispute my claim, will not, perhaps, be very formidable;—it is, I repeat, my full conviction that the rights and doctrines, the *agenda et credenda*, of the Roman Catholics, could we separate them from the adulterating ingredients combined with, and the use made of, them by the sacerdotal Mamelukes of the Romish monarchy, for the support of the Papacy and Papal hierarchy, would neither have brought about, nor have sufficed to justify, the convulsive separation under Leo X. Nay, that if they were fairly, and in the light of a sound philosophy, compared with either of the two main divisions of Protestantism, as it now exists in this country, that is, with the fashionable doctrines and interpretations of the Arminian and Grotian school

on the one hand, and with the tenets and language of the modern Calvinists on the other, an enlightened disciple of John and of Paul would be perplexed which of the three to prefer as the least unlike the profound and sublime system he had learned from his great masters. And in this comparison I leave out of view the extreme sects of Protestantism, whether of the frigid or of the torrid zone, Socinian or fanatic.

During the summer of last year, I made the tour of Holland, Flanders, and up the Rhine as far as Bergen, and among the few notes then taken, I find the following:—"Every fresh opportunity of examining the Roman Catholic religion on the spot, every new fact that presents itself to my notice, increases my conviction that its immediate basis and the true grounds of its continuance are to be found in the wickedness, ignorance, and wretchedness of the many; and that the producing and continuing cause of this deplorable state is, that it is the interest of the Romish priesthood that so it should remain as the surest, and, in fact, only support of the Papal sovereignty and influence against the civil powers, and the reforms wished for by the more enlightened governments, as well as by all the better informed and wealthier class of Roman Catholics generally. And as parts of the same policy, and equally indispensable to the

interests of the Papal Crown, are the ignorance, grossness, excessive number and poverty of the lower ecclesiastics themselves, the religious orders included. When I say the Pope, I understand the Papal hierarchy, which is, in truth, the dilated Pope: and in this sense only, and not of the individual priest or friar at Rome, can a wise man be supposed to use the word.”—Cologne, July 2, 1828.

I feel it as no small comfort and confirmation to know that the same view of the subject is taken, the same conviction entertained, by a large and increasing number in the Roman Catholic communion itself, in Germany, France, Italy, and even in Spain; and that no inconsiderable portion of this number consists of men who are not only pious as Christians, but zealous as Roman Catholics; and who would contemplate with as much horror a reform from their Church, as they look with earnest aspirations and desires towards a reform in the Church. Proof of this may be found in the learned work intituled *Disordini morali e politici della Corte di Roma*—evidently the work of a zealous Romanist and from the ecclesiastical erudition displayed in the volumes, probably a priest. Nay, from the angry aversion with which the foul heresies of those sons of perdition, Luther and Calvin, are mentioned, and his very faint and qualified censure of the

persecution of the Albigenses and Waldenses, I am obliged to infer that the writer's attachment to his communion was zealous even to bigotry.

The disorders denounced by him are:—

1. The pretension of the Papacy to temporal power and sovereignty, directly or as the pretended consequence of spiritual dominion; and as furnishing occasion to this, even the retention of the primacy in honour over all other Bishops, after Rome had ceased to be the metropolis of Christendom, is noticed as a subject of regret.

2. The boast of Papal infallibility.

3. The derivation of the Episcopal power from the Papal, and the dependence of Bishops on the Pope, rightly named the evil of a false centre.

4. The right of exercising authority in other dioceses besides that of Rome.

5. The privilege of reserving to himself the greater causes—*le cause maggiori*.

6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Of conferring any and every benefice in the territory of other Bishops; of exacting the Annates, or First Fruits; of receiving appeals; with the power of subjecting all churches in all parts, to the ecclesiastical discipline of the church of Rome: and lastly, the dispensing power of the Pope.

11. The Pope's pretended superiority to an Ecumenical Council.

12. The exclusive power of canonising Saints.

Now, of the twelve abuses here enumerated, it is remarkable that ten, if not eleven, are but expansions of the one grievance—the Papal power as the centre, and the Pope as the one visible head and sovereign of the Christian Church.

The writer next enumerates the personal instruments of these abuses:—1. The Cardinals. 2. The excessive number of the priests and other ecclesiastics. 3. The Regulars, Mendicant Orders, Jesuits, and the rest. Lastly, the means employed by the Papacy to found and preserve its usurped power, namely:—

1. The institution of a Chair of Canon Law, in the University of Bologna, the introduction of Gratian's Canons, and the forged decisions. 2. The prohibition of books, wherever published. 3. The Inquisition; and 4. The tremendous power of excommunication:—the last two in their temporal inflictions and consequences equalling, or rather greatly exceeding, the utmost extent of the punitive power exercised by the temporal sovereign and the civil magistrate, armed with the sword of the criminal law.

It is observable that the most efficient of all the means adopted by the Roman Pontiffs, namely, the celibacy of the clergy, is omitted by this writer;—a sufficient proof that he was neither a Protestant

nor a philosopher, which in the Italian states, and, indeed, in most Romish Catholic countries, is the name of courtesy for an infidel.

One other remark in justification of the tenet avowed in this chapter, and I shall have said all I deem it necessary to say on the third form of a Church. That erection of a temporal monarch under the pretence of a spiritual authority, which was not possible in Christendom but by the extinction or entrancement of the spirit of Christianity, and which has therefore been only partially attained by the Papacy—this was effected in full by Mohammed, to the establishment of the most extensive and complete despotism, that ever warred against civilisation and the interests of humanity. And had Mohammed retained the name of Christianity, had he deduced his authority from Christ as his principal, and described his own Khalifate and that of his successors as vicarious, there can be no doubt that to the Mussulman theocracy, embodied in the different Mohammedan dynasties, would belong the name and attributes of Antichrist. But the Prophet of Arabia started out of Paganism an unbaptised Pagan. He was no traitor in the Church, but an enemy from without, who levied war against its outward and formal existence, and is, therefore, not chargeable with apostasy from a faith which he had never acknowledged, or from a Church to

which he had never appertained. Neither in the Prophet nor in his system, therefore, can we find the predicted Antichrist, that is, a usurped power in the Church itself, which, in the name of Christ, and pretending his authority, systematically subverts or counteracts the peculiar aims and purposes of Christ's mission; and which, vesting in a mortal his incommunicable headship, destroys and exchanges for the contrary the essential contra-distinguishing marks or characters of his kingdom on earth. But apply it, as Wicliff, Luther,* and indeed all the first Reformers did to the Papacy, and Papal hierarchy; and we understand at once the grounds of the great

* And (be it observed) without any reference to the Apocalypse, the canonical character of which Luther at first rejected, and never cordially received. And without the least sympathy with Luther's suspicions on this head, but on the contrary receiving this sublime poem as the undoubted work of the Apostolic age, and admiring in it the most perfect specimen of symbolic poetry, I am as little disposed to cite it on the present occasion;—convinced as I am and hope shortly to convince others, that in the whole series of its magnificent imagery there is not a single symbol, that can be even plausibly interpreted of either the Pope, the Turks, or Napoleon Buonaparte. Of charges not attaching to the moral character, there are few, if any, that I should be more anxious to avoid than that of being an affecter of paradoxes. But the dread of other men's thoughts shall not tempt me to withhold a truth, which the strange errors grounded on the contrary assumption render important. And in the thorough assurance of its truth I make the assertion, that the perspicuity, and (with singularly few exceptions even for us)

Apostle's premonition, that this Antichrist could not appear till after the dissolution of the Latin

the uniform intelligibility, and close consecutive meaning, verse by verse, with the simplicity and grandeur of the plan, and the admirable ordonnance of the parts, are among the prominent beauties of the Apocalypse. Nor do I doubt that the substance and main argument of this drama *sui generis* (the Prometheus of Eschylus comes the nearest to the kind) were supplied by John the Evangelist: though I incline with Eusebius to find the poet himself in John, an Elder of the Church of Ephesus.

It may remove, or at least mitigate, the objections to the palliative language in which I have spoken of the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, if I remind the reader that that Church dates its true origin from the Council of Trent. Widely differing from my valued and affectionately respected friend, the Rev. Edward Irving, in his interpretations of the Apocalypse and the Book of Daniel, and no less in his estimation of the latter, and while I honour his courage as a Christian minister, almost as much as I admire his eloquence as a writer, yet protesting against his somewhat too adventurous speculations on the Persons of the Trinity and the Body of our Lord,—I have great delight in extracting from his "*Sermons, Lectures, and Discourses*," vol. iii. p. 870, and declaring my cordial assent to the following just observations: namely,—“that after the Reformation had taken firmer root, and when God had provided a purer Church, the Council of Trent did corroborate and decree into unalterable laws and constitutions of the Church all those impostures and innovations of the Roman See, which had been in a state of uncertainty, perhaps of permission or even of custom; but which every man till then had been free to testify against, and against which, in fact, there never wanted those in each successive generation who did testify. The Council of Trent ossified all those ulcers and blotches which had deformed the Church, and stamped the

empire, and the extinction of the Imperial power in Rome—and the cause why the Bishop of Con-

hitherto much doubted and controverted prerogative of the Pope with the highest authority recognised in the Church." Then first was the Catholic converted and particularised into the Romish Church, the Church of the Papacy.

Not less cordially do I concur with Mr. Irving in his remark in the following page. For I too, "am free to confess and avow moreover, that I believe the soil of the Catholic Church, when Luther arose, was of a stronger mould, fitted to bear forest trees and cedars of God, than the soil of the Protestant Church in the times of Whitfield and Wesley, which (*though sown with the same word*) hath brought forth only stunted undergrowths, and creeping brushwood." I too, "believe, that the faith of the Protestant Church in Britain had come to a lower ebb, and that it is even now at a lower ebb, than was the faith of the Papal Church when the Spirit of the Lord was able to quicken in it and draw forth out of it such men as Luther, and Melancthon, and Bullinger, Calvin, Bucer, and Latimer, and Ridley, and a score others whom I might name."

And now, as the conclusion of this long note, let me be permitted to add a word or two of Edward Irving himself. That he possesses my unqualified esteem as a man, is only saying that I know him, and am neither blinded by envy nor bigotry. But my name has been brought into connexion with his on points that regard his public ministry; and he himself has publicly distinguished me as his friend on public grounds; and in proof of my confidence in his regard, I have not the least apprehension of forfeiting it by a frank declaration of what I think. Well, then! I have no faith in his prophesyings; small sympathy with his fulminations; and in certain peculiarities of his theological system as distinct from his religious principles I cannot see my way. But I hold withal, and not the less firmly for these discrepancies in our moods and judgments, that Edward Irving possesses

stantinople, with all imaginable good wishes and disposition to do the same, could never raise the

more of the spirit and purposes of the first Reformers ; that he has more of the head and heart, the life, the unction, and the genial power of Martin Luther than any man now alive ; yea, than any man of this and the last century. I see in Edward Irving a minister of Christ after the order of Paul ; and if the points, in which I think him either erroneous, or excessive and out of bounds, have been at any time a subject of serious regret with me, this regret has arisen principally or altogether from the apprehension of their narrowing the sphere of his influence, from the too great probability that they may furnish occasion or pretext for withholding or withdrawing many from those momentous truths which the age especially needs, and for the enforcement of which he hath been so highly and especially gifted. Finally, my friend's intellect is too instinct with life, too potential, to remain stationary ; and assuming, as every satisfied believer must be supposed to do, the truth of my own views, I look forward with confident hope to a time when his soul shall have perfected her victory over the dead letter of the senses and its apparitions in the sensuous understanding ; when the halcyon Ideas shall have alit on the surging sea of his conceptions,

Which then shall quite forget to rave,
While birds of calm sit brooding on the charmed wave.

But to return from the personal, for which I have little taste at any time, and the contrary when it stands in any connexion with myself ;—in order to the removal of one main impediment to the spiritual resuscitation of the Church it seems to me indispensable that in freedom and unfearing faith, with that courage which cannot but flow from the inward and life-like assurance, *that neither death, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which*

Patriarchate of the Greek empire into a Papacy. The Bishops of the other Rome became the slaves of the Ottoman, the moment they ceased to be the subjects of the Emperor.

I will now proceed to the Second Part, intended as a humble aid to a just appreciation of the measure, which under the auspices of Mr. Peel and the Duke of Wellington is now the law of the land.

is in Christ Jesus our Lord, the rulers of our Church and our teachers of theology should meditate and draw the obvious, though perhaps unpalatable, inferences from the following two or three plain truths:—First, that Christ, *the Spirit of Truth*, has promised to be with his Church even to the end:—secondly,—that Christianity was described as a tree to be raised from the seed, so described by Him who brought the seed from Heaven and first sowed it:—lastly,—that in the process of evolution there are in every plant growths of transitory use and duration. “The integuments of the seed, having fulfilled their destined office of protection, burst and decay. After the leaves have unfolded, the cotyledons that had performed their functions, wither and drop off.”¹ The husk is a genuine growth of the staff of life; yet we must separate it from the grain. It is, therefore, the cowardice of faithless superstition, if we stand in greater awe of the palpable interpolations of vermin; if we shrink from the removal of excrescences that contain nothing of nobler parentage than maggots of moth or chafer. Let us cease to confound oak-apples with acorns; still less, though gilded by the fashion of the day, let us mistake them for golden pippins or renates.²

¹ Smith's Introduction to Botany.

² The fruit from a pippin grafted on a pippin, is called a rennet, that is, renate (*re-natus*) or twice-born.

This portion of the volume was written while the measure was yet *in prospectu*; before even the particular clauses of the Bill were made public. It was written to explain and vindicate my refusal to sign a petition against any change in the scheme of law and policy established at the Revolution. But as the arguments are in no respect affected by this circumstance; nay, as their constant reference to, and dependence on, one fixed general principle, which will at once explain both why I find the actual Bill so much less objectionable than I had feared, and yet so much less complete and satisfactory than I had wished, will be rendered more striking by the reader's consciousness that the arguments were suggested by no wish or purpose either of attacking or supporting any particular measure; it has not been thought necessary or advisable to alter the form. Nay, if I am right in my judgment that the Act lately passed, if characterised by its own contents and capabilities, really is—with or without any such intention on the part of its framers—a stepping-stone, and nothing more; whether to the subversion or to the more perfect establishment of the Constitution in Church and State, must be determined by other causes;—the Act in itself being equally fit for either,—and offering the same facilities of transit to both friend and foe, though with a foreclosure to the first

comer ;—if this be a right, as it is my sincere judgment and belief, there is a propriety in retaining the language of anticipation. *Mons adhuc parturit* : the *ridiculus mus* was but an omen.

PART II.

AIDS TO A RIGHT APPRECIATION OF THE ACT

ADMITTING ROMAN CATHOLICS TO SIT IN BOTH HOUSES
OF PARLIAMENT.

Ἀμέλει, μὰ τὸν Δι' οὐκ ἐνασπιδώσομαι
λέξω δ' ὑπὲρ Ἑτερογνωμόνων, ἃ μοι δοκεῖ
καί τοι δέδοικα πολλά· τούς τε γὰρ τρόπους
τοὺς ξυμπολίτων οἶδα χαίροντας σφόδρα,
ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς εὐλογῇ καὶ τὴν πόλιν,
ἀνὴρ ἀλαζών, καὶ δίκαια κᾶδ' ἰδικά·
κᾶνταῦθα λανθάνουσ' ἀπεμπολώμενοι.

Aristoph. Acharn. 367, &c. (leviter mutata.)

I ESTIMATE the beauty and benefit of what is called "a harmony in fundamentals, and a conspiracy in the constituent parts of the body politic," as highly as any one. If I met a man who should deny that an *imperium in imperio* was in itself an evil, I would not attempt to reason with him: he is too ignorant. Or if, conceding this, he should deny that the Romish Priesthood in Ireland does in fact constitute an *imperium in imperio*, I yet would not argue the matter with him: for he must be a bigot. But my objection to the argument is, that it is nothing to the purpose. And even so with regard to the arguments grounded on the dangerous errors and superstitions of the Romish Church. They may be all very true; but they are nothing to the purpose. Without any loss they might pair off with "the heroes of Trafalgar and Waterloo," and "our Catholic ancestors, to whom we owe our Magna Charta," on the other side. If the prevention of an evil were the point in question, then indeed! But the day of prevention has long

passed by. The evil exists : and neither rope, sword, nor sermon, neither suppression nor conversion, can remove it. Not that I think slightly of the last ; but even those who hope more sanguinely than I can pretend to do respecting the effects ultimately to result from the labours of missionaries, the dispersion of controversial tracts, and whatever other lawful means and implements it may be in our power to employ—even these must admit that if the remedy could cope with the magnitude and inveteracy of the disease, it is wholly inadequate to the urgency of the symptoms. In this instance it would be no easy matter to take the horse to the water ; and the rest of the proverb you know. But why do I waste words ? There is and can be but one question : and there is and can be but one way of stating it. A great numerical majority of the inhabitants of one integral part of the realm profess a religion hostile to that professed by the majority of the whole realm : and a religion, too, which the latter regard, and have had good reason to regard, as equally hostile to liberty and the sacred rights of conscience generally. In fewer words, three-fourths of his Majesty's Irish subjects are Roman Catholics, with a Popish priesthood, while three-fourths of the sum total of his Majesty's subjects are Protestants. This with its causes and consequences is the evil. It is not in our power,

by any immediate or direct means, to effect its removal. The point, therefore, to be determined is: Will the measures now in contemplation be likely to diminish or to aggravate it? And to the determination of this point on the probabilities suggested by reason and experience I would gladly be aidant, as far as my poor mite of judgment will enable me.

Let us, however, first discharge what may well be deemed a debt of justice from every well educated Englishman to his Roman Catholic fellow-subjects of the Sister Island. At least, let us ourselves understand the true cause of the evil as it now exists. To what and to whom is the present state of Ireland mainly to be attributed? This should be the question: and to this I answer aloud, that it is mainly attributable to those, who during a period of little less than a whole century used as a substitute what Providence had given into their hand as an opportunity; who chose to consider as superseding the most sacred duty a code of law, which could have been excused only on the plea that it enabled them to perform it. To the sloth and improvidence, the weakness and wickedness, of the gentry, clergy, and governors of Ireland, who persevered in preferring intrigue, violence, and selfish expatriation to a system of preventive and remedial measures, the efficacy of

which had been warranted for them, alike by the whole provincial history of ancient Rome, *cui pacare subactos summa erat sapientia*; and by the happy results of the few exceptions to the contrary scheme unhappily pursued by their and our ancestors.

I can imagine no work of genius that would more appropriately decorate the dome or wall of a Senate house, than an abstract of Irish history from the landing of Strongbow to the battle of the Boyne, or to a yet later period, embodied in intelligible emblems—an allegorical history-piece designed in the spirit of a Rubens or a Buonarroti, and with the wild lights, portentous shades, and saturated colours of a Rembrandt, Caravaggio, and Spagnoletto. To complete the great moral and political lesson by the historic contrast, nothing more would be required, than by some equally effective means to possess the mind of the spectator with the state and condition of ancient Spain, at less than half a century from the final conclusion of an obstinate and almost unremitting conflict of two hundred years by Agrippa's subjugation of the Cantabrians, *omnibus Hispaniæ populis devictis et pacatis*. At the breaking up of the Empire the West Goths conquered the country and made division of the lands. Then came eight centuries of Moorish domination. Yet so deeply had Roman wisdom impressed the fairest characters of the

Roman mind, that at this very hour, if we except a comparatively insignificant portion of Arabic derivatives, the natives throughout the whole Peninsula speak a language less differing from the *Romana rustica* or provincial Latin of the times of Lucan and Seneca, than any two of its dialects from each other. The time approaches, I trust, when our political economists may study the science of the provincial policy of the ancients in detail, under the auspices of hope, for immediate and practical purposes.

In my own mind I am persuaded that the necessity of the penal and precautionary statutes, passed under Elizabeth and the three succeeding reigns, is to be found as much in the passions and prejudices of the one party as in the dangerous dispositions of the other. The best excuse for this cruel code is the imperfect knowledge and mistaken maxims common to both parties. It is only to a limited extent that laws can be wiser than the nation for which they are enacted. The annals of the first five or six centuries of the Hebrew nation in Palestine present an almost continued history of disobedience, of laws broken or utterly forgotten, of maxims violated, and schemes of consummate wisdom left unfulfilled. Even a yet diviner seed must be buried and undergo an apparent corruption before—at a late period—it shot up and could

appear in its own kind. In our judgments respecting actions we must be guided by the idea, but in applying the rule to the agents by comparison. To speak gently of our forefathers is at once piety and policy. Nor let it be forgotten that only by making the detection of their errors the occasion of our own wisdom do we acquire a right to censure them at all.

Whatever may be thought of the settlement that followed the battle of the Boyne and the extinction of the war in Ireland, yet when this had been made and submitted to, it would have been the far wiser policy, I doubt not, to have provided for the safety of the Constitution by improving the quality of the elective franchise, leaving the eligibility open, or like the former limited only by considerations of property. Still, however, the scheme of exclusion and disqualification had its plausible side. The ink was scarcely dry on the parchment-rolls and proscription-lists of the Popish Parliament. The crimes of the man were generalised into attributes of his faith; and the Irish Roman Catholics collectively were considered accomplices in the perfidy and baseness of King James. Alas! his immediate adherents had afforded too great colour to the charge. The Irish massacre was in the mouth of every Protestant, not as an event to be remembered, but as a thing of recent expectation,

fear still blending with the sense of deliverance. At no time, therefore, could the disqualifying system have been enforced with so little reclamation of the conquered party, or with so little outrage on the general feeling of the country. There was no time, when it was so capable of being indirectly useful as a sedative in order to the application of the remedies directly indicated, or as a counter-power reducing to inactivity whatever disturbing forces might have interfered with their operation. And had this use been made of these exclusive laws, and had they been enforced as the precursors and negative conditions, but above all as *bonâ fide* accompaniments of a process of emancipation, properly and worthily so named, the code would at this day have been remembered in Ireland only as when recalling a dangerous fever of our boyhood we think of the nauseous drugs and drenching-horn, and congratulate ourselves that our doctors now-a-days know how to manage these things less coarsely. But this angry code was neglected as an opportunity, and mistaken for a substitute: *et hinc illæ lacrymæ!*

And at this point I find myself placed again in connexion with the main, and which I contend to be the pertinent, question; namely, the evil being admitted, and its immediate removal impossible, is the admission of Roman Catholics into both Houses

of the Legislature likely to mitigate or to aggravate it? And here the problem is greatly narrowed by the fact that no man pretends to regard this admissibility as a direct remedy or specific antidote for the diseases under which Ireland labours. No! it is to act, we are told, as introductory to the direct remedies. In short, this emancipation is to be, like the penal code which it repeals, a sedative, though in the opposite form of an anodyne cordial, that will itself be entitled to the name of a remedial measure in proportion as it shall be found to render the body susceptible of the more direct remedies that are to follow. Its object is to tranquillise Ireland. Safety, peace, and good neighbourhood, influx of capital, diminution of absenteeism, industrious habits and a long train of blessings will follow. But the indispensable condition, the *causa causarum et causatorum*, is general tranquillity. Such is the language held by all the more intelligent advocates and encomiasts of emancipation. The sense of the question therefore is, will the measure tend to produce tranquillity?

Now it is evident that there are two parties to be satisfied, and that the measure is likely to effect this purpose accordingly as it is calculated to satisfy reasonable men of both. Reasonable men are easily satisfied: would they were as numerous as they are pacable! We must, however, under-

stand the word comparatively as including all those on both sides, who by their superior information, talents, or property, are least likely to be under the dominion of vulgar antipathies, and who may be rationally expected to influence (and in certain cases, and in alliance with a vigorous government, to over-rule) the feelings and sentiments of the rest.

Now the two indispensable conditions under which alone the measure can permanently satisfy the reasonable, that is, the satisfiable, of both parties, upon the supposition that in both parties such men exist and that they form the influence class in both, are these : first, that the Act for the repeal of the exclusive statutes and the admission of Roman Catholics to the full privileges of British subjects shall be grounded on some determinate principle, which involving interests and duties common to both parties as British subjects, both parties may be expected to recognise, and required to maintain inviolable : second, that this principle shall contain in itself an evident definite and unchangeable boundary, a line of demarcation, a *ne plus ultra*, which in all reasonable men and lovers of their country shall preclude the wish to pass beyond it, and extinguish the hope of so doing in such as are neither.

But though the measure should be such as to satisfy all reasonable men, still it is possible that

the number and influence of these may not be sufficient to leaven the mass, or to over-rule the agitators. I admit this; but instead of weakening what I have here said, it affords an additional argument in its favour. For if an argument satisfactory to the reasonable part should nevertheless fail in securing tranquillity, still less can the result be expected from an arbitrary adjustment that can satisfy no part. If a measure grounded on principle, and possessing the character of an *ultimatum*, should still, through the prejudices and passions of one or of both of the parties, fail of success, it would be folly to expect it from a measure that left full scope and sphere to those passions; which kept alive the fears of the one party, while it sharpened the cupidity of the other. With confidence, therefore, I re-assert that only by reference to a principle, possessing the characters above enumerated, can any satisfactory measure be framed, and that if this should fail in producing the tranquillity aimed at, it will be in vain sought in any other.

Again, it is evident that no principle can be appropriate to such a measure, which does not bear directly on the evil to be removed or mitigated. Consequently, it should be our first business to discover in what this evil truly and essentially consists. It is, we know, a compound of many

ingredients. But we want to ascertain what the base is that communicates the quality of evil, of political evil, of evil which it is the duty of a statesman to guard against, to various other ingredients, which without the base would have been innoxious; or though evils in themselves, yet evils of such a kind as to be counted by all wise statesmen among the tares, which must be suffered to grow up with the wheat to the close of the harvest, and left for the Lord of the harvest to separate.

Further: the principle, the grounding and directing principle of an effectual enactment, must be one on which a Roman Catholic might consistently vindicate and recommend the measure to Roman Catholics. It must therefore be independent of all differences purely theological. And the facts and documents, by which the truth and practical importance of the principle are to be proved or illustrated, should be taken by preference from periods anterior to the division of the Latin Church into Romish and Protestant. It should be such, in short, that an orator might with strict historical propriety introduce the framers and extorters of Magna Charta pleading to their Roman Catholic descendants in behalf of the measure grounded on such a principle, and invoking them in the name of the Constitution, over the

growth of which they had kept armed watch, and by the sacred obligation to maintain it which they had entailed on their posterity.

This is the condition under which alone I could conscientiously vote, and which being fulfilled, I should most zealously vote for the admission of lay Roman Catholics, not only to both houses of the Legislature, but to all other offices below the Crown without any exception. Moreover, in the fulfilment of this condition, in the solemn recognition and establishment of a principle having the characters here specified, I find the only necessary security—convinced that this, if acceded to by the Roman Catholic community, would in effect be such, and that any other security will either be hollow, or frustrate the purpose of the Law.

Now this condition would be fulfilled, the required principle would be given, provided that the law for the repeal of the sundry statutes affecting the Roman Catholics were introduced by, and grounded on, a declaration, to which every possible character of solemnity should be given, that at no time and under no circumstances has it ever been, nor can it ever be, compatible with the spirit or consistent with the safety of the British Constitution to recognise in the Roman Catholic priesthood, as now constituted, a component Estate of the realm, or persons capable, individually or collec-

tively, of becoming the trustees and usufructuary proprietors of that elective and circulative property, originally reserved for the permanent maintenance of the National Church. And further, it is expedient that the preamble of the Act should expressly declare and set forth that this exclusion of the members of the Romish Priesthood (comprehending all under oaths of canonical obedience to the Pope as their ecclesiastical sovereign) from the trusts and offices of the National Church, and from all participation in the proceeds of the Nationalty, is enacted and established on grounds wholly irrelative to any doctrines received and taught by the Romish Church as articles of faith, and protested against as such by the Churches of the Reformation; but that it is enacted on grounds derived and inherited from our ancestors before the Reformation, and by them maintained and enforced to the fullest extent that the circumstances of the times permitted, with no other exceptions and interruptions than those effected by fraud, or usurpation, or foreign force, or the temporary fanaticism of the meaner sort.

In what manner the enactment of this principle should be effected is of comparatively small importance, provided it be distinctly set forth as that great constitutional security, the known existence of which is the ground and condition of the right of the Legislature to dispense with other less

essential safe-guards of the constitution, not unnecessary, perhaps, at the time of their enactment, but of temporary and accidental necessity. The form, I repeat, the particular mode in which the principle should be recognised, the security established, is comparatively indifferent. Let it only be understood first, as the provision, by the retention of which the Legislature possesses a moral and constitutional right to make the change in question; as that, the known existence of which permits the law to ignore the Roman Catholics under any other name than that of British subjects; and secondly, as the express condition, the basis of a virtual compact between the claimants and the nation, which condition cannot be broken or evaded without subverting (morally) the articles and clauses founded thereon.

I do not assert that the provision here stated is an absolute security. My positions are,—first, that it may with better reason and more probability be proposed as such, than any other hitherto devised; secondly, that no other securities can supersede the expediency and necessity of this, but that this will greatly diminish or altogether remove the necessity of any other: further, that without this the present measure cannot be rationally expected to produce that tranquillity, which it is the aim and object of the framers to bring about; and lastly,

that the necessity of the declaration, as above given, formally and solemnly to be made and recorded, is not evacuated by this pretext, that no one intends to transfer the Church Establishment to the Romish priesthood, or to divide it with them.

One thing, however, it is of importance that I should mention, namely, that the existing state of the elective franchise * in Ireland, in reference to the fatal present of the Union ministry to the landed interest, that true Deianira shirt of the Irish Hercules, is altogether excluded from the theme and purpose of this disquisition. It ought to be considered by the Legislature, abstracted from the creed professed by the great majority of these nominal freeholders. The recent abuse of the influence resulting from this profession should be regarded as an accidental aggravation of the mischief, which displayed rather than constituted its malignity. It is even desirable that it should be preserved separate from the Roman Catholic Question, and in no necessary dependence on the fate of the Bill now on the eve of presentation to

* Although, since the text was written, the forty shilling freeholders no longer possess the elective franchise, yet as this particular clause of the Act already has been, and may hereafter be, made a pretext for agitation, the paragraph has been retained, in the belief that its moral uses have not been altogether superseded by the retraction of this most unhappy boon.

Parliament. Whether this be carried or be lost, it will still remain a momentous question, urgently calling for the decision of the Legislature—whether the said extension of the elective franchise has not introduced an uncombining and wholly incongruous ingredient into the representative system, irreconcilable with the true principle of election, and virtually disfranchising the class, to whom, on every ground of justice and of policy, the right unquestionably belongs;—under any circumstances overwhelming the voices of the rest of the community; in ordinary times centering in the great land-owners a virtual monopoly of the elective power; and in times of factious excitement depriving them even of their natural and rightful influence.

These few suggestions on the expediency of revising the state of the representation in Ireland are, I am aware, but a digression from the main subject of the Chapter. But this in fact is already completed, as far as my purpose is concerned. The reasons, on which the necessity of the proposed declaration is grounded, have been given at large in the former part of the volume. Here, therefore, I should end; but that I anticipate two objections of sufficient force to deserve a comment and form the matter of a concluding paragraph.


First, it may be objected that, after abstracting

the portion of evil which may be plausibly attributed to the peculiar state of landed property in Ireland, there are evils directly resulting from the Romanism of the most numerous class of the inhabitants, besides that of an extra-national priesthood, and against the political consequences of which the above declaration provides no security. To this I reply, that as no bridge ever did or can possess the demonstrable perfections of the mathematical arch, so can no existing State adequately correspond to the idea of a State. In nations and governments the most happily constituted there will be deformities and obstructions, peccant humours and irregular actions, which affect indeed the perfection of the State, but not its essential forms ; which retard, but do not necessarily prevent its progress ;—casual disorders which, though they aggravate the growing pains of a nation, may yet, by the vigorous counteraction which they excite, even promote its growth. Inflammations in the extremities and unseemly boils on the surface must not be confounded with exhaustive misgrowths, or the poison of a false life in the vital organs. Nay,—and this remark is of special pertinency to the present purpose—even where the former derive a malignant character from their co-existence with the latter, yet the wise physician will direct his whole attention to the constitutional ailments, knowing that

when the source, the *fons et fomes veneni*, is sealed up, the accessories will either dry up of themselves, or, returning to their natural character rank among the infirmities which flesh is heir to; and either admit of a gradual remedy, or where this is impracticable, or when the medicine would be worse than the disease, are to be endured as *tolerabiles ineptiæ*, trials of patience, and occasions of charity. I have here had the State chiefly in view; but a member of the Church in England will to little purpose have availed himself of his free access to the Scriptures, will have read at least the Epistles of St. Paul with a very unthinking spirit, who does not apply the same maxims to the Church of Christ; who has yet to learn that the Church militant is *a floor whereon wheat and chaff are mingled together*; that even grievous evils and errors may exist that do not concern the nature or being of a Church, and that they may even prevail in the particular Church, to which we belong, without justifying a separation from the same, and without invalidating its claims on our affection as a true and living part of the Church Universal. And with regard to such evils we must adopt the advice that Augustine (a man not apt to offend by any excess of charity) gave to the complainers of his day—*ut misericorditer corripiant quod possunt, quod non possunt patienter ferant, et cum delectione lugeant, donec aut emendet*

Deus, aut in messe eradicet zizania et paleas ventilet.

Secondly, it may be objected that the declaration, so peremptorily by me required, is altogether unnecessary; that no one thinks of alienating the Church property, directly or indirectly; that there is no intention of recognising the Romish Priests in law, by entitling them as such to national maintenance, or in the language of the day by taking them into the pay of the State: in short, that the National Church is no more in danger than the Christian. And is this the opinion, the settled judgment, of one who has studied the signs of the times? Can the person who makes these assertions, have ever read a certain pamphlet by Mr. Croker?—or the surveys of the counties, published under the authority of the now extinct Board of Agriculture? Or has he heard, or attentively perused, the successive debates in both Houses during the late agitation of the Roman Catholic question? If he have—why then, relatively to the objector, and to as many as entertain the same opinions, my reply is:—the objection is unanswerable.




APPENDIX.



NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM.

DEMOSIUS AND MYSTES.



GLOSSARY TO THE APPENDED DIALOGUE.

As all my readers are not bound to understand Greek, and yet, according to my deepest convictions, the truths set forth in the following combat of wit between the man of reason and the man of the senses have an interest for all, I have been induced to prefix the explanations of the few Greek words, and the words minted from the Greek :

Cosmos — world. *Toutos-cosmos** — this world. *Heteros*—the other, in the sense of opposition to, or discrepancy with, some former; as heterodoxy, in opposition to orthodoxy. *Allos* — another simply and without precluding or superseding the one before-mentioned. *Allocosmite*—a denizen of another world.

Mystes, from the Greek *μύω*—one who muses with closed lips, as meditating on ideas which may indeed be suggested and awakened, but cannot, like the images of sense and the conceptions of the understanding, be adequately expressed by words.

Where a person mistakes the anomalous mis-

* *Euphoniæ gratia.*—Ed.

growths of his own individuality for ideas or truths of universal reason, he may, without impropriety, be called a mystic, in the abusive sense of the term; though pseudo-mystic or phantast would be the more proper designation. Heraclitus, Plato, Bacon, Leibnitz, were mystics in the primary sense of the term; Iamblichus and his successors phantasts.

"Ἐπεα ζῶντα—living words.—The words following from Plato (page 223) may be Englished;—"the commune and the dialect of Gods with or toward men;" and those attributed to Pythagoras;—"the verily subsistent numbers or powers, the most prescient (or provident) principles of the earth and the heavens."

And here, though not falling under the leading title, Glossary, yet, as tending to the same object of fore-arming the reader for the following dialogue, I transcribe two or three annotations which I had pencilled, (for the book was lent to me by a friend who had himself borrowed it) on the margins of a volume, recently published, and intituled, "The Natural History of Enthusiasm." They will, at least, remind some of my old school-fellows of the habit for which I was even then noted: and for others they may serve as a specimen of the *Marginalia*, which, if brought together from the various books, my own and those of a score others, would go near to form as bulky a volume as most

of those old folios, through which the larger portion of them are dispersed.*

HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM.

I.

“WHATEVER is practically important on religion or morals, may at all times be advanced and argued in the simplest terms of colloquial expression.”—p. 21.†

NOTE.

I do not believe this. Be it so, however. But why? Simply, because, the terms and phrases of the theological schools have, by their continual iteration from the pulpit, become colloquial. The science of one age becomes the common sense of a succeeding. The author adds—“from the pulpit, perhaps, no other style should at any time be heard.” Now I can conceive no more direct means of depriving Christianity of one of its peculiar attributes, that of enriching and enlarging the mind, while it purifies and in the very act of purifying the will and affections, than the maxim here prescribed by the historian of enthusiasm. From the

* See the Author's Literary Remains.—*Ed.* † 7th edit.

intensity of commercial life in this country, and from some other less creditable causes, there is found even among our better educated men a vagueness in the use of words, which presents, indeed, no obstacle to the intercourse of the market, but is absolutely incompatible with the attainment or communication of distinct and precise conceptions. Hence in every department of exact knowledge a peculiar nomenclature is indispensable. The anatomist, chemist, botanist, mineralogist, yea, even the common artisan and the rude sailor discover that "the terms of colloquial expression," are too general and too lax to answer their purposes: and on what grounds can the science of self-knowledge, and of our relations to God and our own spirits, be presumed to form an exception? Every new term expressing a fact, or a difference, not precisely and adequately expressed by any other word in the same language, is a new organ of thought for the mind that has learned it.

II.

"The region of abstract conceptions, of lofty reasonings, of magnificent images, has an atmosphere too subtle to support the health of true piety. * * * In accordance with this, the Supreme * * in his word reveals barely a glimpse of his essential glories. By some naked affirmations we are,

indeed, secured against grovelling notions of the divine nature; but these hints are incidental, and so scanty, that every excursive mind goes far beyond them in its conception of the infinite attributes.”—p. 26.

NOTE.

By “abstract conceptions” the Author means what I should call ideas, which as such I contradistinguish from conceptions, whether abstracted or generalised. But it is with his meaning, not with his terms, that I am at present concerned. Now that the personcity of God, the idea of God as the I AM, is presented more prominently in Scripture than the (so called) physical attributes, is most true; and forms one of the distinctive characters of its superior worth and value. It was by dwelling too exclusively on the infinities that the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato excepted, fell into pantheism, as in later times did Spinoza. “I forbid you,” says Plato, “to call God the infinite! If you dare name him at all, say rather the measure of infinity.” Nevertheless, it would be easy to place *in synopsi* before the Author such a series of Scripture passages as would incline him to retract his assertion. The Eternal, the Omnipresent, the Omniscient, the one absolute Good, the Holy, the Living, the Creator as well as Former

of the Universe, the Father of Spirits—can the Author's mind go far beyond these? Yet these are all clearly affirmed of the Supreme One in the Scriptures.

III.

The following pages from p. 26 to p. 36 contain a succession of eloquent and splendid paragraphs on the celestial orders, and the expediency or necessity of their being concealed from us, lest we should receive such overwhelming conceptions of the divine greatness as to render us incapable of devotion, and prayer on the Scripture model. "Were it," says the eloquent writer, "indeed permitted to man to gaze upwards from step to step, and from range to range, of these celestial hierarchies, to the lowest steps of the Eternal Throne, what liberty of heart would afterwards be left him in drawing near to the Father of Spirits?" But the substance of these pages will be found implied in the following reply to them.

NOTE.

More weight with me than all this Pelion upon Ossa of imaginary hierarchies has the single remark of Augustine, that there neither are nor can be but three essential differences of being, namely, the absolute, the rational finite, and the finite irrational;

that is, God, man, and brute. Besides, the whole scheme is un-Scriptural, if not contra-Scriptural. Pile up winged hierarchies on hierarchies, and outblaze the Cabalists, and Dionysius the Areopagite ! yet what a gaudy vapour for a healthful mind is the whole conception (or rather phantasm) compared with the awful hope holden forth in the Gospel, to be one with God in and through the Mediator Christ, even the living, co-eternal Word and Son of God !

But through the whole of this eloquent declamation I find two errors predominate, and both, it appears to me, dangerous errors. First, that the rational and consequently the only true ideas of the Supreme Being are incompatible with the spirit of prayer and petitionary pleading taught and exemplified in the Scriptures. Second, that this being the case, and "supplication with arguments and importunate requests" being irrational and known by the supplicant to be such, it is nevertheless a duty to pray in this fashion. In other words, it is asserted that the Supreme Being requires of his rational creatures, as the condition of their offering acceptable worship to him, that they should wilfully blind themselves to the light, which he had himself given them, as the contradistinguishing character of their humanity, without which they could not pray to him at all ; and that, drugging

their sense of the truth into a temporary doze, they should make believe that they know no better! As if the God of Truth and Father of all lights resembled an oriental or African despot, whose courtiers, even those whom he had himself enriched and placed in the highest rank, are commanded to approach him only in beggars' rags and with a beggarly whine.

I on the contrary find "the Scripture model of devotion," the prayers and thanksgiving of the Psalmist, and in the main of our own Church Liturgy, perfectly conformable to the highest and clearest convictions of my reason. (I use the word in its most comprehensive sense, as comprising both the practical and the intellective, not only as the light but likewise as the life which is the light of man. *John* i. 3.) And I do not hesitate to attribute the contrary persuasion principally to the three following oversights. First (and this is the queen bee in the hive of error), the identification of the universal reason with each man's individual understanding, subjects not only different but diverse, not only *allogeneous* but *heterogeneous*. Second, the substitution of the idea of the infinite for that of the absolute. Third and lastly, the habit of using the former as a sort of superlative synonyme of the vast or indefinitely great. Now the practical difference between my scheme and that of

the Essayist, for whose talents and intentions I feel sincere respect, may perhaps be stated thus.

The Essayist would bring down his understanding to his religion: I would raise up my understanding to my reason, and find my religion in the *focus* resulting from their convergence. We both alike use the same penitential, deprecative and petitionary prayers; I in the full assurance of their congruity with my reason, he in a factitious oblivion of their being the contrary.

The name of the author* of the Natural History of Enthusiasm is unknown to me and un conjectured. It is evidently the work of a mind at once observant and meditative. And should these notes meet the Author's eye, let him be assured that I willingly give to his genius that respect which his intentions without it would secure for him in the breast of every good man. But in the present state of things, infidelity having fallen into disrepute even on the score of intellect, yet the obligation to show a reason for our faith having become more generally recognised, as reading and the taste for serious conversation have increased, there is a large class of my countrymen disposed to receive, with especial favour, any opinions that will enable them to make a compromise between their new knowledge and their old belief. And with these men the Author's

* Mr. Isaac Taylor.—*Ed.*

evident abilities will probably render the work a high authority. Now it is the very purpose of my life to impress the contrary sentiments. Hence these notes.

DIALOGUE BETWEEN DEMOSIUS
AND MYSTES.*

MY DEAR——,

IN emptying a drawer of rose-leaf bags, old (but, too many of them) unopened letters, and paper scraps, or brain fritters, I had my attention directed to a sere and ragged half-sheet by a gust of wind which had separated it from its companions, and whisked it out of the window into the garden.—Not that I went after it. I have too much respect for the numerous tribe, to which it belonged, to lay any restraint on their movements, or to put the Vagrant Act in force against them. But it so chanced that some after-breeze had stuck it on a standard rose-tree, and there I found it, as I was pacing my evening walk alongside the lower ivy-wall, the bristled runners from which threaten to entrap the top branch of the cherry tree in our neighbour's kitchen garden. I had been meditating a letter to you, and as I ran my eye over this

* See ante, p. 142. —*Ed.*

fly-away tag-rag and bob-tail, and bethought me that it was a by-blow of my own, I felt a sort of fatherly remorse, and yearning towards it, and exclaimed, "If I had a frank for——, this should help to make up the ounce." It was far too decrepit to travel *per se*—besides that the seal would have looked like a single pin on a beggar's coat of tatters—and yet one does not like to be stopped in a kind feeling, which my conscience interpreted as a sort of promise to the said scrap, and therefore, (frank or no frank), I will transcribe it. A dog's leaf at the top was worn off, which must have contained, I presume, the syllable *Ve*——

“Rily,” quoth *Demosius* of *Toutoscosmos*, Gentleman, to *Mystes* the *Allocosmite*, “thou seemest to me like an out-of-door patient of St. Luke's wandering about in the rain without cap, hat, or bonnet, poring on the elevation of a palace, not the house that Jack built, but the house that is to be built for Jack, in the suburbs of the city, which his cousin-german, the lynx-eyed Dr. Gruithuisen has lately discovered in the moon. But through a foolish kindness for that face of thine, which whilome belonged to an old school-fellow of the same name with thee, I would get thee shipped off under the Alien Act, as a *non ens*, or pre-existent of the other world to come.”——

To whom *Mystes* retorted :—" Verily, friend *Demosius*, thou art too fantastic for a genine *Toutoscosmos* man ; and it needs only a fit of dyspepsy, or a cross in love, to make a Heterocosmite of thee ; this same *Heteroscosmos* being in fact the endless shadow which the *Toutoscosmos* casts at sun-set. But not to alarm or affront thee, as if I insinuated that thou wert in danger of becoming an Allocosmite, I let the whole of thy courteous address to me pass without comment or objection, save only the two concluding monosyllables and the preposition (*pre*) which anticipates them. The world in which I exist is another world indeed, but not to come. It is as present as (if that be at all) the magnetic planet, of which, according to the astronomer Halley, the visible globe which we invermine is the case or travelling trunk ;—a neat little world where light still exists *in statu perfuso*, as on the third day of the creation, before it was polarised into outward and inward, that is, while light and life were one and the same, neither existing formally, yet both *eminenter* : and when herb, flower, and forest rose as a vision, *in proprio lucido*, the ancestor and unseen yesterday of the sun and moon. Now, whether there really is such an Elysian *mundus mundulus* incased in the macrocosm, or great world, below the adamantine vault that supports the mother waters, which support the

coatingcrust of that *mundus immundus* on which we and others less scantily furnished from nature's storehouse crawl, delve, and nestle—(or, shall I say the Lyceum, where walk *οἱ τούτου κόσμου φιλόσοφοι*) —Dr. Halley may, perhaps, by this time have ascertained : and to him and the philosophic ghosts, his compeers, I leave it. But that another world is inshrined in the microcosm I not only believe, but at certain depths of my being, during the more solemn sabbaths of the spirit, I have holden commune therewith, in the power of that faith, which is *the substance of the things hoped for*, the living stem that will itself expand into the flower, which it now foreshows. How should it not be so, even on grounds of natural reason, and the analogy of inferior life ? Is not nature prophetic up the whole vast pyramid of organic being ? And in which of her numberless predictions has nature been convicted of a lie ? Is not every organ announced by a previous instinct or act ? The *larva* of the stag-beetle lies in its *chrysalis* like an infant in the coffin of an adult, having left an empty space half the length it occupies ; and this space is the exact length of the horn which distinguishes the perfect animal, but which, when it constructed its temporary *sarcophagus*, was not yet in existence. Do not the eyes, ears, lungs, of the unborn babe give notice and furnish proof of a transuterine, visible, audible,



atmospheric world? We have eyes, ears, touch, taste, smell; and have we not an answering world of shapes, colours, sounds, and sapid and odorous bodies? But likewise—(alas! for the man for whom the one has not the same evidence of fact as the other)—the Creator has given us spiritual senses, and sense organs—ideas I mean—the idea of the good, the idea of the beautiful, ideas of eternity, immortality, freedom, and of that which contemplated relatively to will is holiness, in relation to life is bliss. And must not these too infer the existence of a world correspondent to them? *There is a light*, said the Hebrew sage, *compared with which the glory of the sun is but a cloudy veil*: and is it an *ignus fatuus* given to mock us and lead us astray? And from a yet higher authority we know, *that it is a light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world*. And are there no objects to reflect it? Or must we seek its *analogon* in the light of the glow-worm, that simply serves to distinguish one reptile from all the rest, and lighting, inch by inch, its mazy path through weeds and grass, leaves all else before, and behind, and around it in darkness? No! another and answerable world there is; and if any man discern it not, let him not, whether sincerely, or in contemptuous irony, pretend a defect of faculty as the cause. The sense, the light, and the conformed objects are all there

and for all men. The difference between man and man in relation thereto results from no difference in their several gifts and powers of intellect, but in the will. As certainly as the individual is a man, so certainly should this other world be present to him: yea, it is his proper home. But he is an absentee and chooses to live abroad. His freedom and whatever else he possesses which the dog and the ape do not possess, yea, the whole revenue of his humanity, is derived from this;—but as with the Irish land-owner in the theatres, gaming-houses, and maitresseries of Paris, so with him. He is a voluntary absentee. I repeat it again and again,—the cause is altogether in the will: and the defect of intellectual power, and ‘the having no turn or taste for subjects of this sort,’ are effects and consequences of the alienation of the will, that is, of the man himself. There may be a defect, but there was not a deficiency, of the intellect. I appeal to facts for the proof. Take the science of political economy. No two professors understand each other;—and often have I been present where the subject has been discussed in a room full of merchants and manufacturers, sensible and well-informed men: and the conversation has ended in a confession that the matter was beyond their comprehension. And yet the science professes to give light on rents, taxes, income, capital, the

principles of trade, commerce, agriculture, on wealth, and the ways of acquiring and increasing it, in short on all that most passionately excites and interests the *Toutoscosmos* men. But it was avowed that to arrive at any understanding of these matters requires a mind gigantic in its comprehension, and microscopic in its accuracy of detail. Now compare this with the effect produced on promiscuous crowds by a Whitfield, or a Wesley;—or rather compare with it the shaking of every leaf of the vast forest to the first blast of Luther's trumpet. Was it only of the world to come that Luther and his compeers preached? Turn to Luther's Table Talk, and see if the larger part be not of that other world which now is, and without the being and working of which the world to come would be either as unintelligible as *Abracadabra*, or a mere reflection and elongation of the world of sense—Jack Robinson between two looking-glasses, with a series of Jack Robinsons *in sæcula sæculorum*."

"Well, but what is this new, and yet other world? The brain of a man that is out of his senses? A world fraught with castles in the air, well worthy the attention of any gentleman inclined to idealise a large property?"

"The sneer on that lip, and the arch shine of that eye, friend *Demosius*, would almost justify me,

though I should answer that question by retorting it in a parody. What, quoth the owlet, peeping out of his ivy-bush at noon, with his blue fringed eye-curtains dropped, what is this light which is said to exist together with this warmth we feel, and yet is something else? But I read likewise in that same face, when thou wast beginning to prepare that question, a sort of misgiving from within, as if thou wert more positive than sure that the reply, with which you would accommodate me, is as wise as it is witty. Therefore, though I cannot answer your question, I will give you a hint how you may answer it for yourself. Learn the art and acquire the habit of contemplating things abstractedly from their relations. I will explain myself by an instance. Suppose a body floating at a certain height in the air, and receiving the light so equally on all sides as not to occasion the eye to conjecture any solid contents. And now let six or seven persons see it at different distances and from different points of view. For A it will be a square; for B a triangle; for C two right-angled triangles attached to each other; for D two unequal triangles; for E it will be a triangle with a *trapezium* hung on to it: for F it will be a square with a cross in it ; for G it will be an oblong quadrangle with three triangles in it ; and for H three unequal triangles.

“Now it is evident that not one of all these is the

figure itself, (which in this instance is a four-sided pyramid,) but the contingent relations of the figure. Now transfer this from geometry to the subjects of the real (that is, not merely formal or abstract) sciences,—to substances and bodies, the *materia subjecta* of the chemist, physiologist and naturalist, and you will gradually (that is, if you choose and sincerely will it) acquire the power and the disposition of contemplating your own imaginations, wants, appetites, passions, and opinions, on the same principles, and distinguish that which alone is and abides from the accidental and impermanent relations arising out of its co-existence with other things or beings.

“ My second rule or maxim requires its *prolegomena*. In the several classes and orders that mark the scale of organic nature, from the plant to the highest order of animals, each higher implies a lower as the condition of its actual existence;—and the same position holds good equally of the vital and organic powers. Thus without the first power, that of growth, or what Bichat and others name the vegetative life or productivity, the second power, that of totality and locomotion (commonly but most infelicitously called irritability) could not exist, that is, manifest its being. Productivity is the necessary antecedent of irritability, and in like manner irritability of sensibility. But it is no less true that in

the idea of each power the lower derives its intelligibility from the higher: and the highest must be presumed to inhere latently or potentially in the lowest, or this latter will be wholly unintelligible, inconceivable;—you can have no conception of it. Thus in sensibility we see a power that in every instant goes out of itself, and in the same instant retracts and falls back on itself: which the great fountains of pure *Mathesis*, the Pythagorean and Platonic geometricians, illustrated in the production or self-evolution of the point into the circle. Imagine the going-forth and the retraction as two successive acts, the result would be an infinity of angles, a growth of zig-zag. In order to the imaginability of a circular line, the extroitive and the retroitive must co-exist in one and the same act and moment, the curve line being the product. Now what is ideally true in the generations or productive acts of the intuitive faculty (of the pure sense, I mean, or inward vision—the *reine Anschauung* of the German philosophers) must be assumed as truth of fact in all living growth, or wherein would the growth of a plant differ from that of a crystal? The latter is formed wholly by apposition *ab extra*: in the former the movement *ab extra* is in order of thought consequent on, and yet coinstantaneous with, the movement *ab intra*. Thus, the specific character of sensibility, the highest of the three powers, is found

to be the general character of life, and supplies the only way of conceiving, the only insight into the possibility of, the first and lowest power. And yet, even thus, growth taken as separate from, and exclusive of, sensibility would be unintelligible, nay, contradictory. For it would be an act of the life, or productive form of the plant, having the life itself as its source, (since it is a going forth from the life), and likewise having the life itself as its object, for in the same instant it is retracted: and yet the product (that is, the plant) exists not for itself, by the hypothesis that has excluded sensibility. For all sensibility is a self-finding; whence the German word for sensation or feeling is *Empfindung*, that is, an inward finding. Therefore sensibility cannot be excluded: and as it does not exist actually, it must be involved potentially. Life does not yet manifest itself in its highest dignity, as a self-finding; but in an evident tendency thereto, or a self-seeking;—and this has two epochs or intensities. Potential sensibility in its first epoch, or lowest intensity, appears as growth: in its second epoch, it shows itself as irritability or vital instinct. In both, however, the sensibility must have pre-existed, or rather pre-inherited, though as latent: or how could the irritability have been evolved out of the growth, (as in the *stamina* of the plant during the act of impregnating the *germen*):—or the sensibility out

of the irritability,—as in the first appearance of nerves and nervous bulbs in the lower orders of the insect realm? But, indeed, evolution as contradistinguished from apposition, or superinduction *ab aliunde*, is implied in the conception of life : and is that which essentially differences a living fibre from a thread of *asbestos*, the floscule or any other of the moving fairy shapes of animalcular life from the frost-plumes on a window pane.

“Again : what has been said of the lowest power of life relatively to its highest power—growth to sensibility, the plant to the animal—applies equally to life itself relatively to mind. Without the latter the former would be unintelligible, and the idea would contradict itself. If there had been no self-retaining power, a self-finding would be a perpetual self-losing. Divide a second into a thousand, or if you please, a million of parts, yet if there be an absolute chasm separating one moment of self-finding from another, the chasm of a millionth of a second would be equal to all time. A being that existed for itself only in moments, each infinitely small and yet absolutely divided from the preceding and following, would not exist for itself at all. And if all beings were the same, or yet lower, it could not be said to exist in any sense, any more than light would exist as light, if there were no eyes or visual power : and the whole conception would break

up into contradictory positions—an intestine conflict more destructive than even that between the two cats, where one tail alone is said to have survived the battle. The conflicting factors of our conception would eat each other up, tails and all. *Ergo*: the mind, as a self-retaining power, is not less indispensable to the intelligibility of life as a self-finding power, than a self-finding power, that is, sensibility, to a self-seeking power, that is, growth. Again: a self-retaining mind—that is, memory, (which is the primary sense of mind, and the common people in several of our provinces still use the word in this sense)—a self-retaining power supposes a self-containing power, a half-conscious being. And this is the definition of mind in its proper and distinctive sense, a subject that is its own object,—or where A contemplant is one and the same subject with A contemplated. Lastly, (that I may complete the ascent of powers for my own satisfaction, and not as expecting, or in the present habit of your thoughts even wishing you to follow me to a height, dizzy for the strongest spirit, it being the *apex* of all human, perhaps of angelic, knowledge to know that it must be: since absolute ultimates can only be seen by a light thrown backward from the penultimate; *John* i. 18.)—lastly, I say, the self-containing power supposes a self-causing power; *causa sui*, αἰτία ἑπ'ἑαυτοῦς. Here alone we find a

problem which in its very statement contains its own solution—the one self-solving power, beyond which no question is possible. Yet short of this we dare not rest; for even Ο ΩΝ, the Supreme Being, if contemplated abstractly from the Absolute Will, whose essence it is to be causative of all being, would sink into a Spinozistic deity. That this is not evident to us arises from the false notion of reason as a quality, property, or faculty of the real: whereas reason is the supreme reality, the only true being in all things visible and invisible; the *pleroma*, in whom alone God loveth the world! Even in man will is deeper than mind; for mind does not cease to be mind by having an antecedent; but will is either the first (τὸ ἀεὶ πρόπρωτον, τὸ *nunquam positum, semper supponendum*), or it is not will at all.

“And now for the practical rules which I promised, or the means by which you may educate in yourself that state of mind which is most favourable to a true knowledge of both the worlds that now are, and to a right faith in the world to come.

“I.—Remember that whatever is, lives. A thing absolutely lifeless is inconceivable, except as a thought, image, or fancy, in some other being.

“II.—In every living form, the conditions of its existence are to be sought for in that which is

below it; the grounds of its intelligibility in that which is above it.

“ III.—Accustom your mind to distinguish the relations of things from the things themselves. Think often of the latter as independent of the former, in order that you may never think of the former apart from the latter, that is, mistake mere relations for true and enduring realities: and with regard to these seek the solution of each in some higher reality. The contrary process leads demonstrably to atheism, and though you may not get quite so far, it is not well to be seen travelling on the road with your face towards it.

“ I might add a fourth rule: Learn to distinguish permanent from accidental relations. But I am willing that you should for a time take permanent relations as real things—confident that you will soon feel the necessity of reducing what you now call things into relations, which immediately arising out of a somewhat else may properly be contemplated as the products of that somewhat else, and as the means by which its existence is made known to you. But known as what? not as a product; for it is the somewhat else, to which the product stands in the same relation as the words which you are now hearing bear to my living soul. But if not as products, then as productive powers: and the result will be that what you have hitherto

called things will be regarded as only more or less permanent relations of things, having their derivative reality greater or less in proportion as they are regular or accidental relations; determined by the pre-established fitness of the true thing to the organ and faculty of the percipient, or resulting from some defect or anomaly in the latter.

With these convictions matured into a habit of mind, the man no longer seeks, or believes himself to find, true reality except in the powers of nature; which living and actuating powers are made known to him, and their kinds determined, and their forces measured, by their proper products. In other words, he thinks of the products in reference to the productive powers, *τοῖς ὄντως ὑπάρχουσιν ἀριθμοῖς ἢ δυνάμεσι, ὡς ταῖς προμαθεστάταις ἀρχαῖς τοῦ πάντος οὐράνου καὶ γῆς*, and thus gives to the former (to the products I mean) a true reality, a life, a beauty, and a physiognomic expression. For him they are the *ἔπεα ζῶοντα, ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεῶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους*. The Allocosmite, therefore, (though he does not bark at the image in the glass, because he knows what it is), possesses the same world with the Toutocosmites; and has, besides, in present possession another and better world, to which he can transport himself by a swifter vehicle than Fortunatus's wishing cap.

“ Finally, what is reason ? You have often asked me ; and this is my answer ;

Whene'er the mist, that stands 'twixt God and thee,
Defecates to a pure transparency,
That intercepts no light and adds no stain—
There reason is, and there begins her reign !

“ But, alas !

—————*tu stesso ti fai grosso*
Col falso immaginar, sì che non vedi
Ciò che vedresti se l'avessi scosso.”

DANTE, *Par. Canto I.* 88.

THE END.

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